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1 Introduction
Dan Banik and Blessings Chinsinga
The debate on the relationship between democracy and development has become 
increasingly complex. The emerging scholarship on the topic has begun 
questioning the dominant western orthodoxy that good governance and 
democracy are not simply desirable, but also essential conditions for development 
in all societies. Indeed, recent scholarship in many parts of the world has raised 
important questions about the implied positive causal relationship between 
democracy and development. The broad conclusion from the resulting studies is 
that the institutional characteristics and requirements for development, and 
those for stable and consolidated democracy, essentially pull in opposite 
directions. This conclusion is supported by the fact that countries that are widely 
considered as promising development success stories across the African continent 
(e.g. Rwanda, Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique) are not democracies in the 
classical sense. These countries are characterized either by a dominant party with 
consensual decision-making tradition or an organic bureaucracy insulated from 
the political process (Booth, 2011; Kelsall, 2012).
The emerging scholarship on democracy and development has revived interest 
in the seminal work of Seymour Martin Lipset. Some argue that the introduction 
of democracy in a country enhances the prospects of it achieving transformative 
and sustainable development. The case for democracy is further reinforced by Sen 
(1999), who defi nes development in relation to the extent of freedom enjoyed by 
individuals and groups in society. Thus, in addition to economic indicators, Sen 
argues that freedoms of various kinds and social opportunities are essential 
ingredients in the development process. Consequently, the democratic process is 
intrinsically valuable and policy decisions can potentially be made in an inclusive, 
participatory, transparent and accountable manner that broadly represents 
different societal interests. Studies by Przeworski (2005), however, do not 
conclusively assert whether and to what extent democracy is good for development. 
Although the development track records of dictatorships and democracies are 
not distinctively different, democracies are substantially better off as dictatorships 
exhibit great variations in development performance. This apparent variability in 
performance is attributed to the fact that policymaking and implementation of 
development programmes in non-democracies are considerably dependent on the 
personal preferences and whims of the ruler.
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Those that remain sceptical about the overall effi cacy of democracies in 
promoting development argue that the good governance agenda is totally 
misleading on the prerequisites for fundamental economic transformation in 
Africa (Henley and Van Donge, 2012). This resonates well with an emerging 
strand of scholarship that advocates for a shift from the preoccupation with good 
governance to ‘political settlement’ as the basis for understanding contemporary 
challenges in developing countries in general, and Africa in particular (Khan, 
2005; Hickey, 2012). Political settlement, thus understood, refers to the formal 
and informal agreements between contending groups over the organization of 
power in society and the rules of political engagement (Khan, 2005). Consequently, 
differences in political settlement can explain the overall quality and extent to 
which institutional structures in developing countries function. Such a framework 
can further help identify relevant governance reforms that, if implemented 
properly, can promote development as well as provide a framework for 
understanding how political settlement patterns change in different local, 
regional and national contexts. Moreover, the political settlement approach 
draws attention to the fact that political, economic and social institutions, both 
formal and informal, interact with each other to shape the distribution of wealth 
and power in society.
The character of political settlement may explain the quality of policy processes 
and the nature of the resultant policies. There is thus a particular emphasis on the 
role of context in shaping development outcomes, as achieving development 
entails not just identifying concrete outcomes, but also paying attention to the 
nature and quality of the process through which these outcomes are achieved. 
Andrews (2013) argues against a pre-set toolkit of best practices or blueprints of 
institutional reforms largely promoted by international development agencies. The 
argument is that functional reforms aimed at facilitating sustainable development 
can only be achieved by using a problem-driven iterative approach, rooted in 
context specifi c understandings of problems as an entry point for change. Andrews 
concludes that the current set of reforms promoted by western donor agencies, 
under the banner of good governance, cannot deliver effective and sustainable 
development mainly because such reforms are aimed at providing developing 
country governments a modicum of legitimacy in the eyes of the donor community.
It is against this backdrop that this volume revisits the question of whether 
certain regimes are better able and equipped to promote economic growth and 
eradicate poverty than others, which has preoccupied academics and policymakers 
alike for several decades. We are essentially concerned with better understanding 
the relationship between democratic consolidation and development. Infl uenced 
by the work of Atul Kohli and others, we understand development as a deliberate 
movement of societies towards a situation of more liveable life conditions (Banik, 
2010). Three critical elements of such liveable conditions are economic growth, 
some redistribution of growth and democracy for the redistribution of the benefi ts 
of growth. Development is thus a process where these goals are to be maximized 
even though there may be trade-offs in the process. Development, thus broadly 
understood, entails the transformation of society that goes beyond economic 
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growth (Stiglitz, 2002) to also include social dimensions such as improvements in 
literacy, distribution of income and life expectancy at birth – variables captured 
in the UNDP’s human development index as well as the redistribution of wealth.
Our volume is motivated by the fact that, despite strong claims about the 
limitations of the good governance agenda, many western countries continue to 
argue that developing countries must democratize if they are to develop. And, 
acting in their role as providers of foreign aid, these countries and their 
development agencies continue to highlight the key role that elections play in 
the democratization process, often making aid conditional upon the holding of 
free and fair elections and improvements of civil and political rights. Many 
development actors also readily criticise the recent trend by many emerging 
country nations (e.g. China, Brazil, India, Taiwan and South Korea) to provide 
generous grants and loans to African countries without tying up such development 
assistance to good governance and the promotion of human rights. The impression 
given is that democracy, or at least its introduction, will save poor countries from 
falling further into the trap of poverty. As noted earlier, democracy, apart from 
being intrinsically valuable, is largely viewed by many development actors as 
further promoting an important instrumental goal, namely development.
Political developments during the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ in 2011 ushered in 
new optimism of Africa’s potential of accelerating democracy and development. 
However, recent events in the continent (including the dramatic military coup 
in Egypt) indicate that the initial optimism of increased democratization is slowly 
being tempered down. In relation to economic growth, however, the picture 
looks much brighter and there has been considerable talk of ‘Africa Rising’ and 
‘Emerging Africa’, with several countries (e.g. Rwanda and Ethiopia) being 
highlighted as major successes despite limited evidence of democratization within 
their borders. Thus Radelet (2010) highlights fi ve set of factors that characterize 
the successful development stories in emerging Africa:
• more democratic and accountable governments;
• more sensible economic policies (market friendly, with budget and fi scal 
discipline);
• a new relationship with the international community upon the end of the 
debt crisis;
• the spread of new digital technologies that foster business and political 
accountability;
• a new generation of policymakers, civic activists, and business leaders.
Several chapters in this volume therefore discuss broad theoretical and practical 
assumptions on the relationship between democracy, development and poverty 
reduction. They also highlight selected sets of mechanisms for achieving reducing 
poverty in the context of democratization, including a critical look at national 
policies as well as development policy advice provided by bilateral donors and 
international development organizations. Many of these initiatives have not 
achieved intended goals and objectives, despite the economic rise of Africa.
4 Dan Banik and Blessings Chinsinga
The apparent dismal track record of development and poverty reduction 
interventions invariably raises serious questions about the relationship between 
growth and distribution. This is underscored by recent waves of protests across 
the continent where large groups of people have voiced their concerns over 
deepening socio-economic disparities. Thus, we examine why democracy has not 
fully delivered on development and poverty reduction. We argue that the 
emphasis on ‘governance’, and not necessarily on ‘politics’, has resulted in 
disproportionately formalistic approaches that do not pay adequate attention to 
incentives available to the political leadership. Thus there is limited attention to 
the dynamic interaction between policy and politics in shaping development and 
poverty reduction outcomes.
Revisiting the democracy and development relationship is also interesting, 
timely and relevant given the increased use of the concept of ‘good governance’, 
‘pro-poor governance’ and ‘democratic governance’ by western donors and 
multilateral institutions when they impart advice to aid-recipient countries. Yet 
the evidence linking democracy and development in one way or another remains 
inclusive and highly contentious (Przeworski, 2005). It is in this context that 
Malawi provides an illustrative example of some of the challenges a relatively 
young democracy faces in strengthening civil and political rights on the one hand 
while ensuring the protection and promotion of economic, social and cultural 
rights on the other. Moreover, we consider Malawi as an ideal case to shed further 
light on the democracy and development debate for two reasons:
• First, Malawi is widely considered as a successful case of democratic transition 
achieved largely outside the international limelight and underpinned by a 
progressive constitution.
• Second, Malawi has held fi ve consecutive democratic elections since the 
transition to democracy in the early 1990s, and all of these elections have 
been classifi ed as free, fair and credible.
The democratization project that Malawi embarked upon in 1993 appeared 
initially to promise good democratic governance that would translate into 
effective management of the economy for growth, development and poverty 
reduction. And the events that followed in the aftermath of the establishment of 
democracy in the country raised the hopes of Malawians of being able to take 
centre stage in public affairs, and consequently becoming the targets and 
benefi ciaries of development interventions through active participation in 
national and local decision-making processes. The neo-liberal agenda that was 
subsequently adopted further gave the impression that Malawians would no 
longer be relegated to playing a peripheral role in issues of political, economic 
and social governance. However, nineteen years down the line, all available 
evidence indicates that the initial promises and goals of the national democracy 
project remain largely elusive. Participation and actual infl uence in public affairs, 
including business transactions, remain the privilege of a small group of elites. 
Moreover, poverty remains deep, severe and widespread. According to the 2012 
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Integrated Household Survey (IHS), poverty in Malawi declined marginally from 
52.4 to 50.7 per cent between 2005 and 2011. The proportion of the ultra poor 
increased from 22 to 25 per cent, the majority residing in rural areas. While urban 
poverty declined from 25 to 17.3 per cent, rural poverty increased from 55.9 to 56 
per cent. And the Gini coeffi cient – which provides an indication of the extent 
of inequality in a country – increased from 0.39 in 2005 to 0.45 in 2012, providing 
further evidence of the widening gap between the rich and poor.
One of the problems we highlight in this volume relates to the impact of a 
political culture of informality on Malawi’s democratization and development 
agendas. Indeed, Malawi’s democratization project remains fragile and is 
constantly threatened by prospects of reversal, if not complete breakdown, despite 
concerted efforts to establish a functioning democratic regime in the past two 
decades. This is in line with Hyden’s (2006) contention that the interface 
between formal and informal institutions is critical in shaping political, economic 
and social development outcomes – and that Africa is an ideal starting point to 
fully grasp these dynamics. Consequently, some scholars have claimed that the 
main challenge for the democratization project is that Malawi has experienced 
transition without transformation. Indeed, throughout the volume, we argue that 
while Malawi has embraced a gamut of institutions of democracy, they do not 
function as expected because the one-party political culture, deeply wedded to 
the ethos of informality, remains squarely intact in the country.
The volume
This volume focuses on how, and to what extent, processes related to democratic 
and economic governance can be strengthened in order to make political and 
administrative authorities more responsive to the development needs of Africa. 
In other words, how can countries in the region consolidate democracy given the 
dominance of a one-party political culture? Additional topics of general interest 
covered in this volume relate to the characteristic features of public policy 
implementation, the nature of citizen participation and dialogue with various 
levels of government and the factors that enable civil society organizations to 
hold political and administrative offi cials to account for failing to provide effi cient 
delivery of public services. Our goal is to synthesize the results of on-going 
academic research with the aim of achieving improved and evidence-based policy 
formulation and implementation.
It is against this background that we aim to critically analyse opportunities and 
constraints related to the impact of democracy on development in one of the 
world’s poorest countries. While a focus on Malawi may appear too narrow for 
general consumption, we believe the timing for doing so is opportune as the 
Malawian case exhibits some of the main challenges facing African democracies 
while they attempt to consolidate the benefi ts of democratization. There are very 
few good scholarly works on the topic that covers Malawi, and we believe that 
the studies in this volume on the Malawian experience provide a sound basis for 
comparing democratic experiments in other African countries. Further, recent 
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studies by international organizations show that Malawi is among the few 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa that has witnessed signifi cant improvements in 
relation to meeting the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targets.
This volume is the product of a long-term collaboration between the editors 
and their institutions in Norway and Malawi. The impetus for this publication 
came from a research project entitled ‘Strengthening capacity for democratic and 
economic governance in Malawi’, funded by the Norwegian Agency for 
Development Cooperation (Norad) under the Norwegian Programme for 
Capacity Development in Higher Education and Research for Development 
(NORHED). The main goal of the project is to enable Chancellor College to 
help build a critical mass of more and better-qualifi ed Malawians who can 
effectively engage with political and economic elites and policymakers, and 
thereby positively infl uence decision-making processes related to democratic and 
economic governance.
The contributors to this volume – with a background in the social sciences and 
law – represent some of the most infl uential voices on political development in 
Malawi, and include academics, practitioners, media commentators and activists.
The volume is structured around three broad parts:
• Part I: Democratization and political culture;
• Part II: Governance and policy implementation; and
• Part III: Activism, aid and accountability.
The chapters in each of these parts examine whether and to what extent Malawi’s 
democracy has progressed, stagnated or been threatened with reversal.
Part I consists of three chapters that examine the extent of institutional 
consolidation in the country and its impact on civil, political, economic and 
cultural rights. In particular, the focus is on political parties, the parliament and 
the judiciary.
In Chapter 2, Boniface Dulani examines the fi ve election cycles in Malawi, 
including the latest elections that were held in 2014 which marked two decades 
of uninterrupted democracy. The euphoria of change that characterized the 
landmark democratic elections of 18 May 1994 has since been replaced with 
critical refl ection of the nature and overall trajectory of the country’s nascent 
democracy. Dulani examines whether Malawi’s democracy has progressed, 
stagnated or been threatened with reversal. Has the pessimism over economic 
performance translated into a questioning of the democracy itself? Based on a 
critical examination of the political developments in the two decades between 
1994 and 2014, Dulani argues that, despite a myriad of challenges, democracy 
appears to have taken root in the country and the passage of time is lowering the 
odds for democratic reversal. He analyses micro-level data from public opinion 
surveys conducted by Afrobarometer, which further demonstrates high levels of 
public commitment to democracy even though many Malawians are disappointed 
with how the political elites have failed to perform to the expected standards. 
Using a demand and supply analysis of survey data, he argues that prospects for 
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progress remain high against a background of consistently high demand for 
democracy, even if the evidence suggests low levels of its supply. Dulani concludes 
by asserting that, having overcome numerous episodes that could have derailed 
it, Malawi’s democracy is tilting towards progress and that the passage of time is 
increasingly reducing the likelihood of democratic stagnation or even reversal.
Kizito Tenthani and Blessings Chinsinga examine the relationship between 
political parties, political settlement and development in Chapter 3. Despite 
their fl aws, political parties are considered to be the lifeblood of a multiparty 
democracy – a political system that if harnessed properly has the potential of 
ushering in economic development and poverty reduction in a country like 
Malawi. Tenthani and Chinsinga begin by providing an overview of the history, 
development and operation of political parties in the country before critically 
examining the nature of political settlements that have characterized both 
national and local politics. A specifi c focus on the legal framework offers 
explanations of how political parties are formed, how the party system is regulated 
and the extent to which parties serve the interests of voters. The general 
conclusion is that political parties in Malawi have failed to reach a level and type 
of political settlement that can facilitate sustainable development.
In Chapter 4, Edge Kanyongolo studies the linkages between political parties 
and the judiciary and what he terms as the ‘judicialisation’ and ‘informalisation’ 
of politics in Malawi. Since the early 1990s, the Malawian judiciary has played a 
growing role in the mediation and arbitration of political relations. Kanyongolo 
analyses this role in the context of debates over the interplay between the 
institutional framework of politics and the institutionalization of democratic 
governance. Using the regulation of political parties as a case study, and applying 
critical legal theoretical approaches, he examines supply-side and demand-side 
factors that infl uence the potential of the judiciary to facilitate the 
institutionalization of the democratic principles of participation, accountability, 
the rule of law and human rights in Malawian political culture and practice. 
Kanyongolo argues that the potential of the Malawian judiciary to contribute to 
the institutionalization of democratic governance is constrained by a number of 
conceptual, jurisdictional, procedural and substantive factors that obstruct courts 
from suffi ciently integrating the realities of informalization of politics into the 
jurisprudence of political party regulation. He further argues that the obstructive 
effect of these factors is a function of the dominance of formalism in Malawian 
legal theory. Enhancing the contribution of the judiciary to the democratization 
of Malawian politics therefore requires a reorientation of judicial discourse on 
political parties away from the dogmatic dichotomization of law and politics, 
which the formalism of classic legal positivist theory currently establishes 
and perpetuates.
Part II focuses on governance and policy formulation and implementation. 
While the fi rst two chapters in this section highlight the formal and actual 
linkages between various levels of elected and non-elected offi cials, the third 
chapter highlights the specifi c case of agricultural policy aimed at generating 
youth employment.
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In Chapter 5, Lewis Dzimbiri discusses the Malawian public service, a key 
institution that the government uses to implement national policies aimed at 
promoting economic and social development. While a well-functioning public 
service is crucial in enabling a government to function and deliver on its 
mandates, it is also widely accepted that an effective public service depends on a 
good interface between the political and administrative leadership to ensure that 
polices are formulated and implemented properly. Dzimbiri examines the role 
ministers (as elected leaders) and principal secretaries (as the highest ranked 
bureaucrats in ministries) play in the recruitment, promotion, demotion, transfer 
and disciplining of public servants. The aim is to better understand how these 
roles impact on the functioning of the public service machinery. Dzimbiri notes 
that politics and administration in Malawi are inseparable, and there is 
considerable integration of the roles of ministers and principal secretaries in 
policy processes. The entire process is moreover characterized by considerable 
political interference in the appointments, promotions, transfers, etc., of public 
servants, which in turn adversely affects public service morale and contributes to 
ineffective service delivery. Dzimbiri nonetheless concludes on an optimistic 
note, arguing that current proposals for reform, if properly implemented, have the 
potential of addressing many of the current challenges.
Asiyati Lorraine Chiweza’s focus in Chapter 6 is local government and the 
political economy of local level politics. In the international development 
discourse, decentralization is frequently advocated as a tool for improving the 
effi ciency and effectiveness of public service delivery and for promoting 
participatory democracy and decision-making. Thus, donors and policymakers 
viewed Malawi’s adoption of a democratic decentralization policy in 1998 as a 
logical conclusion of the transition to the national democratic agenda that started 
in 1994. There was considerable hope that policy reforms would institutionalize 
political, administrative and fi scal decision-making powers and authority in local 
governments, and that the local governments would pursue development policies 
on the ground based on the principles of accountability, transparency and 
participation. Chiweza examines the impact of politics on local government 
paralysis in terms of ensuring accountable, transparent and participatory decision-
making and service delivery. Her study – which focuses on the politics of 
representation, district decision-making and oversight processes in district 
councils – concludes that the scope for realizing the commonly advocated goals 
of improved service delivery, governance and poverty reduction goals has 
remained elusive.
Youth unemployment is a rapidly growing problem not only in Malawi but in 
large parts of the African continent. Blessings Chinsinga and Michael Chasukwa 
examine the problem in Chapter 7, with a particular focus on the agriculture 
sector, which continues to be the largest employer in Malawi. Like in the rest of 
Africa, Malawi has witnessed a disproportionate increase in youth unemployment, 
which is now a major social problem. It is therefore natural to expect the country’s 
largest employment sector to address the issue of rising youth unemployment. 
Thus, Chinsinga and Chasukwa examine the extent to which the youth have 
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featured in the country’s agricultural policy and how the agriculture sector 
features in the government’s national youth policy. They argue that, despite 
several attempts to promote youth development in Malawi since 1994, agriculture 
has been grossly neglected in these efforts. Indeed, politicians do not view the 
sector as providing adequate incentives for strong patronage networks, which in 
turn explains why youth unemployment is not accorded a policy priority in what 
is possibly the sector with the greatest potential for generating employment.
Part III discusses the role and impact of activism and foreign aid on holding the 
government to account. The three chapters in this section examine the role of 
the media, the legislature, civil society organizations and providers of foreign aid.
In Chapter 8, Nandini Patel discusses government accountability and the 
oversight role of governmental and non-governmental bodies. There is a direct 
functional relationship between the legislature and constitutional bodies such as 
the Human Rights Commission, the Ombudsman, the Director of Public 
Prosecutions and the Anti-Corruption Bureau. A vibrant and adversarial legis-
lature can effectively interact with and enhance the role, power and infl uence of 
these institutions. However, legislatures in many developing countries are weak 
and ‘rubber stamp’ legislation leading to the executive amassing power amidst a 
culture of impunity. Such practices often result in the growth of autocracy and 
corruption. The prevalence of neo-patrimonialism within the modern state is 
thus a signifi cant challenge to oversight bodies playing their rightful roles, 
although not the sole challenge. Patel examines the performance and contributions 
of the oversight bodies, with the aim of exploring whether these bodies have now 
developed the capacity to face these constant political and economic challenges 
and can sustain themselves. She fi nds that the gradual and systematic rise of 
watchdog institutions in Malawi was dealt a severe setback during the years 
2009–2011, when democracy was under siege. The legislature’s role in general 
was reduced and its oversight role was particularly thwarted. Appointments of 
offi cials to the independent bodies were based on patronage and their 
independence was severely constrained. Despite a host of challenges, Patel argues 
that the Malawian parliament – especially through its various committees – has 
demonstrated that it has the potential, and can be an effective mechanism, for 
ensuring accountable governance.
Malawi’s economy is heavily dependent on western foreign aid, which funds 
almost 40 per cent of the national budget. However, China is increasingly 
supporting a wide range of projects (from infrastructure and health to education 
and agricultural technology) that appear to complement western efforts to 
promote development and reduce poverty. In Chapter 9, Dan Banik and Michael 
Chasukwa critically analyse and highlight the impact of ideas, values and tangible 
benefi ts resulting from China’s engagement in Malawi. Rather than providing 
budget support to governments, and conditioning aid on support for democracy 
and gender equality, the Chinese model has consistently emphasized the 
principles of ‘win–win’, ‘mutual respect’, ‘friendship’ and ‘non-interference’. 
Despite the rhetoric often found in western media outlets, Banik and Chasukwa 
do not fi nd substantial evidence to indicate that western donors and the Chinese 
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are competing in Malawi. They further conclude that, although Chinese aid is 
making important contributions to development and employment generation in 
tune with local needs, there are numerous challenges looming in the horizon. 
These relate primarily to future availability of adequate capital given the recent 
slowdown of the Chinese economy and growing dissatisfaction with Chinese 
traders in rural areas.
The post-1994 democratization period witnessed a growing interest in bringing 
about realistic participation of women in Malawian politics. In preparation for 
the 2009 general elections, the quest for increased female political participation 
took a more organized approach under the banner of the 50–50 campaign – 
relying heavily on the media. In Chapter 10, Happy Mickson Kayuni examines 
the role of the media in shaping political views and social behaviour in relation 
to gender equality. He argues that, although the media may have contributed to 
enriching democracy by facilitating debates on female representation in 
parliament, the entire 50–50 campaign was based on a politically unsustainable 
premise. Kayuni also fi nds that the media’s approach to gender issues in Malawi 
has been too narrow, over-simplistic and oriented towards the short term.
In the fi nal chapter of this volume, we briefl y summarize some of the main 
arguments presented by our co-authors and identify a set of political and 
development issues that require the urgent attention of policymakers and the 
international community in order to highlight realistic ways of making democracy 
count for transformative, inclusive and sustainable development.
It is our hope that this volume provides an important source of knowledge 
about political transformation and inclusive development in one of the world’s 
most impoverished nations. We would be delighted if this volume proves to be 
useful as a tool of analysis for researchers, teachers and undergraduate and post-
graduate students in politics, law, sociology, geography, anthropology, economics, 
law, history, philosophy, development and area studies, and as a guide to policy 
for decision-makers. This volume should appeal to those interested in democracy, 
governance, human rights, state action and the implementation of anti-poverty 
programmes, development administration and decentralization. In addition to 
specifi c case studies from Malawi, we also hope the volume will provide theoretical 
and comparative insights for cross-cultural extensions.
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2 Progress or stagnation?
Twenty years of democracy
Boniface Dulani
Introduction
Within a span of two decades, Malawi has undergone fi ve democratic election 
cycles. During the period 1994 to 2014, the country has been served by four 
presidents: Bakili Muluzi (1994–2004), Bingu wa Mutharika (2004–12), Joyce 
Banda (2012–14) and Peter Mutharika (2014–). The euphoria of change that 
characterized the landmark democratic elections of 18 May 1994 has since been 
replaced with largely pessimistic refl ections on the nature and overall trajectory 
of the country’s nascent democracy (Chirwa et al., 2003; Dulani, 2008, Chirambo, 
2009, Svasand, 2011). Within this debate, questions have been raised about the 
overall strength and durability of the country’s nascent democracy. The view that 
Malawian democracy is on shaky and uncertain ground is summed up most 
succinctly by Svasand (2011: 20), who notes that the country’s democracy 
indicators show ‘stagnation, or in some cases, reversals’.
Previous attempts at assessing the trajectory of Malawi’s democracy faced the 
challenge of insuffi cient data points given the relatively short duration of the 
democratic regime. However, as Malawi’s democratic experiment hits the twenty-
year mark, there are enough data points that make it possible to have a fuller 
assessment on the overall direction that the country is making in terms of democratic 
consolidation. Is the country making progress, stagnating or even regressing in its 
democracy? This is the central question that this chapter will address. Drawing on 
expert data sources and complimented by public opinion survey data, the fi ndings 
reveal a rather mixed picture, one that points more towards the stagnation thesis. 
Numerous international indices of democracy – including the Freedom House 
scores, Polity Index and Ibrahim index of African governance – show that, beyond 
the initial gains of the transition years, there has actually been limited progress on 
the country’s democratic trajectory to a higher level. At the same time, there have 
been a few mild reversals but these have not been suffi ciently large enough to take 
the country signifi cantly backwards. Meanwhile, the evidence from the public 
opinion data shows similar trends, with modest gains in support for democracy and 
rejection of authoritarian alternatives. While public attitudes in favour of democracy 
appear resilient to economic downturns, the empirical evidence suggests that major 
political events, such as former president Bakili Muluzi’s attempts to remove the 
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constitutional clause limiting presidents to serving a maximum of two terms in 
offi ce, can erode public expressions of support for democracy in ways that undermine 
the viability of the regime.
Although support for democracy has since increased, a signifi cant minority – 
mainly women, rural residents, people with lower educational attainments and 
people who are either unemployed or engaged in unskilled work – consistently 
expresses preference for one of three forms of non-democratic regimes: one-party, 
military and one-man rule. Ultimately, although support for democracy is wide, it 
is at the same time shallow in the sense that a number of Malawians say that they 
support democracy but are at the same time willing to countenance authoritarian 
modes of government. When demand for democracy is measured against perceived 
supply, the conclusion is similar – as one of stagnation, where demand for 
democracy appears to be in equilibrium with perceived supply at levels suggesting 
consolidation of a hybrid regime; one that is neither fully democratic or regressing 
back to authoritarian rule. Based on both the expert-driven and public opinion 
data sources, I conclude by asserting that Malawi’s democracy is tilting towards 
stagnation at hybrid levels. Put differently, Malawi faces little risk of sliding back 
to authoritarian rule as a large proportion of the public reject authoritarianism, 
yet, at the same time, commitment to democracy is not very strong, suggesting 
that there is limited appetite among the populace for further democratic reforms. 
This state of affairs suggests that the public would resist any attempts to remove 
the democratic gains made thus far but will, at the same time, not pressure leaders 
to introduce additional democratic reforms. This scenario leads to the 
consolidation of a hybrid type of regime, one that is neither fully democratic 
nor authoritarian.
Conceptualizing democracy consolidation
The debates on the viability of Malawi’s democracy appear to be informed, at 
least in part, by the literature on democracy consolidation, which suggests that 
transitions from authoritarian rule do not always result in consolidated 
democracies. Instead, democratic regimes typically face the risk of collapse and 
reversal to authoritarian rule (Linz and Stepan, 1979; Wallerstein, 1980; Cohen, 
1994; Bermeo, 2005; Diskin et al., 2005; Bratton and Gyimah-Boadi, 2015).
With the literature suggesting that the likelihood of democratic reversal is 
higher in poorer countries than wealthier ones (Przeworski and Limongi, 1993; 
Przeworski et al., 1996), the discourse on Africa’s third-wave democracies has 
shifted from the democratic transitions themselves to consolidation. While there 
are multiple meanings attached to democratic consolidation, including those 
that place emphasis on institutions (Schedler, 2001) and on political alternation 
(cf. Huntington, 1991), I draw primarily from the literature that looks at 
attitudinal measures to assess the extent to which democratic values have been 
internalized among the general citizenry. Several works on democracy 
consolidation inform this position. O’Donnell (1996), for example, argues that 
democracy consolidation should be refl ected in measures that imply expectations 
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of regime continuity especially when faced with socio-economic and political 
challenges. Accordingly, democracy is consolidated when the system endures 
during times of socio-economic and political hardships and there exists no 
signifi cant political anti-system parties (O’Donnell, 1996). Przeworski (1991) 
echoes this view and places emphasis on the internalization of democratic 
attitudes and values among citizens. He thus contends that ‘democracy is 
consolidated when under given political and economic conditions a particular 
system of institutions becomes the only game in town; when no one can imagine 
acting outside the democratic institutions, when all losers want to do is to try 
again within the same institutions under which they have just lost’ (Przeworski, 
1991: 23).
The attitudinal view of democratic consolidation is further expounded by 
Schedler (2001), when he relates democracy consolidation to the absence of 
anti-democratic behaviour and attitudes between the both political actors and 
the public at large. Under this scenario, ‘democracy appears to be safe if all 
relevant players conform to the basic rules of the democratic game’ (Schedler, 
2001: 70). Schedler’s citizen-centric view of democracy consolidation is echoed 
by Linz and Stepan (1996) when they contend that democracies can be considered 
consolidated when democracy becomes ‘behaviourally, attitudinally and 
constitutionally’ internalized. The authors go on to contend that from a 
behavioural angle, democracy is consolidated when ‘no signifi cant political 
groups seriously attempt to overthrow the democratic regime or secede from the 
state’, (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 15). The attitudinal dimension meanwhile places 
emphasis on the attitudes of a majority of ordinary citizens keeping faith in 
democracy even when faced with ‘severe political and economic crises’ (Linz and 
Stepan, 1996: 15). Thus in order to ascertain whether a democracy has 
consolidated or not, public opinion measures should, in the words of Linz and 
Stepan (1996: 16), show that ‘a strong majority, even in the midst of major 
economic problems and deep dissatisfaction with incumbents, hold the belief 
that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to 
govern collective life, and when support for anti-system alternatives is quite small 
or isolated from pro-democratic forces’.
The literature on institutions has further highlighted the important role that 
‘critical junctures’,1 play in the survival of democracy (Przeworski, 1991; Capoccia 
and Kelemen, 2007; Linz and Stepan, 1996). Understanding the fate of Malawi’s 
democracy thus also requires a detailed examination of what happens during 
times that qualify as ‘critical junctures’. In the two decades since the arrival of 
democracy in the country, there have been numerous critical junctures that have 
had the potential of shaping the trajectory of the country in either positive or 
negative directions. Three such events stand out:
• the unsuccessful bids by President Bakili Muluzi to seek a third term in offi ce 
in 2002 and 2003 by changing the constitution;
• the increasing authoritarianism tendencies exhibited during the second term 
of Bingu wa Mutharika’s presidency; and
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• the death in offi ce of President Mutharika in 2012, which was marked by an 
unconstitutional attempt by the deceased president’s loyalists to install the 
President’s brother, Peter Mutharika, as president over the then Vice-
President, Joyce Banda.
Some authors have contended that generally poor economic performance, in a 
context where the democratic transition was founded on the belief that it would 
deliver better development prospects for ordinary citizens, presents a continuing 
threat to the survival of democracy in the country (Dulani, 2005; Chirwa et al., 
2003). The revelation of a major corruption scandal in late 2013, locally dubbed 
as ‘Cashgate’,2 threatened to further diminish public confi dence in democratic 
politics in ways that could further derail the democratic regime.
A model of regime consolidation
To ascertain the status of Malawi’s democratic consolidation, the study adapts a 
model of regime consolidation proposed by Bratton and Mattes (2009). The 
model, which is designed to draw from public opinion data, uses a demand and 
supply framework to gauge whether a regime is consolidating as a democracy, an 
autocracy, a hybrid regime or one that is still in transition. Demand for democracy, 
once again, is an index based on the proportion of respondents who express 
support for democracy and reject three non-democratic forms of government. 
Supply of democracy, on the other hand, is a composite index that captures the 
proportion of respondents that perceive extensive democracy and at the same 
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Figure 2.1 Model of regime consolidation
Source: Adapted from Bratton and Mattes (2009)
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The model suggests three possible outcomes. A regime can consolidate as:
• an autocracy (demand and supply in low equilibrium);
• a hybrid regime (mid-level equilibrium) or
• a democracy (high level equilibrium).
For a regime to consolidate as an autocracy, demand for democracy and perceived 
supply should be in equilibrium at low levels. Hybrid regimes are those where 
demand and supply are in equilibrium at moderate levels. For a regime to 
consolidate as a democracy, however, demand and supply should be at high level 
equilibrium. But there is also a fourth scenario, one where demand and supply are 
in a state of disequilibrium. In this case, it can be argued that the regime is one in 
transition, and that it can move towards a democracy, or an autocracy, or end up 
as a hybrid.
Data
To answer the question on whether Malawi’s democracy has made progress or 
stagnated, I use two different sources of data. The fi rst includes democracy indices 
developed by experts – Freedom House, Polity Index and the Ibrahim Index of 
African Governance (IIAG). In order to demonstrate the behavioural and 
attitudinal dimensions of democracy consolidation in Malawi, I also draw on a 
second source of data: public opinion data gathered by Afrobarometer3 in Malawi 
between 1999 and 2014. The data are then used to develop a demand and supply 
framework that sheds greater light on popular attitudes and commitment to 
democracy measured against popular perceptions on the supply of democracy 
(Bratton and Mattes, 2009). Demand for democracy is a scale constructed from 
four questions measuring support for democracy and the rejection of the three 
authoritarian alternatives. Respondents who say they both prefer democracy and 
also reject all three non-democratic alternatives are held to demand democracy.4 
The logic of the scale is that effective demand requires ‘more than lip service [i.e. 
expressed support] to democracy; it also implies that people abandon attachments 
to old autocratic [modes of governance]’(Bratton, 2012). To measure the supply 
side of democracy, an index is developed from two indicators that measure 
citizen’s judgements of the extent of democracy5 and their expressed satisfaction 
with democracy in practice.6
Findings
Democratic trends in Malawi
All three measures of Malawi’s democratic trajectory reveal an initial period of 
progress, followed by an interim phase of regression that has since been replaced 
by stability at low democratic levels. The fi rst draws from Freedom House Index, 
which measures democracy along two dimensions of political rights and civil 
liberties.7 However, to capture the positivity scores of higher values, I have opted 
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to reverse the scores, such that a score of 1 is reversed to 7 while the score of 7 is 
reversed to 1 and the same with the middle categories (see Figure 2.2)
Although the aggregate indicators suggest an initial period of progress – 
characterized by relatively high scores that placed Malawi in the ‘full democracy’ 
category between 1994 and 1998 – this was followed by a period of decline 
between 1999 and 2002, when the reversed average scores for the country dropped 
from 11 to 8, bringing the country into the realm of partially free or the partially 
democratic category. Despite a slight increase in the average scores in 2010, 
Malawi has, since 1999, fi rmly remained in the partially free category, a fi nding 
that suggests stagnation rather than progress.
A similar picture of stagnation at low democratic levels is refl ected in Polity 
Index Scores for Malawi between 1994 and 2013 (the year when the latest scores 






































































Figure 2.2 Freedom House scores for Malawi (reversed Freedom House scores, 
1994–2014)


































































Figure 2.3 Polity index scores for Malawi, 1990–2013
Source: Polity IV project, www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4x.htm
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measures democracy on a −10 to +10 scale, where −10 represents the most 
extreme form of autocracy and +10 indicates the most democratic states.8 In 
terms of actual measures, the Polity Index compares factors such as competitiveness 
of political participation, competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of 
executive recruitment and constraints on the chief executive.
The Polity Index scores in Figure 2.3 capture the effects of the democratic 
transition of 1994, which pushed the country from the ranks of an autocracy to a 
democracy. However, between 2000 and 2004, which coincided with Bakili 
Muluzi’s attempt to manipulate the constitution to seek additional terms in offi ce, 
Malawi fell out of the category of democracies and into one of ‘open anocracy’.9 
However, after 2004, the country’s scores improved again and have remained 
consistent at an average of 6 since then, a fi nding that is consistent with the 
stagnation noted in the Freedom House scores above. The drop in the Polity 
Index score for the period 2001–2004, which we discuss below, suggests that 
major political events, such as those that threaten to reverse democratic trends, 
as was the case with Muluzi’s third term quest, can have a major impact on 
Malawi’s democratic trajectory. And this very episode also had important effects 
in diminishing public attitudes toward democracy. As with the Freedom House 
scores, the evidence from the Polity scores fails to suggest any progress beyond the 
initial jump in 1994. Since then, Malawi’s average Polity Index scores have been 
5.5, supporting yet again the picture of stagnation noted in the Freedom House 
score fi ndings.
The third measure I use is the Ibrahim Index of African governance. This 
index, which was fi rst introduced in 2007, combines over 100 variables based on 
four conceptual categories:
• safety and rule of law;
• participation and human rights;
• sustainable economic opportunity; and
• human development.
The scores range from zero for the poorest performing countries to 100 for the 
best. The high number of variables that is accounted for means that, when 
compared to the other two indexes, the Mo Ibrahim Index is more likely to track 
even minute changes in governance, whether positive and negative. Figure 2.4 
provides Malawi’s MIIAG scores for 2007–2014.
Although the IIAG does not date back very far, the evidence again suggests 
stagnation, as there is very little variation in the scores for Malawi in the eight 
cycles for which data were available. In particular, it is telling that, according to 
the IIAG, Malawi’s governance peaked with a score of 63.9 in 2008, a year prior 
to the fourth democratic election of 2009. However, by 2010, Malawi’s state of 
governance had fallen to its lowest levels at 52.33, before gradually picking up to 
trend upwards. The precipitous decline in 2010 arguably captures the socio-
economic decline during the second half of Bingu Mutharika’s presidency, which 




























Figure 2.4 Malawi Ibrahim index of African governance scores, 2007–14
Source: Ibrahim Foundation index or African governance annual reports (various)
recent years, Malawi’s governance performance has recovered slightly, especially 
following the death in offi ce of President Bingu Mutharika in April 2012. However, 
the positive trend was not sustained, as it did not recover to the high levels of 
2007–9. Instead, Malawi’s governance scores have remained more or less static in 
the post-2010 period, neither trending upwards or downwards. This period 
coincided with Mutharika’s second term, which was characterized by the 
suppression of opposition voices and generally poor political and economic 
governance (Dionne and Dulani, 2013). Although Mutharika’s sudden death in 
April 2012 brought an end to the period of poor political and economic governance, 
his successor, Joyce Banda, only addressed the political governance issues. On the 
economic front, Banda failed to introduce sound economic governance principles, 
as evidenced by the theft of large sums of public funds under her watch in what has 
come to be known as the ‘Cashgate scandal’. Thus, although Banda presided over 
a relatively calm period in terms of political governance, the corruption scandals 
during her presidency cancelled out the political gains, such that the country’s 
overall governance scores remained stagnant.
Perceived quality of democracy as viewed by ordinary Malawians
While the expert assessments suggest stagnation in the trajectory of Malawian 
democracy, we now turn to examining the perceived extent of democracy. 
Drawing on the views of ordinary citizens allows us to gauge and test the expert 
assumptions that Malawian democracy has stalled. It is particularly interesting 
studying the proportion of Malawians who express the view that the country is a 
full democracy or one with only minor problems. An additional measure of 
satisfaction with democracy is also examined to get a fuller picture on whether 
Malawians consider the new political regime meaningful or not. The results are 
presented in Figure 2.5.
Consistent with the fi ndings on the expert measurements discussed above, the 
evidence from the Afrobarometer surveys show that Malawians believe that their 
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Figure 2.5 Support for and perceived extent of democracy, 1999–2014
Source: Afrobarometer
democracy peaked in 1999, a year when just about two-thirds of the country’s 
citizens perceived the country to have been a democracy. In the years 1999–2005, 
Malawians, just like the international experts, were of the view that the country’s 
political trajectory was heading away from democracy. Once more, this period 
coincided with the national campaign by the Muluzi administration to remove 
presidential term limits. Although the perceived extent of democracy picked up 
again in 2008, the numbers have not recovered to the 1999 peak. If anything, there 
is a perception in 2014 that the country is sliding backwards, albeit marginally. 
Meanwhile, public satisfaction with democracy appears to mirror the perceptions 
of its extent. Yet again, support for democracy and satisfaction with it among the 
public, was at its lowest level in 2005, creating a possibility that Malawians might 
have been tempted to look elsewhere for an alternative regime type.
The overall picture, from the expert-based democracy indicators and the 
perception data, is thus one of stagnation. From the two indicators for which data 
from 1994 are available, the overall picture is that the 1994 transition was an 
important event in Malawi’s democratic trajectory, marking the highest level of 
the democratic experience. After an initial period of high scores, there followed 
a period of regression, precipitated by Muluzi’s attempt to remove the term-limit 
clause from the country’s constitution in the fi rst few years of the twenty-fi rst 
century. Although the democracy began to recover after 2005, poor economic 
and political governance, especially in the second term of Bingu Mutharika’s 
presidency, has meant that the country’s democracy has failed to recover fully to 
its peak levels of the mid- to late 1990s. As a result, Malawi remains stuck in a 
phase of stagnation.
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Demand for democracy in Malawi, 1999–2014
Although both expert and survey data suggest that Malawi’s democracy has 
stagnated, we must also address whether a comprehensive assessment of 
consolidation requires that the study further consider whether the observed 
stagnation is impacting on public attitudes towards democracy. This is in keeping 
with the democracy consolidation literature, which suggests that democracy can 
only be considered consolidated when there is an absence of anti-democratic 
behaviour and attitudes among both political actors and ordinary citizens. In 
other words, a consolidated democracy requires that citizens internalize democracy 
and refuse to support non-democratic modes of governance.
To measure the extent of democratic commitment, I examined the 
Afrobarometer survey data to ascertain trends in demand for democracy. Where 
democracy has been fully internalized, and thus consolidated, citizens would be 
expected to maintain support for this particular regime type and while 
simultaneously refusing to contemplate the introduction of authoritarian 
alternatives, even if democracy is considered to be failing (Bratton and Mattes, 
2009). Subsequently, a scale was developed from the Afrobarometer survey data 
to measure demand for democracy. This scale was constructed from four questions: 
do you support democracy, and do you reject each or any of the three authoritarian 
alternatives of one-party, military and one-man rule. Respondents who say they 
both prefer democracy and also reject all three non-democratic alternatives are 
held to demand democracy.
Since 1999, a majority of Malawians have expressed support for democracy. 
With the exception of 2005, support for democracy has been on an upward trend. 
Thus, support for democracy has increased by 11 percentage points (i.e. from 65 
per cent to 76 per cent). As the duration of the country’s democratic experience 
increases, support for the regime has also correspondingly increased. This would 

















Figure 2.6 Support for democracy in Malawi, 1999–2014
Source: Afrobarometer
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Malawians refusing to offer support for other alternatives. This would, on the 
surface, suggest that democracy is becoming the only game in town.
However, in order to fully understand the depth and commitment towards 
democracy, it is important to move beyond mere expressions of support for a 
democratic regime. As Bratton (2012) has argued, effective demand for democracy 
requires more than lip service (i.e. expressed support) for democracy. Instead, 
genuine demand indicates that people both support democracy and abandon 
attachments to old autocratic modes of governance. It is important to test both as 
individuals are liable to say they support democracy whilst at the same time 
countenancing non-democratic forms of government. The fi ndings on the 
proportion of Malawians that have rejected three authoritarian forms of 
government in the period 1999–2014 are presented in Figure 2.7.
Figure 2.7 shows that a majority of Malawians reject, by a large margin, the 
three authoritarian forms of government. However, there remains a sizeable 
minority of Malawians for whom democracy has not become the only game in 
town. In particular, support for authoritarian forms of government is higher 
among rural Malawians, women and those with lower levels of education. 
Malawians who are unemployed, young (18- to 24-year-olds) or elderly (those 
aged 65 and above) also tend to have relatively higher acceptance levels for 
authoritarian regimes (Table 2.1).
The descriptive statistics show that, of the three forms of authoritarian rule, 
Malawians are more nostalgic for one-party rule. This suggests that twenty years 
of democracy have not completely erased memories of the one-party era from the 
minds of some Malawians. Indeed, the proportion of Malawians rejecting one-
party rule has fallen from 76 per cent in 1999 to 69 per cent in 2014. It is 
interesting to note that the proportion of Malawians that reject one-party rule in 
2014 is almost identical to the 64 per cent that voted in favour of multi-party 
competition in the referendum of 1993. It could thus be argued that the passage 
of time has not won over those Malawians who consider multi-party democracy 
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Figure 2.7 Rejection of non-democratic alternatives in Malawi, 1999–2014
Source: Afrobarometer
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Gender Male 19 8 8
Female 34 11 16
Rural/Urban 
locality
Rural 27 11 13
Urban 20 4 8
Age categories 18-24 30 10 12
25-34 25 8 11
35-44 24 12 14
45-54 27 11 10
55-64 20 9 8
>65 27 11 12
Education levels No formal 
Schooling
37 16 22
Primary 30 12 14
Secondary 17 4 5
Post-Secondary 9 4 1
Employment 
status
Unemployed 27 10 12
Employed 17 11 10
Lived Poverty 
Status
Non-Poor 21 10 10
Moderately Poor 27 9 12
Extremely Poor 30 12 12
Source: http://afrobarometer.org/data/malawi-round-6-data-2014, accessed 26 February 2016
Although rejection of authoritarian forms of government has remained high and 
has been growing over the years, there is evidence to suggest that critical events 
can potentially undermine confi dence in democracy, thus demonstrating some 
fragility in the democratization process. This is evident in the low rejection rates 
of authoritarian alternatives in the 2005 survey, where less than half (44 per 
cent) of Malawians rejected all three authoritarian forms. These results followed 
the attempts by President Bakili Muluzi’s attempts to change the constitution in 
order to seek a third term in offi ce.
However, since then, rejection of all three authoritarian forms has picked up 
and is steadily growing, suggesting that the events of 2002–4 did not have long-
lasting effects in democratic attitudes among Malawians. In keeping with 
Bratton’s (2012) contention that effective demand for democracy requires 
individuals to both express support for democracy and reject all three authoritarian 
forms of government, we will further examine the proportion of respondents who 
can be termed true and committed democrats. Using the very strict measure of 
effective demand outlined in Figure 2.8, the proportion of Malawians who can be 
said to be true and committed democrats was then calculated and illustrated in 
Figure 2.9.
Between 1999 and 2012, less than half of Malawians appear to have been 
effective and committed democrats. The overall low level of democratic demand 
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Figure 2.9 Demand for democracy in Malawi, 1999–2014
Source: Afrobarometer
suggests that the country’s democracy remains very fragile. The claims of democratic 
support among Malawian citizens thus remain shallow as, at best, no more than 
half of the country’s citizens express support for democracy while disavowing the 
three non-democratic alternatives. In other words, a substantial proportion of the 
population, at times more than half, have failed to make ‘democracy the only game 
in town’ by completely rejecting one-party rule, military rule and dictatorship. 
This scenario is likely to render the country’s path towards democracy consolidation 
bumpy and susceptible to elite capture with little likelihood of popular resistance. 
This is the scenario that prevailed between 2004 and 2009, when large majorities 
of Malawians expressed support for the performance of Bingu Mutharika, despite 
him exhibiting increasing authoritarian tendencies.10
Although the proportion of Malawians who express support for democracy and 
disavow all three non-democratic forms of government has remained low, it 
compares favourably with continental trends.11 With just around one-third of 
Malawians qualifying as committed democrats in 2005, the evidence once more 
suggests the earlier observation that Bakili Muluzi’s quest for a third term in offi ce 
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posed the greatest threat to Malawi’s democracy. Yet it appears that poor 
economic performance such as occurred during the later years of Bingu Mutharika’s 
presidency in 2009–12 and corruption scandals, such as Cashgate of 2013–14, 
have not signifi cantly impacted on democratic commitment. From this angle, 
therefore, one can conclude that the greatest threats to Malawi’s democracy 
originate largely from political rather than economic factors; in other words, it is 
more resilient when faced with poor economic performance.
In order to explore the socio-demographic origins of demand for demand in 
Malawi, the study further analysed demand for democracy across a number of 
attributes(see Table 2.2).
The results tracking the socio-demographic characteristics of Malawians who 
demand democracy reveal a number of interesting characteristics of Malawians 
who can be labelled as ‘committed democrats’. The northern region has, at 62 per 
cent, by far the largest proportion of individuals qualifying as committed 
democrats. By contrast, less than half of Malawians residing in the central and 
southern regions express support for democracy and also reject all three 
authoritarian forms of government. Yet again, this is in keeping with results of 
the 1993 referendum, when the northern region had the largest proportion of 
individuals who voted in favour of introducing multi-party rule.12 However, the 
most worrisome result in this regard relates to Malawians who live in the southern 
Table 2.2 Demand for democracy among socio-demographic groups in Malawi, 2014



















Employment status Employed 48
Unemployed 54
Lived poverty status Non-poor 55
Moderately poor 50
Extremely poor 43
Source: http://afrobarometer.org/data/malawi-round-6-data-2014, accessed 26 February 2016
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region, where only 46 per cent qualify as effective democrats. Yet, in 1994 84 per 
cent of people in this region had voted in favour of multi-party rule. This suggests 
a possibility that the people in this region are not as committed to democracy as 
they were in 1993.
Consistent with the broader democratization literature (Bratton and Mattes, 
2001; Dulani, 2008), the fi ndings presented in Table 2.2 also demonstrate that 
urban populations are more committed to democracy than their rural counterparts; 
that women are less committed compared to men; and that more educated 
individuals tend to have a stronger attachment to democracy compared to those 
with low educational attainment. Employed Malawians, as well as citizens that 
experience no or moderate lived poverty, are stronger democrats compared to the 
unemployed and extremely poor citizens. The effects of age, on the other hand, 
suggest a curvilinear relationship: effective demand for democracy is low at the 
lower age brackets, but increases before beginning to decline again after age 44. 
The low demand for democracy among the 18- to 24-year-olds is particularly 
concerning about the overall fate of democracy in the country, given that young 
people make up a large proportion of the Malawi populace. However, given the 
positive effects of education on demand for democracy, this situation is not as dire 
as it might initially appear, as the younger category of democrats is fl exible and 
more likely to change their positions over time.
Does poor economic performance affect demand for democracy?
The literature on democracy consolidation highlights the important fact that 
democratic attitudes should remain resilient, even in the face of poor economic 
conditions (O’Donnell, 1996; Przeworski, 1991; Przeworski et al., 1996; Schedler, 
2001). When faced with economic and other political changes, committed 
democrats should not lose confi dence in democracy itself but, instead, use it to 
choose a calibre of politicians that can turn things around (Dulani, 2005; Bratton 
and Gyimah-Boadi, 2015). Given that Malawi is almost perennially experiencing 
poor economic performance, the study explored the relationship between three 
measures of economic evaluations13 from the 2014 edition of the Afrobarometer 
survey (see Table 2.3).










48 50 1.67 0.048
Evaluation of country’s 
economic condition
45 50 5.30 0.000
Evaluation of own 
economic condition
46 50 4.61 0.000
Source: http://afrobarometer.org/data/malawi-round-6-data-2014, accessed 26 February 2016
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The results tracking the effects of economic performance on demand for 
democracy show that there is no signifi cant difference between the proportion of 
Malawians who demand democracy based on their overall assessment of the 
general direction of the country. Thus, holding negative or positive views on the 
overall direction of the country has no effect on attitudes toward democracy. 
However, interestingly, a relatively higher proportion of Malawians who held 
negative views about the economic situation in the country, and their own, were 
more likely to demand democracy than respondents that held positive evaluations. 
The differences in both cases were statistically signifi cant. This means that 
negative evaluations of economic performance might be helping to strengthen 
faith in democracy rather than undermining it. Although further analysis is 
needed to determine causality, the preliminary evidence appears to suggest that 
democracy in Malawi might actually be strengthened by perceptions of poor 
economic performance rather than being undermined by it. This would seem to 
point towards consolidation to the extent that Malawians might be looking at 
democracy as the better form of government that would give them, in the near 
future, opportunities to solve their and the country’s economic problems.
Demand and supply of democracy in Malawi
Applying the demand and supply framework outlined earlier in this chapter, the 
evidence suggests that demand for democracy among ordinary Malawians has 
remained consistently higher than the perceived supply (Figure 2.10).
With very few exceptions, demand and supply of democracy in Malawi appear 
to be at the mid-level equilibrium point – in other words, medium demand and 
medium supply. At these equilibrium points, citizens perceive moderate 
democracy being supplied but also demand moderate levels. Thus there is no 
pressure on political leaders to supply more democracy, resulting therefore in the 
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Figure 2.10 Demand and supply of democracy in Malawi, 1999–2014
Source: Afrobarometer
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be argued, explains the fi ndings on stagnation revealed by the expert and public 
opinion data above.
On a positive note, it would appear that since 2012 the supply and demand 
lines have begun to diverge, creating a situation of disequilibrium where demand 
is beginning to outstrip supply. The disequilibrium situation creates a new period 
of transition, marked by uncertainty. However, the fact that demand exceeds 
supply, suggests that Malawians will pressure the regime to introduce further 
democratic reforms while standing up against any attempts to undermine the 
existing democratic gains. It is thus not surprising that the period since 2008 has 
been marked by numerous anti-government protests and demonstrations, the 
most notable of which were demonstrations mounted by civil society organizations 
in July 2011 aimed at forcing the late Bingu Mutharika to honour the country’s 
democratic institutions. Similarly, in 2014, Joyce Banda, whose government had 
been embroidered in the Cashgate scandal, was voted out of offi ce in favour of 
Peter Mutharika.
Conclusion
Democracy is considered consolidated when it has become internalized by the 
citizens and become the only game in town. Even in times of major political and 
economic upheavals, citizens in a consolidated democracy should remain 
confi dent in the regime, even if they are displeased with the calibre and 
performance of the politicians in power. From the analysis of both expert and 
public opinion data, the fi ndings of this chapter suggest that Malawi’s democracy 
is stuck in a period of transition, neither consolidating as a democracy nor 
regressing to the era of authoritarianism. From the data from expert sources, the 
evidence points towards an initial period of progress between 1994 and 1999 that 
was followed by a period of regression from 2000 to 2005. The period of regression 
coincided with president Bakili Muluzi’s attempt to remove the presidential limit 
clause from the constitution, making this one of the most critical junctures in 
Malawi’s twenty-year democratic history. Although the trajectory of Malawi’s 
democracy began to trend upwards again after 2005, the evidence suggests that it 
is yet to recover fully to its pre-2000 heights. Instead, the period after 2009 in 
particular, appears to be one of stagnation, where the country is not making 
progressive either positively or negatively.
The above fi ndings are further supported by public opinion data, with Malawian 
citizens expressing support for democracy even if some say so while simultaneously 
saying sometimes authoritarian rule can be preferred. This suggests that 
democratic attitudes are still not fully embraced, a fi nding that once more suggests 
that even if a large proportion of Malawians support democracy, it is still yet to 
become the only game in town, reinforcing the picture of a transition that is yet 
to fully consolidate as a fully fl edged democracy. Further analysis of the survey 
data using a demand and supply framework suggests that the stagnation phase 
might be evidence of a different type of consolidation, namely as a hybrid regime 
instead of a democracy. In other words, the country might have been getting 
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comfortable with moderate levels of democracy. Under this scenario, democracy 
would neither be progressing or regressing. However, there is also some emerging 
evidence to suggest that demand for democracy is beginning to outstrip supply, 
which might create a disequilibrium favouring grassroots pressure for further 
democratic reform. There is thus cause for cautious optimism that democracy in 
Malawi will rise again even though it is currently in a period of stagnation.
Notes
1 This chapter adopts the defi nition of critical junctures suggested by Capoccia and 
Kelemen (2007: 348), who defi ne them as ‘relatively short periods of time during which 
there is a substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the 
outcome of interest’. In this case, the outcome of interest is democracy.
2 Cashgate refers to the occasion between 2012 and 2013 when ‘perpetrators exploited 
the weaknesses in the Integrated Financial Management System (IFMIS), through 
collusion, to transfer funds from government bank accounts to vendor accounts for 
goods and services that were never supplied and then deleted these transactions from 
the IFMIS system’ (Baker Tilly, 2014: 1–2).
3 The Afrobarometer is a comparative series of public attitude surveys that measure 
citizen attitudes on democracy and governance, the economy, civil society and other 
related topics. At the time of writing this chapter, a total of six survey cycles had been 
done in Malawi, the fi rst in 1999, then 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012 and 2014. The fi rst four 
surveys had national sample sizes of 1,200, giving a margin of error of ±3%. The most 
recent surveys (2012, 2014), had sample sizes of 2,400, giving a margin of error of ±2% 
at the 95% confi dence interval.
4 To measure support for democracy, survey respondents were asked to indicate which of 
three statements were closest to their opinion:
• Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.
• In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable.
• For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have.
Democracy supporters were those respondents that chose the fi rst statement. To 
measure rejection of authoritarian alternatives, respondents were asked to indicate 
whether they would disapprove or approve of three non-democratic forms of 
government, namely, one-party rule, military rule and one-man presidential rule.
5 Respondents were asked ‘In your opinion, how much of a democracy is Malawi today?’ 
Responses ranged from ‘A full democracy’, ‘A democracy but with minor problems’, ‘A 
democracy with major problems’, and ‘Not a democracy’. Respondents who perceived 
extensive democracy were those who said ‘a full democracy’ or ‘a democracy but with 
minor problems’.
6 Respondents were asked: ‘Overall, how satisfi ed are you with the way democracy works 
in Malawi today’? Responses ranged from ‘Very satisfi ed’, ‘Fairly satisfi ed’, ‘Not very 
satisfi ed’, and ‘Not at all satisfi ed’. Satisfi ed respondents were those who said they were 
‘Very satisfi ed’ or ‘fairly satisfi ed’.
7 On each of the two dimensions of the Freedom House scores, the index ranges from 1 
to 7. A score of 1 represents the highest possible score, i.e. very democratic, while a 
score of 7 represents the least democratic. The two indicators are often averaged to 
come up with country scores that are in turn classifi ed on three dimensions: an average 
score of 1–2.5 are considered free; average scores of 3.0–5.0 are partly free and a score 
of 5.5–7.0 are tabbed as not free.
8 Countries in the Polity Index are grouped into fi ve categories: Full Democracies (score 
of 10); Democracies (scores of 6–9); Open Anocracy (1–5); Closed Anocracy (−5–0); 
Autocracies (−6–−10).
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 9 An ‘anocracy’ is defi ned as a regime that is characterized by inherent qualities of 
political instability and ineffectiveness, as well as an ‘incoherent mix of democratic and 
autocratic traits and practices’.
10 See ‘African viewpoint: Is Malawi reverting to dictatorship?’ available online at http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13266263, accessed 18 February 2016.
11 For example, demand for democracy among 31 African countries, Malawi inclusive, in 
2014 was 49 per cent. This was almost identical to Malawi’s fi gure of 50 per cent.
12 Some 89 per cent of northerners voted for the introduction of multiparty rule. This 
compares to 85 per cent southerners and 32 per cent of people in the central region.
13 The indicators include respondents to a general question that asks respondents to 
indicate their evaluations of the overall direction of the country; to indicate their 
perceptions of the general economic situation of the country; and to measure the 
respondent’s own perceived economic situation.
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3 Political parties, political 
settlement and development
Kizito Tenthani and Blessings Chinsinga
Introduction
Malawi achieved independence from Britain in 1964. However, the country slid 
into a one-party dictatorship immediately after independence, and multiparty 
politics was barred for over three decades. The country became a democracy in 
1993, when multiparty politics were reintroduced, and currently Malawi boasts 
over 50 registered political parties. This chapter traces the evolution and 
consolidation of four major political parties: Malawi Congress Party, United 
Democratic Front, Democratic Progressive Party and the People’s Party. The aim 
is to examine the various political settlements that these political parties 
negotiated and the impact of such settlements on economic and political 
development (or lack of it) in the country.
We begin by providing a brief historical overview of the development of the 
party system in the country before outlining a conceptual framework within 
which political parties in Malawi will be interrogated. Thereafter, we address the 
question of political ideologies, by examining how far parties are guided by 
ideological orientation. This is undertaken by presenting a study on party 
ideologies that was conducted by the Centre for Multiparty Democracy (CMD – 
Malawi) based in Lilongwe. We conclude by arguing that political parties in 
Malawi are not playing their rightful role of championing social economic 
transformation, and that they are largely to blame for the lack of economic 
development of the country.
The political history of Malawi: An overview
The modern political history of Malawi can be traced to 1893, when so-called 
Nyasa districts were formally named as British Central Africa Protectorate with 
the headquarters situated in Zomba. At that time, and until 1907 – when the 
country was renamed Nyasaland with the formalization of colonial structures in a 
constitutional framework called the Nyasaland Order in Council – politics was 
dominated by the European settlers. An early attempt at an Africa-led political 
organization to agitate for some special interest issues was led by John Chilembwe 
in 1915. Using his infl uence as a Church minister, Chilembwe mobilized a protest 
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movement against the inhuman treatment of the local population by European 
settlers, and the recruitment and use of Nyasa soldiers against the Germans in 
East Africa. The revolt was, however, crushed and Chilembwe was killed.
After the collapse of the Chilembwe uprising, the Nyasaland African Congress 
(NAC) led a more organized political organization with a greater national appeal 
in 1944. While the initial intention of the NAC was to coordinate the native 
associations and other groups within Nyasaland (Ross, 2009), the declaration of 
a Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953 changed the game plan in that 
the fi ght against the Federation and the push for self-government became the 
principle agenda of the NAC. During the time when the NAC was formed, 
Hastings Kamuzu Banda, a prominent Nyasa (as Malawians were then called), 
had spent nearly four decades outside the country, for the most part in the USA 
and United Kingdom, and briefl y in Kumasi, Ghana. He was following the 
political developments in Malawi closely and became an ardent supporter of the 
NAC. When Banda returned to Malawi in 1958, he assumed the leadership of 
NAC and immediately went on a drive to mobilize people to agitate for the end 
of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. His arguments and rallying points 
were that Nyasaland was not benefi ting from the federation arrangement as it was 
merely considered to be a source of cheap labour for developing economies such 
as that of Rhodesia. This stirred so much unrest that in 1959 the NAC was 
banned and its leaders including Banda were arrested. During this period, the 
Malawi Congress Party (MCP) emerged to replace the NAC and continued to 
agitate for independence. And when the fi rst parliamentary elections were 
organized in 1961, the Malawi Congress Party won all contested seats, apart from 
the seats that were reserved for the white minority (Chirwa, 2014). The MCP 
became the dominant political force, and held 22 of the 28 seats in the legislative 
council (Banda, 2014).
The poor showing of most political parties in the 1961 elections notwithstanding, 
Malawi attained independence as a multiparty democratic state in 1963. The 
MCP, however, dominated the April 1964 elections once again. And with the 
remaining political parties disintegrating, a new constitution was enacted in 
1966, which declared Malawi as a single party state (Mariyamkono and 
Kanyongolo, 2003). Why would a political party that benefi ted from a multiparty 
system turn against the very system that provided space for it to thrive? As has 
been argued elsewhere (Ross, 2009), the MCP came into being after the Nyasaland 
Africa Congress was banned. The MCP was therefore formed when Hastings 
Banda – himself a late addition to the top echelons of the NAC politburo, despite 
being an infl uential and dominant fi gure – was in detention.
The party was fortunate to be well endowed with potential leaders who drove 
the agenda of the NAC and later the MCP itself when Banda was in jail. Most 
notable among these leaders were Orton Chirwa (who presided over the transition 
of the NAC into the MCP), Henry Chipembere (an intelligent and charismatic 
orator) and Dunduzu Chisiza (an independent-minded and foresighted leader) 
(Lwanda, 2009). Some have argued that the MCP’s aversion for multiparty 
politics stemmed from a desire to accelerate development (Cammack and Kelsall, 
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2010). Given the numerous developmental challenges the country faced, there 
appeared to be a need in some circles to rally behind a strong leader rather than 
waste time with opposition politics. Another, and perhaps a more plausible, 
motivation for the country to slide into a one-party dictatorship was what 
subsequently came to be known as a ‘cabinet crisis’ that erupted only weeks after 
the country gained independence in 1964.
The cabinet crisis arose after the ambitious and mostly youthful ministers in 
the cabinet began noticing the dictatorial tendencies emerging from Hasting 
Banda’s rule. For example, the President was seen to be undermining the day-to-
day functions of his ministers and his unilateral decision to accept the Skinner 
Report (Skinner, 1964) (which purportedly gave lower wages to Africans for the 
same job) was another bone of contention. Several of Banda’s ministers, moreover, 
did not subscribe to the regime’s foreign policy, especially Banda’s alignment with 
apartheid-tainted South Africa. Yet another source of dissatisfaction was Banda’s 
proposal to levy hospital fees on rural Africans (Baker, 2001; Lwanda, 2009).
Despite growing discontentment, Banda persevered and survived all challenges 
to his power. As would later become typical of his rule, his strategy included a 
reliance on the MCP grassroots machinery for political support, and he portrayed 
revolting ministers as evil. Banda continued to successfully employ his ‘divide 
and rule’ tactics and propelled some loyal followers such as Gwanda Chakuamba, 
Aleke Banda, Albert Muwalo and John Tembo to the highest echelons of power 
and infl uence, effectively replacing Orton Chirwa, Henry Chipembere, Yatuta 
Chisiza and others who were the leaders of the cabinet revolt (Baker, 2001). 
These loyalists, who were swiftly promoted in the power structure, also turned out 
to be the foot soldiers that in 1966 championed and advanced the quest for the 
country to become a one-party state. This situation prevailed from 1966 to 1994.
The original Constitution of 1964, which was drafted by the British Colonial 
Offi ce, had an entrenched Bill of Rights that guaranteed a wide variety of civil 
and political rights and freedoms – including freedom of speech, assembly and 
association. This encouraged the formation of numerous political parties. 
However, the Bill of Rights was removed from the subsequent Republican 
Constitution of 1966, which went on to declare that the Malawi Congress Party 
would be the only party allowed to operate within the country. With the removal 
of the Bill of Rights, political parties were not the only casualties. Indeed, all 
fundamental rights of citizens were under threat as there were no effective 
safeguards from arbitrary decisions of the Banda regime. What followed was a 
state of tyranny and oppression. Banda’s opponents either disappeared or were 
detained without trial, and the justice system was severely undermined while 
there was a general shrinking of space for political discourse. The MCP and the 
government became synonymous, and the period 1966–94 was characterized by 
authoritarianism, paternalism, repression and economic domination and 
exploitation (Mhone, 1992).
A summation of the ills of the one-party dictatorship that followed were well 
espoused in ‘Living our Faith’, a pastoral letter written by the Catholic bishops of 
Malawi, which arguably put the last nail in the dictatorship’s coffi n and paved the 
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way for more open challenges to Banda’s hitherto undisputed power. The letter 
argued for the need for the respect of basic human rights and freedoms (including 
the right to free speech and association), and was hence a direct attack on the 1966 
Constitution that was in force. The letter also specifi cally mentioned that every 
constitution ought to have a bill of rights, as a way of safeguarding human dignity, 
and went on to denounce the infringement of rights of the critics of Banda’s rule. A 
major criticism levelled against the regime by the pastoral letter was the accusation 
that the education sector not only continued to be underdeveloped, but was also 
actively being undermined by the MCP (Mhone, 1992; Mitchell, 2012). As a 
result, the majority of the population was forced to join the underpaid labour 
market in order to service the growing commercial agriculture sector (mainly the 
production of burley tobacco), which was controlled by business elites directly or 
indirectly linked to the political establishment of the MCP.
The one-party dictatorship that developed post-1966 was defi ned by ruthless 
suppression of dissenting views: detention without trial, political disappearances, 
political assassinations, and suppression of academic, religious and artistic freedoms. 
Trade unionism was prohibited and the civil society arena was stifl ed. And only 
international development NGOs such as Save the Children were allowed to 
operate in the country. Schools were not allowed to teach or discuss politics, apart 
from in courses on ‘civics’, a compulsory subject in primary school aimed at 
socializing school children and brainwashing them with the regime’s emphasis on 
four so-called cornerstone principles: unity, discipline, loyalty and obedience. Not 
surprisingly, these principles were actively used as tools for further oppression and 
subjugation (Mhone, 1992; Divala, 2007). The sole alternative for people to 
participate in the political sphere was through attendance of MCP rallies and the 
purchase of the compulsory party ‘membership’ card. Anyone who refused to toe 
the party line was severely dealt with by the ever-present youth leaguers or the 
notorious Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP).1 The political norm was set by the MCP 
apologists, often using the name of Hastings Banda, and any deviation from that set 
norm, real or imaginary, was taken to be an act of treason punishable by 
imprisonment without trial (Mpasu, 2995; Kasambara, 1998).
Another signifi cant dimension of the one-party rule was the grip the MCP had 
on the national economy. Malawi’s economy is largely agriculture-based, and 
tobacco has dominated the agriculture sector for decades. The new political elites 
that emerged after independence saw the tobacco sector as an effective instrument 
for extracting rents. The political and economic systems were systematically 
planned and state interventions conducted in a manner that benefi ted those who 
were close to the centre of power in the party (Mhone, 1992). Thus the political 
structure was used to underpin, propagate and perpetuate its own domination in 
the economy by using a variety of state-driven tactics, such as ensuring a steady 
supply of cheap labour, and state monopoly in the agriculture marketing boards. 
The state was regulating the production and marketing of barley tobacco. The 
Press Corporation conglomerate ensured the extraction and appropriation of 
rents to the politically connected elites in support and perpetuation of the MCP 
machinery (Van Donge, 2002b).
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The ensuing political settlement that emerged during the one-party era was 
defi ned largely by a heavy-handed authoritarian system that had a stranglehold 
on the only productive sector of the economy: estate agriculture (Van Donge, 
2002a; Cammack, 2011). Thus, the political elites and others well connected to 
the political establishment were extracting rents through participation in the 
regulated economy, especially the estate sector. While economic analyses from 
the 1980s show that Malawi was a success story despite widespread patrimonialism, 
(World Bank, 1981), the political settlement was built on a foundation based on 
an underlying set of economic contradictions (Mhone, 1992).
The economic system was designed to favour and benefi t the elite – the small 
group of individuals and families that were politically connected to the centre of 
power in the MCP. These were politicians, civil servants, traders and businessmen, 
and estate owners. Through the organization and regulation of the economy, the 
elites extracted rents by getting preferential and subsidized credits, where resources 
from business were diverted to politics and where for political expediency, market 
price signals were constantly ignored (Van Donge, 2002a). The elites who were 
benefi ciaries of this system were merely supporters of the existing political 
establishment, and not of the long-term development needs of the country. Thus, 
there was the emergence of an extractive political settlement where the elites 
pursued short-term goals at the expense of long-term developmental goals that 
could have been more benefi cial to Malawi (Khan, 2010).
Scholars argue that a political settlement results in positive development 
outcomes when the cost of maintaining it is favourable to the elites and when it is 
inclusive and not predatory (Acemoglu et al., 2004; Khan, 2010). Such was not the 
case for Malawi. The political settlement reached was not broad based and hence 
resulted in widespread discontentment. The political centre that used a strong and 
ruthless state–party machine to crush opposition and dissent was getting weak. The 
authority that used its highly centralized executive to implement its development 
policy (including centralization of the production and distribution of rents and 
ensuring compliance while rewarding loyalists) could no longer hold. And the 
whole settlement faltered on its own weight (Cammack, 2011). The prevailing 
settlement was also increasingly challenged by external economic shocks and the 
growing popularity of opposition parties, which in turn ushered in a new political 
dispensation of multiparty politics.
Malawians found themselves in another struggle for independence in 1992, but 
now in a fi ght for freedom from the dictatorship of the one-party state. Just as in the 
struggle for independence, the struggle in 1992 was not only a political one, but an 
economic one as well, with the multiparty politics advocates promising more 
economic freedom, which would translate into the realization of comprehensive 
economic rights (Oloka-Onyango, 1995). This resonates well with the Nobel 
laureate Amartya Sen’s well-known conception of ‘development as freedom’, where 
the process of development requires the removal of major sources of ‘unfreedoms’ 
(Sen, 1999). Thus, the fi ght for freedom was in fact the struggle for development 
since the lack of substantive freedoms had only perpetuated poverty and denied 
Malawians the enjoyment of basic rights to food and shelter.
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The transition to multiparty democracy in 1993 was therefore considered to be 
an opportunity that would not only lead to political emancipation, but also a new 
environment where the role and functions of political parties in Malawi were 
broadened to include being agents of change and sustainable transformation. 
However, after more than two decades following the transition to democracy, the 
Malawian political system remains highly fragile (Cammack, 2011). The fragility 
of the country’s democracy was particularly heightened during the last years of 
President Mutharika’s term in offi ce. Malawi experienced tremendous political, 
economic and social challenges, which were rooted in serious lapses in governance 
and the systemic failures to invoke checks and balances as provided in the 
country’s Constitution. This culminated in a series of protests in July 2011, 
leading to the death of twenty individuals as Malawians across all walks of life 
rose to reclaim the ideals of the democratic dispensation they fought for in the 
early 1990s. These protests also showed to the rest of the world that ruling elites 
continued to maintain their grip on power despite not enjoying widespread 
popular support. Indeed, the mass protests of July 2011 aptly summed up general 
public disappointment with the achievements of the multiparty system since the 
elections that were held in May 1994. The performance of successive governments 
is hardly inspiring when assessed against the expectations the transition to a 
multiparty political dispensation initially raised. According to Van Donge 
(1995), Malawians enthusiastically embraced democracy as a magic wand that 
would solve the political, economic and social ills that they had endured for at 
least three decades under the authoritarian rule of Hastings Banda – a regime that 
not only actively used political oppression but also did not offi cially recognize the 
existence of poverty!
The record of Malawian political parties as primary agents in building up a 
viable democratic dispensation in the country is not very inspiring. Indeed, all 
political parties in the country have failed to meaningfully play their role in 
spearheading fundamental and sustainable democratic and structural 
transformation. While transition from a one-party to a multiparty democratic 
dispensation has taken place, it has not been accompanied by discernible 
transformation, particularly in terms of how the day-to-day governance activities 
in various spheres are conducted.
Thus, the popular diagnosis of the political system is that political parties are 
unable to drive and preside over a visionary political, economic and social agenda 
because they are not strongly grounded in ideology. None of the parties have 
adequately refl ected on what they stand for and how they differ from each other. 
Consequently, it is invariably diffi cult for political parties to justify their existence 
beyond serving as vehicles for contesting state power once every fi ve years. This 
makes it extremely diffi cult for parties to envision the world as it should be and 
specifying acceptable means of attaining social, economic and political ideals.
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Understanding political parties
Providing a universally accepted defi nition of political parties is a futile exercise, 
as parties must be understood within a given context, specifi c ideology and 
specifi c cultural settings. Ranny and Kendall (1956) defi ne political parties as 
autonomous groups with an aim of making nominations and contesting in 
elections for the purposes of controlling people and policies in government. Thus, 
the raison d’état of political parties is their use as vehicles for winning elections 
and to infl uence public policies.
A political party, in the defi nition advanced by Shively (2008: 247), is defi ned 
as ‘a group of offi cials or would-be offi cials who are linked with a sizable group of 
citizens into an organization; a chief object of this organization is to ensure that 
its offi cials attain power or are maintained in power’. Such a defi nition points to 
the need for parties to have meaningful linkages with the citizenry from which 
they can derive their legitimacy. Further, the defi nition asserts the need for 
attaining power or being maintained in power, which can also be extrapolated to 
mean that small but signifi cant political parties can actually infl uence the use of 
power even if they do not form the government or are the main opposition 
parties. Examples of such parties are those with strong grassroots linkages and 
community-based organizations and civil society organizations. However, not all 
such entities have higher-level national agendas, as many so-called street-level 
parties profess a localized agenda and may thus not be interested in contesting 
national offi ces (Ogunwa, 2012). A political party, moreover, must articulate an 
explicit ideology, expressed in a programme or manifesto, which will allow it to 
build a platform in the quest for political power. Thus, it needs to develop and 
sustain a structure that is constantly engaging with the citizenry and trying to 
drum up support in order for it to make a meaningful impact on the polity.
One of the core functions of political parties is to aggregate and represent the 
interest of citizens (Key, 1964). Thus, a political party must have in-built 
mechanisms for capturing the real interests of citizens, which are often varied and 
at times competing, and attempt to propose policy alternatives that best serve the 
maximum number of its supporters. In doing so, Key observes that political parties 
may have to take into account views of other interest groups within the society, 
thereby establishing regular contact with civil society. Others have suggested 
that ‘political parties articulate and aggregate interests, in pursuit of their electoral 
and policymaking functions’ and ‘represent citizens who have interests’ (NIMD, 
2004: 9). Thus, it is inconceivable that a political party will not attempt to 
infl uence, and, in the process, most likely be infl uenced by, some civil society 
organizations such as business associations and unions (NIMD, 2004: 9).
As parties engage the citizenry and advance their policy agendas, they also 
begin to generate awareness and educate citizens on political issues (Katz and 
Crotty, 2006). Upon galvanizing the interests of the people and processing them 
into policy alternatives, political parties become interlocutors between the 
citizens and the state.
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Perhaps one of the most pronounced functions of political parties is that of 
identifying, recruiting, screening and popularizing potential leaders. Through the 
party establishment, leaders are nurtured and prepared to take up leadership roles 
within the political party itself, as well as in national and local legislatures, and 
broadly in government (Key, 1964; Katz and Crotty, 2006). And, through these 
leaders, parties play other important functions – running the government should 
they win an election or assuming the role of the opposition party and holding the 
ruling party and government to account.
There have been numerous accounts documenting the declining role and 
dysfunctional nature of political parties. One line of argument is that politics is 
no longer noble or relevant and that parties are weak (or ‘hollow shells’), unable 
to discharge their democratic obligations to their supporters or the electorate 
(Vongdouangchanh, 2006). Others argue that parties have largely failed to meet 
the expectations of citizens or simply failed to provide bold alternatives to social 
challenges. Still others claim that parties are facing enormous challenges in 
mobilizing their supporters given the weakening roots of their political base in 
local communities.
While there is a general distrust and low rating of political parties, however, no 
other alternative has been identifi ed for an effective and functional democracy to 
emerge and be sustained. Indeed, parties are indispensable in performing checks 
on the arbitrary power of government. They are also instrumental in providing 
leaders that, at least on paper, represent the interest of the citizenry;– leaders who 
are able to articulate and package the needs and aspirations of the citizenry into 
policy alternatives.
Political parties in Malawi
The Constitution of Malawi, section 40 (1), makes reference to political parties 
by spelling out the rights of people to establish, and become members of political 
parties, while section 40 (2) provides for public fi nancing of parties based on 
specifi c criteria for entities that qualify to receive such funding.2 A more detailed 
guidance to the creation and operation of political parties is found in the Political 
Parties (Registration and Regulation) Act (PPRRA) of 1993. The PPRRA was 
enacted 20 days after Malawians opted to revert to a multiparty democracy model 
in a referendum that was held on 14 June 1993. It is not surprising that many 
scholars and commentators have identifi ed numerous shortcomings of the 
PPRRA, given the sheer speed with which the legislation was enacted. For 
example, one would have expected that the PPRRA would be formulated in the 
spirit of the Constitution to refl ect and be in tandem with the liberal democratic 
principles such as transparency and accountability. The Act does not, however, 
make any implicit or explicit reference to guidelines for parties to, for instance, 
embrace internal democratic practices.
The PPRRA provides for the creation of the Offi ce of the Registrar of Political 
Parties as an interim arrangement. And, until such time as this Registrar is 
appointed, it provides that the Registrar General shall act as the registrar of 
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political parties. Almost two decades after the PPRRA’s enactment, the position 
of Registrar of Political Parties is yet to be fi lled, and no attempt whatsoever has 
been made to fi ll this position. Moreover, an examination of the interim 
functioning of the offi ce of the Registrar General fi nds that the ruling party and 
its leaders considerably infl uence the offi ce. Two incidents in particular point in 
this direction. First, although it is relatively easy to register a party in Malawi, 
some parties have in reality struggled to get themselves registered. In 2003, 
President Bakili Muluzi – leader of the United Democratic Front (UDF) party – 
fell out with his staunch supporter, the infl uential Brown Mpinganjira, who 
subsequently went on to establish his own party – the National Democratic 
Alliance (NDA). Mpinganjira, however, struggled to get his organization 
registered amidst pressure exerted on the Registrar General by the President. 
Also, in 2010, President Bingu wa Mutharika – leader of the Democratic People’s 
Party (DPP) – found himself at odds with the Vice-President and fellow DPP 
member Joyce Banda. When Banda fi nally left the DPP to form the People’s Party 
(PP), she found it diffi cult to get the organization registered. And registration was 
only possible after the intervention of the judiciary.
In terms of the criteria that an aspiring political party should meet in order to 
be registered, the Act stipulates that at least 100 individuals must endorse the 
application. The Act does not stipulate the backgrounds of these individuals or 
who qualify to endorse an application. As a result, Malawi has witnessed a 
dramatic rise in the number of parties registered – from the 7 political parties that 
contested the 1994 elections to the current tally of 55.
The PPRRA is also silent about the private fi nancing of political parties, and 
as a result parties are under no obligation to declare their funding sources. Further, 
the parties are not required by the Act to declare their assets. Many individuals 
and organizations therefore fi nd it puzzling that ruling parties always appear to be 
extremely well-endowed with resources while opposition parties fi nd it diffi cult to 
generate funds for party activities. The problem has come to light in the recent 
Cashgate scandal when the Director of Public Prosecutions, while commenting 
on the actions of an indicted offi cial, remarked that political parties and their 
agents have aspired for the control of government in order to use that as a means 
of appropriating wealth to themselves (The Nation, September 2015). They either 
award their supporters and loyalists with lucrative contracts or they tend to 
directly siphon off funds from the state.
After proving this brief overview of the framework within which political 
parties operate in Malawi, the ensuing sections will examine why political parties 
appear to have failed to function as agents of fundamental and sustainable socio-
economic transformation in one of the poorest countries of the world. We will 
focus on the four major parties – MCP, UDF, DPP and PP – and assess them in 
relation to three sets of interrelated issues: corruption and patronage, weak or 
absent ideological platforms and persistent leadership struggles.
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The emergence of four ‘major’ parties
It is challenging to determine a criterion for categorizing political parties as major 
or minor. It is even more challenging to do so in the case of Malawi because of 
the absence of a criterion for registering and tracking members of political parties. 
Notwithstanding such challenges, we will apply two main criteria in this chapter. 
First, we will consider a party as being major if it has been in government (i.e. has 
been a ruling party). In Malawi, this would imply that the party participated in 
the presidential elections and succeeded in sponsoring a candidate to the 
presidency. Second, we will use the number of parliamentary seats that the party 
has in the national assembly to classify them into major and minor categories. 
Table 3.1 indicates that of the 54 registered political parties that Malawi had as 
it went to the tripartite elections3 in 2014, only 17 participated in the 
parliamentary elections. And out of these 17 political parties, only 4 – MCP, 
DPP, UDF, PP – fi elded candidates in over 30 per cent of parliamentary seats. 
These were also the same parties that won a signifi cant number of seats. Indeed, 
only two other parties, AFORD and CCP, won representation in the National 
Assembly, with 1 seat each. Thus, for all practical purposes, the MCP, UDF, DPP 
and PP are considered the major parties in the Malawian context.
Malawi Congress Party (MCP)
The MCP is the oldest of all the political parties in Malawi, having been 
established in 1959 and with the aim of replacing the Nyasaland Africa Congress 
(NCA). There was widespread unrest in 1959 when the country was agitating for 
cessation from the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and the NCA had 
been banned. Orton Chirwa, MCP’s founding president, was in effect a caretaker 
leader, keeping the position warm for Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda, who was at 
that time incarcerated by the colonial administration at Gweru Prison.
Upon release from prison, Banda assumed leadership of the MCP and, in the 
fi rst elections held in 1961, the party won all the contested seats4 (Chirwa, 
Table 3.1 Participation of parties in parliamentary elections, 2014
Party No. of candidates
(Total: 193 constituencies)








NLP, MAFUNDE, UP, PETRA 4
MPP, PDM 1
Source: Compilation from Malawi Government Gazettes and Malawi Electoral Commission (various years)
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2014). Banda was appointed Prime Minister, and, after Malawi achieved 
independence in 1964, the party faced its fi rst major challenge – the ‘cabinet crisis’ 
that we discussed earlier. This crisis forced the party to fi nd unorthodox ways of 
consolidating their hold on power, and in 1966 the party machinery successfully 
advocated the repeal of the constitutionally provided Bill of Rights, which made 
it the only political party allowed to operate in Malawi. MCP enjoyed a stranglehold 
on power from 1966 to 1993, when a referendum was held and the country voted 
to revert to multiparty politics. In the ensuing 1994 general elections, the party 
won only 56 seats and its candidate (Kamuzu Banda) went on to lose the presidency 
to the United Democratic Front. The party has since remained the country’s 
strongest opposition party by winning 66 seats in the 1999 elections and 56 in the 
2004 elections. Its lowest point was in 2014, when it won a mere 27 seats. In the 
latest election held in May 2014, the MCP emerged with 48 seats (see Table 3.2 
for comparison with the performance of the other political parties).
The United Democratic Front (UDF)
The UDF began as a coalition of business people and former politicians and civil 
servants who had either fallen out of grace with the MCP or become disillusioned 
with Banda’s stranglehold on power. The party rode on the wave of change, 
joining the Alliance for Democracy, and became a formidable pressure group 
agitating for change after the 1992 Catholic Bishops pastoral letter. UDF was 
registered as a political party in 1993, and contested the 1994 general elections. 
Bakili Muluzi, UDF’s leader and presidential candidate, triumphed in the 
elections and ended the dominance of MCP in Malawian politics.
Apart from winning the presidency, the UDF also won a large majority of seats 
in the National Assembly in 1994, getting 85 seats out of 177. The party’s 
popularity under President Muluzi ensured yet another election triumph in 1999, 
when it increased its parliamentary strength to 93 seats. After two terms in offi ce, 
and following a failed attempt at securing a third term, President Muluzi and his 
party began to lose its grip on the electorate. Muluzi nominated Bingu wa 
Mutharika as the UDF’s presidential candidate (hoping to retain control of the 
party and the government), but the party won only 49 seats in the 2004 elections. 
And although the party won the presidency, it suddenly found itself sitting on the 
opposition benches when the presidential candidate they successfully sponsored,– 
Table 3.2 Results from parliamentary elections, 1994–2014
Party 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014
AFORD 36 29 6 1 1
DPP N/A N/A N/A 112 50
MCP 56 66 57 28 48
PP N/A N/A N/A N/A 26
UDF 85 93 49 17 14
Source: Compilation from Malawi Government Gazettes and Malawi Electoral Commission (various years)
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Bingu wa Mutharika,– ditched the UDF and formed his own political party – the 
DPP. Thus, with a mismanaged succession in 2004 the numbers continued to 
dwindle for the party, and in the 2014 elections it was able to win a mere 14 seats.
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)
As discussed above, Bingu wa Mutharika became President of Malawi on a UDF 
ticket following an impressive campaign funded and orchestrated by two-term 
president Bakili Muluzi. However, Mutharika was not content at being Muluzi’s 
puppet, and literally ran away with the presidency when he formed the DPP with 
breakaway factions of the UDF. The creation of the DPP was helped by the 
absence of constitutional provisions that address a situation whereby a president, 
upon winning the elections, resigns from the party that sponsored him into offi ce. 
Thus the DPP was formed from within parliament: MPs elected on UDF tickets 
or independents crossed the fl oor and formed a new political outfi t. This renewed 
a debate on fl oor crossing as enshrined in section 65 of the Constitution, which 
states that members who defect from one party to join another party represented 
in the House are deemed to have crossed the fl oor, and consequently they will 
lose their seats.
The UDF and MCP pushed for the implementation of the fl oor-crossing 
provision, to declare vacant the seats of the MPs who had defected. However, a 
series of court injunctions obtained from the members who believed they would 
be affected by the provision effectively tied the hands of the Speaker of the 
National Assembly and no seat was declared vacant. The DPP only managed to 
get ‘its own’ MPs following by-elections that were held in December 2005, when 
it won all the fi ve contested seats.
Bingu wa Mutharika’s and DPP’s fi rst term in offi ce was fi lled with political 
tensions in Parliament, as the party faced the combined wrath of the UDF (who 
felt cheated) and the MCP (who actually thought they had won the elections by 
securing the majority of seats in Parliament). Indeed, UDF and MCP commanded 
a formidable opposition block that managed to frustrate the DPP’s attempts to 
govern the country as it saw fi t. The most prominent of all debates that defi ned 
this period (from 2005, when the DPP was formed, to 2009) included the issue 
surrounding the fl oor-crossing provision, popularly known as section 65 in the 
Constitution and the passing of the annual national budget. The UDF and the 
MCP managed to frustrate and punish the DPP by declaring that they would only 
support the national budget if members of parliament who were deemed to have 
crossed the fl oor had their seats declared vacant, a move which could have 
possibly led to the collapse of the DPP administration since it could have lost 
almost all its members except the fi ve who had won seats through a by-election.
The DPP for its part used a range of tactics to avoid discussing the fl oor-crossing 
issue: it regularly sought court injunctions, refused to fund parliamentary sittings 
(since in Malawi, for Parliament to convene, the Speaker has to fi rst consult the 
President and obtain consent)5 and prorogued parliament in order to prevent 
debates on section 65. Thus, when the opposition tied the passing of the budget 
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to the implementation of the fl oor-crossing provision, it forced Mutharika and 
the DPP to pursue such policies as infrastructure development and subsidy 
programmes as a way of connecting to the people (Cammack, 2011).
The DPP launched a massive propaganda drive telling the public that the 
opposition’s actions in blocking the budget proceedings would cause much 
hardship. For example, the party claimed that the government would not be able 
to pay civil servants, provide drugs in the hospitals and, perhaps the most effective 
propaganda piece, –implement the hugely popular farm input subsidy programme 
(FISP). The party, exercising control over public broadcasters, targeted primarily 
the rural population with low literacy levels and generally poor, hence more 
vulnerable to manipulation than urban groups. Sections of civil society were also 
roped in, and the country witnessed a spirited campaign by civil society 
organizations in support of the government and argued that politicization of 
national issues was causing more harm to poor and vulnerable groups. The above 
set of strategies worked well for the DPP, and opposition parties were severely 
punished in the 2009 elections. Bingu wa Mutharika not only won the presidency, 
but the DPP won a landslide victory with 113 MPs winning seats (the highest a 
single party had ever amassed in the post-1993 era) against a miserable 27 for the 
MCP and a meagre 17 for the UDF.
Soon after gaining such overwhelming support in an election that drastically 
weakened the power and infl uence of the opposition parties, the desire of the 
DPP to impress the masses with tangible development interventions became less 
urgent (Cammack, 2011). The period also witnessed growing intolerance and 
autocratic tendencies of the Bingu wa Mutharika administration. In particular, 
President Mutharika, perhaps aware of his age and failing health, began to 
actively promote the idea of his younger brother – Peter Mutharika – as his 
successor and hence the next president of Malawi. Thus, the DPP – just like its 
rival the UDF in previous years – continued the tradition of succession politics. 
As Cammack (2011) observes, increased allegations of corruption began to 
surface coinciding with a worsening of the general social and economic situation 
of the country. Tobacco prices during this period were at their lowest, and the 
country faced a severe scarcity of fuel, foreign exchange and basic necessities. 
Such problems provided the background for mass protests that were held in 
various parts of the country in July 2011. As fate would have it, President 
Mutharika died unexpectedly while in offi ce and a period of political instability 
ensued. The automatic choice to succeed Mutharika was the Vice-President, 
Joyce Banda, but the DPP leadership had other plans, as Banda had previously 
been expelled from the DPP and had gone on to establish her own political party 
– the People’s Party. The DPP had already appointed the late President’s brother– 
Peter Mutharika– as party president, and a group of senior leaders tried to seek 
the support of the judiciary and the military to have a new Mutharika assume the 
presidency. Such attempts did not bear fruit, and Joyce Banda took over 
as the fi rst female President of Malawi. The DPP suddenly found itself relegated 
to the opposition benches with the People’s Party becoming a de facto ruling 
party and attracting fl oor-crossing MPs from other parties, including the DPP. 
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Banda’s popularity, however, was short lived, as we discuss below, and the DPP 
fared much better in the 2014 elections (securing 50 seats in Parliament, and its 
candidate won a closely fought contest for the presidency).
The People’s Party (PP)
The People’s Party was founded in 2011 by Joyce Banda who was at that time the 
Vice-President of Malawi, having contested the 2009 elections as a running mate 
for Bingu wa Mutharika on a DPP ticket. Between 2009 and 2011, Banda and 
President Mutharika began disagreeing over numerous issues, and a range of 
circumstances (which we will discuss later in this chapter), resulted in her 
expulsion from the DPP. With no constitutional mechanism providing for the 
resolution of such situations, Joyce Banda continued to serve in her post as Vice-
President (just as Bingu wa Mutharika did upon fi rst being elected on a UDF 
ticket and later switching to a newly formed party), despite being fi red from the 
party on whose ticket she was elected to the vice-presidency.
Following the sudden death of Bingu wa Mutharika, Joyce Banda ascended to 
the presidency in April 2012 to serve out the former president’s term, and her PP 
became the de facto ruling party. Despite being a very young and inexperienced 
political entity, the PP had to hit the ground running as it came into offi ce at a 
time when Malawi’s economy was in serious trouble. The party not only had to 
try and resolve immediately economic problems, but it also had to lay the 
foundations and prepare for a general election that was to be held within the 
short span of two years. The PP’s tasks appeared insurmountable and the party 
not only won a mere 26 seats, its candidate (Joyce Banda) lost heavily in the 
presidential elections, coming in a distant third.
Ideological malaise of political parties in Malawi6
An ideology is a worldview or a lens through which one sees the world. It is a 
framework through which one can interpret various social problems that a society 
faces. Thus, an ideology often provides the foundational basis for political action. 
It is diffi cult to provide a universal defi nition of an ideology because of the very 
nature of the concept. As Heywood (1997: 141) observes:
no one sees the world as it is [since] all of us look at the world through a veil 
of theories, presumptions and assumptions [such] that when we look at the 
world, we are also engaged in imposing meaning upon it.
A recent study (Chinsinga, 2013) fi nds that political parties in Malawi cannot be 
fi rmly distinguished from each other on the basis of their ideological orientations. 
Indeed, the study fi nds that justifi cation given by informants (MPs and other 
leaders) for either joining or quitting political parties do not qualify as issues that 
can be tested and defi ned along the ideological spectrum. Rather, four sets of 
interrelated factors determine the formation and functioning of political parties 
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in Malawi – patronage, clientelism, ethnicity and tribalism. In the ensuing 
sections, we will examine the professed ideological foundations of the four major 
political parties in the country. This will help further deepen our understanding 
of the policy formation dynamics within political parties and examine whether 
the policymaking processes are informed by any particular ideological leaning. 
The empirical basis is formed by the debates and discourse during the annual 
conventions that these four parties have held in recent years.
The Malawi Congress Party (MCP)
The MCP held a convention in November 2008, just before its election manifesto 
was fi nalized. However, prior to the convention, MCP had mooted the idea of 
reworking its election manifesto justifi ed as a strategy to develop a crop of leaders, 
party agents, values and ideals.
The 2008 convention passed resolutions on the basis of the party president’s 
opening speech. These included:
• delegates unanimously endorsed John Tembo as party president;
• delegates unanimously endorsed Tembo as the party’s presidential candidate 
for the May 2009 elections;
• the party’s vice-presidential candidate for the 2009 elections should be 
elected by the National Executive Committee (NEC);
• if elected to power, the MCP will prioritize implementation of the universal 
fertilizer subsidy programme;
• a government formed by the MCP will not take revenge for the atrocities 
infl icted on the party or its leadership by other parties;
• a government formed by the MCP will give top priority to agriculture, 
extension services and irrigation programmes;
• a government formed by the MCP will prioritise equitable distribution of 
development resources throughout the country;
• a government formed by the MCP will work with other parties with similar 
policies, while allowing these parties to maintain their individual identities;
• the MCP will pursue a well-designed youth policy with a view to engaging 
the youth in national development; and
• leaders of the MCP will be elected by the people and not imposed on the 
people by the party leadership.
Following these resolutions, the convention conducted elections to fi ll the vacant 
positions of Vice-President, Secretary General and Treasurer General. However, 
contrary to one of its resolutions of ensuring that the party’s leadership is popularly 
elected, the delegates mandated the party president to appoint ‘deserving people’ 
to the remaining positions in the NEC. The MCP eventually produced an 
election manifesto but argued that ‘the convention had little or no infl uence at 
all in the framing of the manifesto because the policy resolutions which were 
made were based on the president’s speech’ (Chinsinga, 2013: 39). Nonetheless, 
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MCP offi cials argued that ‘the convention was part and parcel of the process of 
developing an election manifesto because delegates, through the resolutions that 
were passed, had directed the shape and issues to be addressed in the manifesto’.
The United Democratic Front (UDF)
The UDF held its latest convention in November 2012, having held the previous 
one four years earlier. Both conventions were largely held to endorse the party’s 
presidential candidates for the May 2009 and 2014 elections, respectively. The 
major difference between the 2008 and 2012 conventions was that the latter 
included the election of new offi ce bearers in addition to endorsing the presidential 
candidate for the May 2014 elections.
In 2008, there were no calls within the party for an election manifesto although 
the party president’s speech to the convention contained a range of policy 
statements that would be typical of such a document. Indeed, the leader promised 
a new manifesto whose development would be highly participatory ‘in determining 
and validating the type of development agenda that will meet [our] aspirations for 
a better Malawi after May 2009’ (Chinsinga, 2013: 38).
By not holding a party conference, the party’s constitutional provision – 
empowering the party conference to decide on its election programme – was 
effectively ignored. Moreover, the 2008 convention lasted only for a day. No 
documents were circulated in advance, and no delegate spoke on any of the issues 
on the agenda. The same procedure was repeated at the 2012 convention. There 
were no substantive discussions on the party’s policy platform, apart from 
endorsing Atupele Muluzi as the UDF’s presidential candidate and fi lling up some 
NEC positions. The newly appointed presidential candidate, however, promised 
to hold a policy convention before the May 2014 general elections and this was 
done, making the UDF the only party to have held such an indaba aimed at 
discussing future public policy.
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)
Since it was founded in February 2005, the DPP has held two conventions – in 
2009 and 2013. The 2009 convention had only one agenda item: the adoption of 
the party’s parliamentary candidates and former president Mutharika, the party’s 
founder, as its presidential candidate for the May 2009 elections. Moreover, until 
the April 2013 convention, none of the party’s offi ce bearers had ever been 
elected to their positions. All decisions regarding party positions were taken 
either by the party leader or those very close to him.
DPP offi cials have on several occasions indicated to scholars that their 
National Governing Council (NGC) is responsible for the development of party 
policies and programmes. However, we found that most offi cials of the party did 
not possess even a rudimentary understanding of how the party develops its policy 
positions. Rather, we found that the DPP’s election manifesto was developed by 
a team of offi cials appointed by President Mutharika, in a process lacking 
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transparency. As a member of the manifesto team remarked, ‘Most of us learnt 
about the manifesto when it was released during the campaign, and we did not 
know who had developed it and how it was developed’ (Chinsinga, 2013).
We fi nd that, on paper, the party’s NGC plays a critical role in formulating 
policies. In reality, however, the NGC does not meet quarterly as it is supposed 
to. An offi cial observed that the NGC ‘meetings are hugely ad hoc, and few of us 
understand how the NGC operates’ (Chinsinga, 2013). Other offi cials claimed 
that ‘most of the critical party and policy decisions are taken by the party’s central 
executive committee, which is a sub-committee of the NGC . . . And the central 
executive committee essentially means the party president since most of the 
members are very loyal to him’ (Chinsinga, 2013). Thus, neither the DPP’s 
governing statutes nor the 2009 election manifesto were endorsed by the party 
convention despite the party constitution stipulating structures through which 
these processes are supposed to take place.
The major focus of the April 2013 convention was the election of offi ce bearers 
for the NGC. Apart from the acceptance speech by the former president’s brother, 
Peter Mutharika, as the party’s torchbearer in the May 2004 elections, the 
convention did not discuss or debate the party’s policy priorities. There was no 
indication at all whether a policy specifi c indaba would be held to discuss the 
party’s policy messages ahead of the May 2014 elections.
The People’s Party (PP)
The PP held its inaugural convention in August 2012. While the original plans 
were to organize a one-day event, a decision was taken to extend it by an extra 
day in order to meet logistical challenges. The convention had two main agenda 
items:
• to elect offi ce bearers; and
• to adopt the party’s election manifesto.
Despite the extra day, the convention did not manage to adopt the manifesto. 
While some party members claimed that the party did indeed have a specifi c 
manifesto, others dismissed such claims. Those who indicated that the PP did 
possess a manifesto argued that ‘a party of its calibre cannot exist without one; 
whatever President Joyce Banda says and does is a refl ection of PP’s manifesto’.
The functioning of parties in Malawi
The implication of the above fi ndings is that, while all major political parties 
express a desire to engage with their members in the process of developing party 
platforms and policies, they fail spectacularly to translate this commitment into 
practice. Indeed, Malawian parties fail ‘to function according to their own 
constitutions’ (Chinsinga, 2013: 40) mainly because of defi ciencies in intra-party 
democracy that subject parties to the suffocating grip of their leaders or founders.
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Our discussion above demonstrates some of the challenges that political parties 
in Malawi face, although such challenges are not particularly unique to Malawi. 
Other empirical studies of party manifesto development indicate defi ciencies in 
internal democracy and allude to the fact that the process of manifesto 
development is strongly controlled by the political elites (Cohen, 1999; Scarrow, 
2000). Thus, in spite of many opportunities for inputs and feedback from the rank 
and fi le party members and lower levels in party organization, the party elites in 
most countries nevertheless almost always dominate the process. Scarrow (2000: 
136) argues that ‘electoral leadership will seek to curtail the power of party 
congresses over policy by reducing the frequency with which they are held [and 
by simply putting such items off the agenda]’. The situation appears particularly 
relevant to Malawi where control of the manifesto remains in, or passes into, the 
hands of the electoral leadership.
Notwithstanding the numerous challenges of developing manifestos across 
parties in Malawi, there are even further challenges in communicating the 
manifestos to voters. The primary function of a manifesto is to inform the 
electorate of what the parties stand for especially since the expectation is that 
‘voters will make up their mind about who to vote for, at least partly, based on the 
party programme’ (Chinsinga, 2013: 40). This assumes or, indeed, presupposes a 
seamless fl ow of information from the parties to the electorate. However, our 
study fi nds this to be a huge challenge in Malawi, where parties are seldom 
concerned with effectively communicating with their followers, mainly due to 
the entrenched culture of secrecy and suspicion that exists in the political system. 
For example, none of the four major parties have websites with information on 
party programmes, and even the rudimentary information available on these sites 
is seldom updated. Indeed, it is extremely diffi cult to acquire a hard copy of a 
manifesto during the election campaign, even at a party’s offi cial headquarters, as 
parties and their leaders are wary of getting their ideas ‘stolen’. Hence, as one 
offi cial observed, ‘we prefer to keep our manifestos close to our chests; we only 
release them when we are absolutely sure that our competitors will not have 
adequate time to photocopy them for their own purposes.’
As a result of the weak or absent ideological foundations, Phiri (2000) and Mpesi 
(2009) argue that political parties in Malawi have the following characteristics:
• parties lack long-term vision and are largely preoccupied with securing short-
term survival and protecting the immediate economic interests of their 
constituents;
• parties often fail to successfully manage internal confl icts, which results in 
the formation of splinter groups or their leaders frequently switching loyalties 
with ease and without any sense of shame; and
• party leaders deliver inconsistent messages even during crucial national 
events.
Thus, the apparent ideological defi cit among political parties in Malawi has 
resulted in a multiparty democratic system in which political power and control 
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are built around personalities that centre on the ‘big man’ syndrome and their 
networks rather than organizations with clear ideologies and programmes. And as 
Mpesi (2009) argues, regionalism, ethnicity and a culture of hand-outs have 
become de facto guiding principles for ordinary Malawians when it comes to 
choosing between political parties.
Conclusion
This chapter set out to trace the development of political parties in Malawi with 
the aim of examining various political settlements that political parties have 
negotiated over the years. The goal was to assess the impact of such settlements 
on economic and political development (or lack of it) in Malawi. Malawians 
embraced democracy in 1993–94 in order to escape from the political, economic 
and social ills that they had endured for three decades under the authoritarian 
one-party rule of Hastings Banda. Thus, the struggle in 1993, just as in the 
independence struggle in the 1950s and 1960s, was not only a struggle for political 
emancipation but also a struggle for general improvements in the quality of life. 
Over two decades after the arrival of democracy, poverty levels remain alarmingly 
high and inequality is rising in the country (GoM, 2012).
The current legal framework has led to the opening of political space, with an 
exponential growth in the number of political parties, from 3 in 1994 to 55 by the 
time the country was holding its fi fth general election. However, political parties 
in Malawi have not been able to function as drivers of economic and social 
transformation. Considering that political parties are a central unit of governance 
in any democratic system of government (Maiyo, 2008), Malawians expected 
their parties to take control and drive the country towards a more assured future 
based on a specifi c and well-defi ned agenda of development (Mpesi, 2009). This 
has not happened. In the period between 1966 and 1994, the Malawi Congress 
Party created a clientelist political settlement that only benefi ted ruling political 
elites and their cronies. This state of affairs did not improve with the reintroduction 
of multiparty politics. While the country is witness to clientelistic party 
competition and maintains formal institutions of democracy (Khan, 2010), the 
fundamental political behaviours have remained the same (Cammack, 2011). All 
parties that have come to power in Malawi have perpetuated clientelistic 
behaviour, forging settlements within which the political elites and those well 
connected to the political establishment have benefi ted at the expense of national 
development. Political parties as critical actors in the policymaking processes 
have thus not provided an adequate forum through which the general populace 
can provide input in the policy discourses. Political parties have by and large been 
used to promote personal or sectional interests at the expense of a collective 
national good.
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Notes
1 The Youth League, was a youth branch of the MCP and was used to drum up support 
primarily through coercion and intimidation. The Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP), on 
the other hand, was a paramilitary wing that operated as a political militia, aimed at 
compliance enforcement and intelligence-gathering, though it also performed certain 
civilian functions in developing agricultural and other entrepreneurial skills amongst 
young people.
2 Section 40 (2) reads: ‘The State shall provide funds so as to ensure that, during the life 
of any Parliament, any political party which has secured more than one-tenth of the 
national vote in elections to that Parliament has suffi cient funds to continue to 
represent its constituency.’
3 In 2014, for the fi rst time, Malawi simultaneously conducted local, parliamentary and 
presidential elections.
4 The Legislative Council had 28 seats, 20 seats were on the lower roll while 8 were on 
the higher roll. MCP won all the seats on the lower roll and 3 on the higher roll. The 
rest (5) were reserved for the United Federal Party (see Banda, 2014).
5 See section 59 of the Malawian Constitution.
6 This section borrows from, and presents an overview of, fi ndings of an assessment 
pertaining to the status and practical feasibility of political ideologies as the basis for 
political engagement and development in Malawi (Chinsinga, 2013). The Centre for 
Multiparty Democracy commissioned the study.
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4 Judicialisation and informalisation 
of politics in Malawi




There is a considerable amount of literature that describes and analyses the role 
of the judiciary in the development of democratic politics in Malawi, especially 
since 1994, when Malawi adopted a predominantly liberal democratic 
Constitution. However, despite the vastness of the literature and the depth of 
insights that they provide on the process of democratisation and its impact on 
development, studies of the institutional framework and dynamics of the processes 
pay little attention to the position and role of the judiciary. To the limited extent 
that the judiciary features in the literature, its analysis is limited to a formalistic 
nature and functions, with little attention paid to its contribution to the 
construction and reproduction of the framework of informal institutions. Given 
the relevance of informal institutions to development, the limited analysis of the 
role of the judiciary in the literature in Malawian politics and development limits 
scholarly and policy understanding of the totality of institutional drivers of 
development and its specifi c imperatives such as inclusion.
This chapter seeks to contribute to debates on the institutional drivers of 
inclusive development in Malawi by critically examining the role of the judiciary 
in the informalisation of politics and the impact of informalisation on inclusive 
development. Informed by Helmke and Levitsky’s (2006: 5) defi nition of informal 
institutions as ‘socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, 
communicated and enforced outside offi cially sanctioned channels’, this chapter 
conceptualises informalisation as the process by which institutions are created, 
located, communicated and enforced outside offi cially sanctioned channels. 
Relying mainly on theoretical insights from critical legal scholarship which 
challenges legal formalism, the chapter grounds its conceptualisation of the 
nature and functions of the judiciary in the lived reality of the incidence and 
drivers of the judicialisation of politics in Malawi since 1994.
Grounded in the acknowledgement of the political role of the judiciary, this 
chapter examines the tension between the doctrinal and practical approaches of 
Malawi’s highest courts to the inclusion of politics in judicial discourse, with 
reference to the informalisation of politics in the context of ‘customary law’ 
institutions, mechanisms of accountability in parliamentary and political party 
relations and actions of local government and community structures that lack 
statutory authority. The chapter thus investigates whether judicial discourse on 
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each of these contexts promotes and/or impedes informalisation, and whether the 
discourse is guided by any consistent and coherent legal principles that reconcile 
the upholding of constitutional norms of human rights, the rule of law and 
accountability with the promotion of informal institutions which are either 
indifferent or antithetical to such norms. In the fi nal section, the chapter makes 
some general comments about the effect(s) of judicialisation of politics, in so far 
as it legitimises informal politics, on the prospects of inclusive development in 
Malawi. This chapter is limited to highlighting the role of the judiciary in 
contributing to the dialectics of the formalisation and informalisation of politics 
and, by extension, inclusive development. In conclusion, the chapter suggests 
certainty and coherence in judicial discourse and practice; increased attention to 
the political role of the judiciary in academic and policy discourse and development 
programming; and more scholarly and public debate of the democratic legitimacy 
of the judiciary’s involvement in adjudication of political issues. This will 
contribute to debunking of the myth of the political neutrality of the judiciary, 
justify the demand for more political accountability from courts and underline 
the need to deepen the democratic legitimacy of the judiciary, an institution that 
is often universally described as ‘the least democratic branch of government’ 
(Dickson, 2014: 169).
Inclusive development
The notion of inclusive development is explored in more detail in other chapters 
of this book. For present purposes, it suffi ces to highlight aspects of the concept 
that pertain most directly to the processes of judicialisation and informalisation 
discussed in this chapter. In this connection, the defi nition of the term by the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is most instructive. In that 
defi nition, development is inclusive ‘only if all groups of people contribute to 
creating opportunities, share the benefi ts of development and participate in 
decision-making’ (UNDP, U/D). For the UNDP, inclusive development is 
underpinned by the standards and principles of human rights, namely 
participation, non-discrimination and accountability (UNDP, U/D).
It is the standards and principles that create the nexus between judicialisation 
and inclusive development in Malawi. This is because, under the country’s 
constitution, it is the judiciary that has the fi nal authority to interpret and enforce 
the constitution, including its guarantees of human rights. This makes Malawian 
courts the fi nal arbiters of the scope and limits of constitutional norms of 
participation, non-discrimination and accountability. This necessarily implicates 
courts in the dynamics of the promotion or impediment of inclusive development.
Judicialisation of politics
A number of studies have examined judicial involvement in political questions in 
the context of Malawi. However, they have largely focussed on specifi c 
manifestations and specifi c drivers of the phenomenon, and have not developed 
an overarching theoretical framework to underpin the practice in Malawi. Among 
the specifi c elements on which the literature has focussed are the nature and 
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effect of judicialisation of Malawian electoral politics (Gloppen and Kanyongolo, 
2012), the drivers of judicial assertiveness in Malawi in comparison to Zambia 
(Vondoepp 2005) and the signifi cance of the political environment as a critical 
factor that threatens judicial independence (Ellett 2008).
The theoretical context
The broader question of the judicialisation of politics has, however, been the 
subject of signifi cant academic and public debate in other parts of the world. This 
is not surprising because the phenomenon raises important questions of democratic 
principle and practice with respect to the limits of the doctrine of the separation 
of powers, the democratic legitimacy of judicial power and the co-relationship 
between judicialisation of politics and the dysfunctionality of political institutions. 
In a number of countries, for example in Asia (Dressel, 2012), Latin America 
(Ingram, 2015), Africa (Vondoepp 2009), interest in the judicialisation of politics 
has gained added impetus from the democratic transitions that have resulted in 
expansion of judicial power as part of the process of enhancing accountability 
mechanisms and the rule of law. In addition, judicialisation of politics also merits 
renewed consideration given its potential to impact directly on developmental 
processes (Gauri, 2015).
Judicialisation of politics is the process by which courts appropriate the fi nal 
authority to mediate and adjudicate political competition and confl icts by 
recasting them into legal forms and resolving them using the legal tools and 
logics. The legitimacy of judicial involvement in political issues is contested by 
orthodox legal theories, which predicate the law on the absolute dichotomisation 
between law and politics. This theoretical position is endorsed by courts in many 
jurisdictions through the development of various exclusionary principles in 
judicial discourse.1
The absolutist dichotomisation of law and politics refl ected in the discourses 
in the cases mentioned above is challenged by a wide range of radical legal 
theories, which include the critical legal studies movement, as well as feminist 
and Marxist legal theories (Barnett, 2013; Leiter, 2014; Unger, 2015). The main 
thrust of the radical critiques is their rejection of legal formalism and objectivism, 
which posit the law as a phenomenon that exists, and should be analysed and 
assessed, independently of non-legal factors such as morality or politics (Banakar 
and Travers, 2014). The radical scholars essentially argue that the formal 
dichotomisation of the law and politics, for example, does not refl ect the reality 
that, in practice, law and political, economic and social factors are inextricably 
linked, and that the law generally refl ects the power relations that subsist in any 
particular context.
The practice of Malawian courts
The High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal in Malawi have also endorsed 
the dichotomist conceptualisation of law and politics espoused in classic legal 
positivist theories. On a number of occasions, the courts have stated that the 
judiciary should not adjudicate questions that are essentially political. In this 
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regard, the High Court has observed that, ‘allowing the judiciary and judges into 
disputes entirely political unduly politicizes the judiciary and we dare say the 
judges … That erodes the public’s confi dence in the judges and the judiciary and 
also their independence.’2
In this particular case, the court also highlighted a reason that justifi es the 
dichotomisation of rhetoric, namely that judges lack the competence or mandate 
to adjudicate non-legal matters such as politics. In the words of the judge:
judicial offi cers are not best placed to decide on matters inter alia of politics. 
The considerations operating in politics are different to those obtaining in 
the courts…the courts should be slow, very slow in our humble view, to 
adjudicate on matters that though dressed up as legal are really political 
disputes.3
The dichotomous position has been endorsed in a number of other cases. For 
example, in the case of State v The President of the Republic of Malawi, Ministry of 
Finance ex-parte SGS Malawi Limited4 the judge expressed the view that matters 
involving socio-economic policy and competing policy considerations are not 
justiciable. In a similar vein, the judge in the case of The State v The Minister of 
Finance and the Secretary to the Treasury, ex parte the Malawi Law Society5 noted, 
albeit in passing, that:
matters of policy…should be left to those best suited to deal with them 
namely the people’s elected representatives and their permanent advisors i.e. 
the civil servants. We would therefore be the fi rst to wash our hands off this 
case if it raised issues only of policy or required this court to evaluate 
socioeconomic policy or allocate scarce economic resources.6
Despite its formalist rhetoric, which normalises the separation of law and politics, 
the judiciary in Malawi does get involved in the adjudication of essentially 
political questions in practice. Before examining the evidence of such 
judicialisation of politics from case law, it is important to note some of the factors 
that encourage the judiciary to engage with such cases. One such factor is the 
language of provisions of the Constitution, which defi ne the mandate of the 
judiciary. Some of the sections of the Constitution use language that creates 
suffi cient interpretive space for judges to extend their adjudicative mandate 
beyond the boundaries of what positivist legal theorists regard as ‘law’. The most 
pertinent provision in this regard is that which stipulates that, ‘in the resolution 
of political disputes the provisions of this Constitution shall be the supreme 
arbiter and ultimate source of authority’.7 Since interpretation and enforcement 
of the Constitution is the responsibility of the judiciary, this provision implicitly 
authorizes courts to adjudicate political disputes. In any case, it is up to the 
judiciary itself to decide what matters fall within its mandate and, relying on this 
rule, judges have the basis on which they may justify adjudicating what are 
essentially political matters.
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The other factor which contributes to the judicialisation of politics in practice, 
despite the rhetoric of dichotomisation, is the level of judicial activism of the 
courts themselves. Here, I adopt the understanding of judicial activism used by 
Kmiec (2004), which includes invalidation of the arguably constitutional actions 
of other branches, failure to adhere to precedent, judicial ‘legislation’, departures 
from accepted interpretive methodology, and result-oriented judging. In that 
sense, the High Court can be argued to have displayed a signifi cant degree of 
activism, by invalidating legislation passed by Parliament, disregarding precedent, 
‘legislating’ by establishing rules of law where Parliament had made no such rule 
and departing from rules of statutory interpretation. In some of the cases, the 
activism of the High Court has been constrained by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal, which has overruled the decisions of the former.
This is not to say that the Supreme Court itself has not performed an activist 
function. On the contrary, in one of the most signifi cant cases decided in Malawi 
since 1994,8 the court appeared to have disregarded accepted interpretive 
methodologies and engaged in result-oriented judging when it invoked ‘the 
doctrine of necessity’ to dismiss the appellants’ argument that, for as long as their 
boycott of proceedings of the National Assembly subsisted, Parliament could not 
pass any legislation because it was inquorate. The court rejected the argument 
partly on the ground that to uphold it would result in legislative paralysis, 
although the logic of the decision was diffi cult to justify on the basis of precedents 
and judicial interpretive methodology (Chirwa, 2007: 27–32).
The combination of the permissive constitutional framework and rising 
judicial activism has led the judiciary in Malawi to contradict its own rhetoric of 
formalist dichotomisation and become quite activist in resolving what are 
essentially political disputes. Within an environment conducive to the 
judicialisation of politics, the country’s highest courts have, in a signifi cant 
number of cases, engaged in adjudication of what are essentially political 
questions. The questions the courts have addressed include: whether the 
relationship between a Member of Parliament and his or her constituent is that 
of delegate or agent;9 whether the leader of one faction of a political party enjoyed 
the overwhelming support and loyalty of the party’s Members of Parliament while 
support for his challenger for the leadership of the party existed outside 
Parliament;10 and what degree of consultation is required prior to appointment of 
members of the electoral management body.11 The courts have also been involved 
in the judicialisation of politics in the context of disputes over succession to 
traditional chieftaincies and the legal authority of ad hoc local government and 
community structures.
Although the judicialisation of politics has attracted some academic interest 
much of the discussion has not addressed two important questions:
• absence of any development by the courts of principles to guide courts in 
balancing the legitimate arbitration of political disputes and unjustifi ed 
judicial encroachment into the constitutional mandates of bodies charged 
with making political judgments; and
• (of more direct relevance to the aims of this chapter) the effect of the 
judicialisation of individual political questions on the dialectic of 
formalisation and informalisation of politics at national level.
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Informalisation of politics
Informal institutions may be defi ned as ‘socially shared rules, usually unwritten, 
that are created, communicated and enforced outside offi cially sanctioned 
channels’ (Helmke and Levitsky, 2006: 5). Drawing on this defi nition, this 
chapter conceptualises informalisation of politics as the process by which informal 
political institutions are established and operate. The ensuing sections of this 
chapter addresses the question of the impact of informalisation of politics on 
inclusive development and argues that the effects of informalisation are not 
limited to a reconfi guration of institutions, but may extend to the defi nition of 
the ability of people to access resources. As Ninsin (2000: 113) notes, 
informalisation ‘produces normative disarray and marginalized or anomic 
behaviour for a vast majority of members in the society [and] entails the 
restructuring of access to – and ownership of – the material means for livelihood’.
A growing interest in informal institutions in Malawi has generated a 
considerable body of literature that identifi es the various forms that informal 
institutions take in various areas of country’s political economy (Rakner et al., 
2004; Mvula et al., 2014). Although the literature is varied in its conclusions, the 
most frequently cited characteristics that mark informal institutions in Malawi 
are neo-patrimonialism and clientilism. These manifestations (and causes) of 
informality crosscut the institutional terrain of political representation, 
democratic governance, democratic accountability and the rule of law. This 
chapter cannot cover the whole institutional landscape and will confi ne itself to 
a representative sample of institutions which have a direct impact on 
democratisation and development. For these purposes, the chapter focuses on the 
dynamics of judicialisation with respect to their impact on the promotion or 
constraining of informalisation in relation to the action of political parties (see 
Chapter 3), Members of Parliament (Rakner et al., 2004) and ‘town chiefs’ 
(Cammack et al., 2009).
Helmke and Levitsky (2006) provide a useful framework for analysing the 
intersection of judicialisation and informalisation of politics. Three aspects of 
their framework appear to be particularly relevant to the focus of this chapter. 
The fi rst is the identifi cation of the following key areas in which informality is 
critical to democratic politics: political representation, democratic accountability, 
democratic governance and citizenship and the rule of law (Helmke and Levitsky, 
2006: 8–13). The second is the recognition that the relationship between 
informalisation and democratic politics is ambivalent in nature, with 
informalisation both promoting and impeding democratic politics within the 
same context.
Viewed from a legal theoretical perspective, Helmke’s model presents 
conceptual challenges in that, unlike in constitutional law theory, it separates 
‘democratic accountability’ from ‘democratic governance’ and it defi nes the rule 
of law almost exclusively with reference to citizenship rights. Nevertheless, it 
does present a focused and functional framework that is useful for structuring 
what would otherwise be an incoherent and disjointed narrative. Using Helmke’s 
model in the context of the focus of this chapter, the central question becomes: 
what is the effect of the judicialisation of politics in Malawi on the processes of 
political informalisation with respect to political representation, democratic 
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accountability, democratic governance and citizenship and the rule of law? 
Related to this is the question of whether judicialisation infl uences the extent to 
which informalisation facilitates or impedes the development of democratic 
politics in Malawi?
Answering these questions comprehensively requires in-depth ethnographies 
of specifi c manifestations of judicialisation of politics and informalisation of 
politics that is beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, there is ample 
evidence to indicate that the highest courts in Malawi make a signifi cant 
contribution to the informalisation of politics by (de)legitimising 
neopatrimonialism, clientilism and other constitutive features of the character of 
Malawian politics. The evidence consists primarily of cases in which courts have 
both promoted and constrained informalisation of politics in judgments that 
pertain to the aspects of democratic politics identifi ed by Helmke, namely 
representation, accountability, democratic governance and the rule of law.
The judiciary has contributed to the perpetuation of neo-patrimonialism in at 
least three ways. The fi rst, and probably most signifi cant, is by reinforcing 
customary law and its institutions. The term ‘customary law’ is contested and has 
attracted critical scepticism from scholars who have argued that it includes a 
range of norms and institutions, some of which are informal. Because ‘customary 
law’ is defi ned imprecisely, many informal institutions are also included under the 
umbrella of ‘customary law’ that the courts uphold. The courts in a number of 
cases have acknowledged the imprecision of customary law, for example, in 
Nyambi v Kambalame,12 where the High Court effectively held that ‘customary 
law’ is whatever the Chiefs say it is. Similarly in the case of Banda v Banda,13 the 
High Court acknowledged that ‘applicable customary rules may not always be 
obvious’. The inclusion in ‘customary law’ of norms and practices that operate 
outside offi cially sanctioned channels confi rms its character as an informal, or at 
least hybrid, institution. By defi nition, the informal institutions that exist outside 
the formal framework are not subject to control by that framework, which in 
terms of the Constitution includes guarantees of human rights, including equality 
under the law. This has implications for the prospects of inclusive development 
as further demonstrated below.
In upholding customary law, the judiciary contributes to sustaining its informal 
aspects, such its oral traditions as was acknowledged by the High Court in the 
case of Edwin Ingelesi Ganya v James Goodson Ganya et al.,14 in which the court 
stated that ‘chieftaincy disputes pose a peculiar adjudicative challenge since they 
are largely premised on oral tradition’. Similarly, in the case of Chafumbwa v 
Village Headman Mkanda et al., the court based its decision to disentitle a claimant 
to a chieftaincy title under ‘Chewa custom’ on oral evidence of ‘local tradition’. 
In Mbwana v Kanthiti,15 the High Court relied on what it termed ‘propositions of 
good sense and common justice’, to guide it in its determination of a dispute 
revolving around the distribution of matrimonial property following the 
dissolution of a customary law marriage.
The court has also reinforced customary law by legitimising the informal 
politics that surround chieftaincy appointments. In the case of Group Village 
Headman Kakopa et al. v Chilozi et al.,16 the court indicated that, as part of his 
efforts to protect his right to succeed to the position of a traditional authority, a 
claimant ‘should have taken the initiative, immediately after the present 
Constitution was adopted, to infl uence the offi ce of the President to remove late 
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Dickson Chilozi who was installed Chief Kabudula in 1979’. The court was clearly 
endorsing executive interference in the process of appointment and removal of 
traditional authorities, a characteristic feature of Malawi’s informal politics.
The second respect in which the judiciary contributes to the informalisation of 
politics in Malawi is in its establishment of precedents that, directly or indirectly, 
weaken formal accountability ties between Members of Parliament and their 
constituents, between members of political parties and their leaders, and between 
members of political parties and their parties. In a number of precedent-setting 
decisions made since 1994, the High Court has held that a constituent has no 
right to compel his or her Member of Parliament to attend parliamentary 
proceedings;17 that a member of a political party can be appointed to the Cabinet 
without the need for his or her party leadership to be consulted;18 that a Member 
of Parliament may resign from the political party of which he or she was a 
member at the time of elections and declare himself or herself to be independent 
and not lose his or her seat in Parliament;19 and that the President may 
determine what constitutes ‘consultation’ with leaders of political parties 
represented in the National Assembly for purposes of appointing members of the 
Electoral Commission.20
The decisions contribute to the reduction of the range of formal mechanisms 
which are available to constituents and members of their political parties and 
leaders of parties represented in Parliament for enforcement of accountability 
against Members of Parliament, members and leaders of political parties and the 
President. The reduced availability of formal institutions of accountability to 
which the judiciary has contributed through the decisions mentioned above 
incentivises increased resort to informal ones. It is to this extent that the judiciary 
promotes the informalisation of politics.
The courts have also promoted informalisation with respect to the rule of law. 
This is most evident in cases in which the High Court has recognised informal 
institutions regardless of their lack of any basis in formal law. In addition to 
upholding the ‘power’ of informal District Consultative Forums,21 the High Court 
has also stated, albeit in passing, that people have an obligation to comply with 
orders made by ‘the traditional leaders who administer land in the affected 
locality’.22 This effectively recognised the authority of traditional leaders 
operating within urban areas despite the fact that Section 3 (5) of the Chiefs Act 
prohibits chiefs from exercising jurisdiction within cities, municipalities or towns 
without the written approval of the appropriate council established under the 
Local Government (Urban Areas) Act, and section 6 of the Local Government 
Act vests jurisdiction of areas within a district or township to a local council 
designated under the Act. The statement also indicated judicial promotion of the 
purported power of traditional authorities to administer land in urban areas 
despite the fact that statute law vests such powers in a number of formal 
authorities, including the central and local government authorities.
The judiciary has also promoted informalisation of politics at the expense of 
the rule of law in at least one other case. In this case,23 the High Court was asked 
to decide whether an informal forum established by a local government authority 
could raise revenue, a function which could be performed lawfully only by elected 
councillors. In its judgment, the court answered the question in the affi rmative. 
While acknowledging that the forum had no statutory basis, the court nevertheless 
upheld its decision to raise revenue on the ground that this was necessitated by 
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the unavoidable need for the local government to have resources in order to be 
able to deliver services to the residents of the city.
However, the contribution of this case to the promotion of informalisation of 
politics is counterweighed by a case, based on similar facts, in which the court 
decided that no institution can exercise administrative or adjudicative power in 
Malawi unless it has specifi c formal legal authorisation.24 These two cases 
exemplify the contradictory contributions of the judiciary to informalisation. In 
some cases, courts promote informalisation, while in others they constrain it. The 
High Court has enforced this formalistic view of the law not only in the case of 
local government structures,25 but also with respect to community level 
institutions, which exercise adjudicatory powers without statutory authorisation.26 
The judiciary’s efforts to formalise institutions by upholding the outlawing of 
some informal institutions has not been wholly successful. For example, the 
prohibition of the institution of adjudication without statutory authority has not 
resulted in the elimination of the institution. On the contrary, such adjudication 
continues unabated and is, in fact, supported in offi cial policy as a critical 
component of the primary justice system.
The High Court has also constrained informalisation of politics by enforcing 
norms that are antithetical to aspects of the neo-patrimonialism and clientilism 
which characteristically underlie informal politics. The court has done this 
mainly through decisions that criminalise certain conduct as corruption, although 
it may be considered to be acceptable and, even expected, from the point of view 
of the community.27 Customary law is subject to the Constitution and cannot 
override it in cases of inconsistency, thus, for example, it can only limit, and not 
supplant, constitutional rights.28 This judicial approach constrains the 
development of those elements of informal institutions within ‘customary law’ 
that are inconsistent with human rights and other stipulations of the Constitution 
which militate against the relations that characterise informal institutions. 
Despite the judicial rhetoric, which suggests that courts will review customary 
law institutions for compliance with human rights, the judiciary continues to 
uphold ‘customary law’ institutions under which people are subjects of traditional 
authorities rather than equal citizens with rights and liberties. Among the 
institutions which the judiciary has upheld, despite their apparent incompatibility 
with human rights, are polygamy and hereditary chieftaincy.
The judiciary further constrains informalisation of politics by restricting the 
freedom of some institutions to regulate themselves. The case of Parliament is 
illustrative of this judicial approach and its effects on informality. That the 
Malawian Parliament combines both formality and informality in its organisation 
and proceedings has been well documented elsewhere (Rakner et al., 2004). The 
constitutional power of Parliament to regulate its own procedures, therefore, 
provides it with the opportunity to perpetuate informal aspects of that self-
regulation. However, on a number of occasions, the judiciary has limited the 
scope of Parliament’s self-regulation and intervened to subordinate self-regulation, 
and any informality it includes, to the dictates of formal rules of law.
In the case of Nseula v The Attorney General,29 the Supreme Court of Appeal 
held that courts have the power to intervene in Parliament’s regulation of its 
proceedings if the regulation involves interpretation of the Constitution. 
Similarly, in the case of The State v Speaker of the National Assembly et al., ex.p. 
Nangwale,30 the High Court held that courts could override the principle of 
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self-regulation of Parliament to enforce the constitutionality of parliamentary 
decisions and actions. Judicial intervention in these circumstances constrains the 
informality, which would otherwise thrive under the cover of self-regulation.31
From the selection of cases described above, a number of conclusions can be 
made about the judicialisation of politics in Malawi and how it affects the 
development of its informalisation:
• the judiciary both facilitates and constrains informalisation of politics;
• the judiciary has not articulated an overarching set of normative principles 
to guide its involvement in politics and to reconcile the apparent 
inconsistency between the rhetoric of dichotomisation of law and politics, 
on the one hand, and the practice of judicialisation of politics on the other; 
and
• the judiciary further contributes to the informalisation of politics by 
facilitating it in some respects and impeding it in others.
Noting that a considerable amount of informal political activity remains 
untouched by judicial activity must preface the analysis of the infl uence of the 
judicialisation of politics. The major reason for this is that most Malawians do 
not have access to the courts for the resolution of their matters. This is largely 
because of prohibitive fi nancial costs of litigation and long distances that many 
people have to travel to the nearest court (Schärf et al., 2002). Many of the 
informal institutions and processes that typify Malawian society, therefore, 
continue to operate beyond the reach of judicial intervention.
Despite its limited reach into the realm of politics, the judiciary does make a 
signifi cant contribution to the defi nition and scope of informal politics in 
Malawi. In one respect, judicialisation contributes to informalisation by 
legitimising some forms and practices of informal politics. One example of this is 
the courts’ enforcement of political rights, which entitle citizens to freedom of 
expression, freedom of association and equality. By upholding these individual 
liberties and rights, the courts legitimate citizens’ actions outside of formal 
institutional frameworks.
Implications for inclusive development
Despite its promotion in scholarly literature and development practice, inclusive 
development is neither acknowledged nor promoted explicitly by the country’s 
supreme policy instruments. For example, in over 200 pages of the country’s 
overarching policy framework, the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy 
(MGDS), the word ‘inclusive’ appears only fi ve times, and then only in reference 
to inclusive ‘economic’ growth. Clearly, this does not capture the totality of the 
concept of inclusive development, which is not limited to growth and economic 
transformation, but extends to the question of redistribution of the economic 
growth dividend (Vom Hau, 2012).
An informed appreciation of inclusive development in Malawi requires an 
understanding of the institutional dynamics that structure, promote and impede 
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it. Key among such dynamics is the nexus between judicialisation, informalisation 
and inclusive growth. Judicialisation has causal links with informalisation in 
that, through the exercise of their adjudicative powers, courts continually shape 
and reshape political, economic and social relations. Such shaping and reshaping 
of relations occasionally results in their inclusion or exclusion from the sphere 
of formal state processes. Thus, for example, by adjudging that a constituent 
has no enforceable legal right to compel his or her MP to attend meetings of the 
National Assembly,32 the courts unwittingly incentivised constituents to fi nd a 
means of controlling MPs from outside the formal legal framework. In other 
circumstances, the link between judicialisation and informalisation is more 
explicit, as is exemplifi ed by situations where courts expressly declare certain 
relationships and transactions to be outside or within the purview of formal 
institutional and processes.
By contributing to informalisation of institutions, judicialisation affects 
inclusive development. As institutions become or remain informalised, access to 
developmental processes by individuals or groups becomes relative to their 
possession of informal ‘currencies’ such as ‘time’, ‘money, ‘social status’, ‘social 
relations’ and ‘supernatural powers’ (Bierschenk, 2008). Those who lack the 
currencies become vulnerable to exclusion, as they have no means with which to 
bargain for entry into the developmental processes. The linear judicialisation–
informalisation-inclusive development chain of causation is paralleled by a direct 
linkage that exists between judicialisation and inclusive development at the 
normative level. At this level, the judiciary is obligated to promote inclusive 
development as part of the discharge of its constitutional mandate. In the case of 
the Constitution of Malawi, for example, the judiciary has the responsibility to 
enforce norms that promote aspects of inclusive development. Of particular note 
is the constitutional guarantee (section 30(2)) of the right to development which 
requires ‘The State [to] take all necessary measures for the realization of the right 
to development [including] equality of opportunity for all in their access to basic 
resources, education, health services, food, shelter, employment and infrastructure’.
Informalisation of politics has the potential to affect the prospects of inclusive 
development both negatively and positively. On the one hand, there is evidence 
that, by reinforcing neo-patrimonialism and clientilism, informalisation of 
politics creates economic, political and social relations that militate against 
inclusion of ‘clients’ in developmental processes. This point is made in a number 
of other chapters in this book (see also Gaynor, 2010). Suffi ce it to note at this 
juncture that informalisation does have an exclusionary effect for people who 
lack the resources and power to infl uence decisions made by informal institutions, 
which are dominated by those who drive the neo-patrimonial and clientilistic 
order. In fact, there is a strong view among many development theorists and 
practitioners that the main constraint on inclusive development is the unequal 
power relations that characterise informal political institutions. Therefore, in so 
far as the judiciary promotes informalisation, it may be said to be one of the 
institutional factors that contributes to the impediment of inclusive development 
in Malawi.
On the other hand, there is evidence from studies conducted elsewhere which 
suggests that informalisation may be conducive to inclusion because the fl exibility 
it induces creates the space within which disadvantaged social, economic and 
political groups fi nd it easier to organise, mobilise and take action to demand 
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inclusion in developmental processes than if they attempt to use formal 
institutions (see e.g. Miraftab, 2006; Lindell, 2010). To the extent that political 
informality has positive effects on inclusion, the judiciary’s contribution may be 
considered to be desirable and necessary.
Despite the signifi cance of the impact of judicial informalisation of politics on 
inclusive development, the issue has not been subjected to any systematic 
jurisprudential analysis in academic literature or case law. This refl ects the 
dominance of classic legal positivism on Malawian legal theory and practice. 
Predicated on the formal separation of law and politics, classic legal positivism 
excludes consideration of non-legal factors in legal analysis (Austin and Austin, 
1861). Malawian legal theory and judicial discourse refl ects such separation of 
law from extra-legal factors such as the role of the judiciary in the informalisation 
of politics and, by extension, in the promotion or impediment of inclusive 
development. The result is that the processes proceed without a complete 
consideration of the legitimacy of the political role of the judiciary
The immediate implication of this conclusion for development scholars and 
practitioners is that more attention needs to be paid to the political role that 
the judiciary plays, including in shaping informal politics. Analyses of the role 
of the Malawian judiciary in national development should be extended 
beyond the bounds of institutional formalism and explicitly factor the political 
role of the judiciary and the infl uence of courts on the construction and 
reproduction of informal politics. It should also include a critical analysis of the 
democratic legitimacy of the judicial involvement in promoting or impeding 
inclusive development.
In so far as the judiciary can only deal with cases that are brought to it, any 
positive impact that such engagement may generate for informalisation cannot 
benefi t those who, though willing, are unable to access the courts. The majority 
of such people are those who lack the resources to enable them to gain such 
access, for example women and other socio-economically disadvantaged groups, 
which also face procedural obstacles in an instance of indirect discrimination. 
One such obstacle is the requirement that the courts can grant a right of audience 
only to ‘legal persons’. This means that only individuals and organisations that 
are registered by the state can seek the assistance of the courts. The result is that 
unregistered groups of people cannot apply for judicial remedies in their collective 
names and for their collective benefi t. Given that getting registered by the state 
has a fi nancial cost and political risk, and that such costs and risks disproportionately 
affect particular sections of the population such as women, the poor, perceived 
enemies of the state, the result is that members of such groups are obstructed from 
benefi ting from the positive aspects of judicialisation of politics.
Conclusion
The prospects of attaining inclusive development in Malawi are signifi cantly 
infl uenced both positively and negatively by the informalisation that dominates 
the country’s politics. The particular nature of that informalisation and its effects 
on developmental processes is a function of the specifi cities of the institutional 
context that obtains in Malawi. While considerable research has been undertaken 
to explain the dynamics of the context, it is notable that most of the focus of 
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those studies has been on institutions that have an overtly political character and 
role. This approach has obscured the equally important role played by institutions, 
such as the judiciary, which, despite not having an explicit political mandate, 
have a signifi cant impact on the formalisation and informalisation of politics.
The judiciary in Malawi formally claims to be committed to legal formalist 
theories which stipulate an absolutist dichotomisation of law and politics, and 
prohibit courts from involvement in determining political questions. The 
evidence reviewed in this chapter, however, demonstrates that due to a permissive 
constitutional framework and a growth in judicial activism, the courts do in fact 
adjudicate questions which are essentially political in nature. The evidence 
further shows that there are no coherent principles or rules to guide the judiciary 
in its involvement in political questions or to defi ne the governance or 
development objectives towards which such involvement should aim. 
Consequently, judgments by the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal 
display a wide range of differences and, in some cases, inconsistencies, in their 
views on political questions. This is illustrated in the evidence reviewed in this 
chapter, which shows that Malawian courts both promote and impede 
informalisation of politics.
The signifi cant impact that informalisation of politics has on inclusive 
development in Malawi makes it imperative that the role of all institutions should 
be considered. Given that the evidence indicates that the judiciary does play a 
signifi cant role in the process, it must be subjected to more rigorous analysis than 
has hitherto been the case. This requires piercing the veil of political neutrality 
with which the institution is clothed in liberal legal theory, and subjecting it to 
the same scrutiny that is faced by other institutions involved in politics and 
development. Rhetorical appeals to notions of judicial independence and 
impartiality are outweighed by the imperative of holding to account all institutions 
that shape the structure and dynamics of politics and development in Malawi.
If judicial power and discourses in Malawi are to have the optimum impact in 
facilitating inclusive development, there has to be:
• a more explicit recognition of the political role of the judiciary in both 
scholarly and practitioner analysis;
• a more coherent judicial discourse which addresses the apparent contradiction 
between rhetorical legal formalism and practical anti-formalism; and
• more scholarly and public debate of the democratic legitimacy of the 
judiciary’s involvement in adjudication of political issues.
Notes
1 Such devices include ‘the Political Question doctrine’ developed by the United States 
Supreme Court, which is summarised aptly in the landmark case of Marbury v Madison, 
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) in the following words: ‘Questions, in their nature 
political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can 
never be made in this court.’ For an illuminating conceptualisation and critique of the 
doctrine, see Louis Michael Seidman (2004), ‘The Secret Life of the Political Question 
Doctrine’, 37 J. Marshall Law Review 441–80.
 2 Ajinga v United Democratic front, Civil Cause No. 2466 of 2008.
 3 High Court Civil Cause No. 2466 of 2008
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 4 Civil Cause No. 40 of 2003.
 5 Constitutional Case No. 6 of 2006.
 6 Also see Chiume v The Alliance for Democracy, Civil Cause No. 108 of 2005.
 7 Section 10(1).
 8 The Attorney General v Malawi Congress Party, Civil Appeal No. 22 of 1996.
 9 Chakuamba v Ching’oma, Civil Cause No. 99 of 1996.
10 Tembo v Chakuamba, MSCA Civil Cause No. 230 of 2001.
11 The State v Electoral Commission, exp. p. Muluzi and Tembo, Miscellaneous Civil Cause 
No. 99 of 2007.
12 Civil Appeal No. 25 of 2011. See also Steven et al v Kasitoni et al. on Mang’anja 
customary law of succession to chieftaincy based on testimony of plaintiffs which was 
not contradicted by defendants because they did not attend court hearing or adduce 
any evidence.
13 Miscellaneous Civil Cause No. 102 of 2011.
14 Civil Cause No. 1707 of 2005.
15 Civil Appeal No. 109 of 2011.
16 [2000–2001] MLR 140.
17 Chakuamba v Ching’oma, Civil Cause No. 99 of 1996.
18 Mponda Mkandawire v Attorney General, Civil Cause No. 49 of 1996.
19 In Mponda Mkandawire v Attorney General, Misc. Civil Cause No.49 of 1996.
20 The State v Electoral Commission, exp. p. Muluzi and Tembo, Miscellaneous Civil Cause 
No. 99 of 2007.
21 Zomba Municipal Assembly v Council of the University of Malawi (Civil Cause No. 3567 
of 2000) [2003] MWHC 90.
22 Kabango v Kunjawa, Civil Appeal No. 5 of 2012.
23 Zomba Municipal Assembly v Council of the University of Malawi [2003] MWHC 90.
24 Bandawe [T/A Kaka Motel] v Mzuzu City Assembly Civil Cause No 63 of 2006.
25 Ibid.
26 R v Karonga, African Law Reports (Malawi) Vol. 1, p. 210.
27 On the tension between formalistic defi nitions of corruption and autochthonous 
notions of the legitimacy of ‘payments’ to service social networks of obligation based on 
kinship ties see Gerhard Anders, ‘Like Chameleons: Civil Servants and Corruption in 
Malawi’ in Blundo, Giorgio, and Le Meur, Pierre-Yves, (eds.) (2009) The governance of 
daily life in Africa: ethnographic explorations of public and collective services. Leiden: Brill.
28 Kamphoni v Kamphoni, Matrimonial Cause No. 7 of 2012.
29 [1997] 2 MLR 294.
30 Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 1 of 2005.
31 Another instance of judicial overriding of self-regulation by Parliament occurred in the 
case of In Re Appeal by the National Assembly et al. against the Ruling of the High Court 
[2006] MLR 185 in which the High Court restrained the Speaker of the National 
Assembly from exercising his powers of declaring vacancies in some seats until the 
conclusion of related judicial processes. Similarly, in the more recent case of State v 
Speaker of the National Assembly, ex.p. Lilian Patel, et al. Misc. Civil Appeal No. 46 of 
2015, the High Court and Supreme Court pre-emptively prohibited the Speaker from 
exercising similar powers.
32 See note 9 above.
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Part II
Governance and policy 
implementation

5 Politics and the public service
Lewis B. Dzimbiri
Introduction
The public service is the main tool governments use to implement various 
national development policies and deliver services in education, health, 
community development, transport and maintenance of law and order, among 
others. It is seen as pivotal for the growth of African economies and the creation 
of an appropriate and conducive environment in which all sectors of the economy 
can perform optimally. Governments rely on this machinery to design, formulate 
and implement its policies, strategies and programmes, and to discharge all routine 
governmental functions. Human resources play an important and strategic role in 
the implementation of national development policies. The manner in which civil 
servants are recruited, selected, appointed, oriented, trained, rewarded and 
disciplined affect their commitment, motivation and productivity. The overall 
purpose of this chapter is to analyse the role and impact of politics on public 
service human resource management systems and service delivery in Malawi.
Using a purposive sampling technique in a cross-sectional study design 
employing in-depth interviews and questionnaires, this study focuses on ministers, 
principal secretaries (hereafter PSs) and human resource management directors 
in key ministries such as Offi ce of the President and Cabinet, Agriculture, 
Education, Health and the Department of Human Resource Management and 
Development. The questionnaires solicited responses regarding the broad roles 
of ministers and PSs in relation to policy formulation, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation. Specifi c questions concentrated on the role of 
ministers and PSs in public service human resource management, in particular 
recruitment, promotion, demotion, discipline and transfers. Data collected was 
analysed through content analysis to derive themes and subthemes based on the 
responses to questionnaires and in-depth interviews guided by the study 
objectives. This also applied to secondary data from documents and reports. 
Central issues examined include the role of elite public servants and politicians 
in the public administration system in Malawi and the nature and impact of the 
relationship between these elite public servants and cabinet ministers on a range 
of issues related to human resource management and service delivery in 
government departments.
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The chapter begins with an overview of the context in which the Malawian 
public service operates followed by a discussion of the politics and administration 
interface as a theoretical framework for the ensuing discussion. The aim is to 
critically examine the role of ministers and principal secretaries in public policy 
processes and their roles in public service human resource management functions 
particularly in relation to recruitment, promotion, discipline and transfer.
The public service context in Malawi
Malawi became independent from Britain in 1964. Since then, the country has 
transitioned from a multiparty democracy to a one-party dictatorship and then 
returned to multiparty democracy in the 1990s. In the 1960s, and through the 
1970s and 1980s, Malawi developed so-called ‘Statement of Development 
Policies’, meant to function as development roadmaps providing a list of priorities 
and strategies that were to function as guidelines for the government. Similarly, 
in the 1990s, the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development developed 
the Malawi Poverty Reduction strategy with assistance from the World Bank, and 
thereafter Vision 2020 in 1998 and the Malawi Growth and Development 
Strategy (MGDS 1 and MDGS 2) during 2003–12. These documents provided 
directions for realizing medium and long-term development policies aimed at 
promoting social and economic development of Malawi.
The documents highlight sustainable economic growth and social development; 
social support and disaster risk management; infrastructure development; 
governance and gender and capacity development. They also include agriculture 
and food security; energy, industrial development, mining and tourism; transport 
infrastructure and port development. Key priority areas for these national 
documents are: education science and technology; public health, sanitation, 
malaria, and management of HIV/AIDS; integrated rural development; green 
belt irrigation and water development; child development, youth development 
and empowerment; climate change, natural resources and environmental 
management (GoM, 2013). The ambitious national plans require an engaged, 
motivated, trained, disciplined and professional public service.
The public service
A public service is defi ned as a service that is provided by the government to the 
people living within its jurisdiction either directly through the public sector or by 
fi nancing provision of the services to the people. The term ‘government’ means 
the authority in which is vested the executive power in a nation according to the 
constitution. In the context of Malawi, public services include the health service, 
teaching service, military service, police service; prison service, local government 
service, parliamentary service, judicial service, anti-corruption service, public 
enterprises/statutory corporations, offi ce of the ombudsman, human rights 
commission and the law commission (Kachimera, 2014).
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The public service largely consists of educated, well-trained and career-oriented 
personnel. These include primary and secondary school teachers, fi eld assistants, 
community development staff, agricultural offi cers, executive offi cers, clerical and 
accounting staff, secretarial staff, human resource offi cers, administrators, and 
various professional and technical staff such as engineers, scientists, doctors, 
health professionals, directors, undersecretaries, lawyers, judges and magistrates. 
These individuals work in ministries, in government departments and in other 
branches of government, such as the judiciary, parliament and other public 
institutions such as city, municipal, town and district councils, parastatal bodies 
and commissions (Dzimbiri, 2014). The Department of Human Resource 
Management and Development under the Offi ce of the President and Cabinet is 
mandated to be responsible for public service administration and management on 
behalf of the Chief Secretary to the Government. This department provides 
HRM services and management consultancy services for the public service, 
conducts policy research, monitoring and evaluation, internal audit services and 
administrative and general support services
Since Malawi became independent from Great Britain in 1964, it has relied on 
the public sector as the machinery responsible for the implementation of the 
national development policies and programmes.
As a former colony (1891–1964), Malawi’s public service was infl uenced by 
the norms and procedures of the British public service in relation to rules and 
regulations and governing principles that embrace the principles recommended 
in the Northcote–Trevelyan Report of 1854, such as political impartiality, 
objectivity, integrity, accountability, confi dentiality, open recruitment, 
promotion on merit basis. The guidelines of the Public Service Commission 
created in 1961 by the British colonial administration continue to provide the 
basis for recruitment, promotion and discipline of public servants in addition to 
the effi cient and effective delivery of public services in the country. Although 
there was considerable political will by President Hastings Banda’s regime to 
deliver effi cient development services, the administrative structures remained 
highly centralized and the style of management was heavily expatriate-infl uenced 
(Kachimera, 2014).
A series of public service reforms were implemented in Malawi following the 
outcomes of the Skinner Commission of 1964. The Herbercq Commission of 
1985 like the Skinner Commission advocated the reorganization of the public 
service in terms of structure, staffi ng, governing principles, pay levels, career 
paths, education, training and conditions of service.
The democratic transition to multiparty politics in 1994 transformed the public 
service. While the President appointed the Secretary to the Offi ce of the President 
and Cabinet, principal secretaries were appointed as supervisors of government 
ministries. Most importantly, however, the openness of the political climate led to 
the birth of unionism, and representatives of public servants could now negotiate 
with the government on increased salaries and improved conditions of services. 
The Malawian Public Service Commission continued to observe and adhere to its 
fundamental principles of fairness, openness and appointment on merit. A Public 
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Service Act (1994) was enacted to compliment the new Constitution (1994), 
which was framed with a view to addressing human rights violations during the 
period of one-party rule. The immediate challenge for a democratic Malawi was to 
balance the need for continuity of the public service systems and practices and 
resolutely exclude the negative practices of the previous dictatorial government. 
However, the newfound freedom also resulted in lawlessness, and the public 
service, which was renowned for its discipline during the one-party Banda regime, 
began to crumble under the pressure to deliver development amidst technical and 
management skills shortage and weak fi nancial management.
The politics and administration dichotomy
The relationship between ministers and administrative heads of ministries in 
policy processes need to be understood in the context of the various arguments 
for or against the separation of politics from administration. The politics–
administration dichotomy is the underpinning feature of Max Weber’s ideal 
bureaucracy, where the main role of politicians is policymaking while 
administrators tackle the task of policy implementation (Rosenbloom, 2008). 
Weber viewed administrators as instrumental and subordinate to politicians, 
functioning as technical experts who advise and effi ciently execute the decisions 
of politicians. However, while politicians are in charge of defi ning the policies to 
be implemented by bureaucrats, Weber feared that career civil servants might 
dominate elected politicians (whose tenure of offi ce is a bit shorter) through their 
superior knowledge, technical expertise and longer experience.
The dichotomy between public administration and politics – which is based 
on the notion of dividing governmental authority between elected and 
administrative offi cials along functional lines – has remained an important 
question since the emergence of public administration as a fi eld of study in the 
late 1880s. For example, Wilson (1887) argued for the separation of politics from 
public administration when he pointed out that public administration lies outside 
the proper sphere of politics. Public administration scholars have since then 
proposed numerous explanations and theoretical models in their attempts to 
understand the role of public administration in the political process. Three 
schools ––have since emerged to explain the politics–administration dichotomy:
• the separation school;
• the political school; and
• the interaction school.
The separation school
The separation school analyses the relationship between politics and 
administration, arguing that the function of politics is to provide guidance, or, as 
Wilson (1887) put it, ‘setting the task for administration’ and public administration 
functions to provide neutral competence to the policy process. Thus, elected 
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offi cials provide political guidance through policy leadership and legislative 
oversight. On the other hand public administrators are responsible for the 
implementation of policies in conformity with legislative intentions and 
instructions. Proponents of the separation school argue that good government is 
usually synonymous with an effi cient and effective public service. The effectiveness 
with which policies are implemented and services are delivered is dependent to a 
large extent on how these policies are formulated, implemented and evaluated. 
Under the career service model, a politically neutral public service is recruited on 
merit, and given tenure to encourage frank and fearless advice and protect it from 
electoral whims, thus enabling it to serve a government of any political persuasion.
Sossin (2006) outlines six key principles that should govern the politics and 
administration interface in order to safeguard neutrality of the public service:
• Politics and policy are separated from administration, and politicians make 
policy decisions and public servants execute these decisions.
• Public servants are appointed and promoted on the basis of merit rather than 
of party affi liation or contributions.
• Public servants do not engage in partisan political activities.
• Public servants do not express publicly their personal views on government 
policies or administration.
• Public servants provide forthright and objective advice to their political 
masters in private and in confi dence; in return, political executives protect 
the anonymity of public servants by publicly accepting responsibility for 
departmental decisions.
• Public servants execute policy decisions loyally, irrespective of the 
philosophy and programmes of the party in power and regardless of their 
personal opinions.
The political school
Scholars belonging to the political school reject the politics–administration 
distinction as they view public administration to be an inseparable part of the 
political process (Long, 1954; Bosworth, 1958; Pfi ffner, 1985; Miller, 1993). 
Factors such as vague and ambiguous legislation, lack of technical knowledge and 
diffi culties in monitoring and controlling bureaucratic behaviour are used to 
justify the critical role of public administrators in the policy process. Indeed, 
public administrators are viewed as policymakers and policy advocates (Lipsky, 
1980). Thus the political approach rejects the subordinate and instrumental role 
of public administration in relating to elected offi cials. Such views, however, face 
challenges of their own, which forced the British public service in the nineteenth 
century to protest when bureaucrats realized that politicians were handing out 
public sector jobs to friends and supporters – practices that were exacerbating 
corruption, favouritism, politicization and ineffi ciency. As a result, the Northcote–
Trevelyan Report (1854) appealed for a meritocratic system that would enhance 
public administration performance.
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The interaction school
The interaction school emphasizes a high degree of collaboration between elected 
and administrative offi cials with each maintaining their traditional roles but also 
adding unique perspectives by crossing traditional boundaries and operating 
inside each others’ terrain. Thus, the interaction school seeks a middle ground 
between the separation and political schools, and acknowledges the differences 
between politics and administration in a number of ways, such as logical and 
psychological differences between politics and administration, and dissimilarities 
in the perspectives, values, and formal positions of elected and administrative 
offi cials (Waldo, 1980; Nalbandian, 1994; Svara, 2001). Yet, what makes the 
interaction school somewhat different from the separation school is its emphasis 
on on-going cooperation between elected and administrative offi cials in the 
process of policymaking. In the 1960s and 1970s, ministers in Commonwealth 
Africa were more dependent on the advice of principal secretaries, but since the 
1980s the role of ministers has changed to the extent that most ministers are now 
not only involved in policymaking, but also interested in ensuring that those 
policies and relevant programmes and projects are effectively implemented 
(Kathyola, 2010). As better-educated ministers with public sector experience 
have come into the administration, the tendency for ministers to do much more 
than their predecessors has increased, with some performing roles that traditionally 
belonged to the principal secretary. Most ministers at times usurp the roles of a 
principal secretary (Kathyola, 2010).
Relations between politics and management
The relations between politics and management (administration), as Demir and 
Nyhan (2008) note, is complex. In reality, a continuum rather than a dichotomy 
appears relevant in most political systems. The overlap of roles and functions 
between elected offi cials and public administrators on policy and administration 
are diverse, illuminating a more variable version of their day-to-day relations 
(Demir, 1993). In recent years, the New Public Management (NPM) movement 
has called for new ways of running governments, as one would run a business, 
resulting in a reshaping of the relations among politicians, administrators, markets 
and citizens (Svara, 2001). Existing literature on the interface between politics 
and administration frequently agrees that in theory there is a division between 
political and administrative roles but in practice it is impossible to defi ne a 
marked border between political and administrative actors (Mulgan, 2007).
Role of actors in public policy processes in Malawi: ministers and 
principal secretaries (PSs)
This section examines the role of ministers and PSs in policy processes in Malawi 
in order to determine the extent to which Malawi’s experience refl ect any of the 
models of politics and administration relationships discussed above.
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Ministers in Malawi are ‘political heads of government ministries’. Their roles 
in the public service machinery include, among others, the provision of political 
leadership and direction of the ministries to which they are appointed. In this 
regard, they are accountable to the public on the performance of their ministry 
and as such they articulate policies aimed at enhancing the performance of their 
ministries. They are answerable to the President for the effi cient performance of 
their ministries/departments and, collectively, for the government. PSs, on the 
other hand, provide professional leadership in their ministries, and are involved 
in policy formulation, strategic planning and management, fi nancial management 
and human resource management. They are the contact points in the public 
service; their effectiveness in discharging their responsibilities is critical to the 
ministries’ performance. They are also viewed as executive heads of their 
ministries and departments in which they are responsible for day-to-day operations 
for all public service matters. As one key informant put it, PSs are essentially 
‘boundary spanners between the technical and the political structures in the 
ministry’.
Public policy had been defi ned by Dye (1995) as ‘whatever government 
chooses to do or not to do’ and the public policy process entails a series of related 
activities in the task of initiating, formulating, legitimizing, implementing, 
monitoring and evaluating policies in the public sector. In the ensuing sections, 
we will examine the relationship between politicians and their principal 
secretaries by focusing on three sets of interrelated processes related to policy 
formulation, implementation and evaluation/monitoring.
Formulation of public policy
From the above defi nition of public policy, it is evident that public policy results 
from the decisions of government to do something. The Government of Malawi 
faces numerous challenges that affect citizens, including HIV/AIDS, poverty, 
crime, and drought and food insecurity. Since governments must address such 
challenges, they are under pressure to formulate a deliberate plan or decision to 
address public concerns.
Ministers formulate policies through Cabinet committees of which they are 
members. At ministerial level, their role in policy formulation is to ensure that 
policies relating to smooth operations of their ministries are articulated and 
formulated. In this regard, they provide direction to the PSs in order to ensure 
that proper policies are formulated. Ministers also take the lead in determining 
policy objectives based on which PSs devise strategies for implementation. Once 
policies have been developed, ministers approve them before they are submitted 
to the Cabinet for approval.
In contrast to their ministers, the role of principal secretaries in policy 
formulation is ‘to provide full, honest and impartial advice’ (as one informant put 
it) to the ministers to enable them to articulate proper policy decisions. Another 
PS argued that they ‘provide technical advice in the policy formulation process, 
as well as advice on how the policies can best be implemented’. At the operational 
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level, PSs allocate fi nancial, material and human resources to supervise the policy 
formulation process. For example, they may decide to organize workshops and 
other forums where various stakeholders such as political leaders, civil servants, 
NGOs and traditional leaders can discuss the issues before developing a draft 
policy for further refi nement.
Policy implementation
According to Hayes (2001), public policy implementation consists of organized 
activities by governments directed towards the achievement of goals and 
objectives, articulated in authorized policy statements. The process of policy 
implementation is affected by various factors such as the nature of the problem, 
circumstances surrounding them, the administrative machinery in charge of the 
task and available resources. In Malawi, once policies have been formulated, 
ministers ‘provide political leadership’ aimed at their implementation. The role 
of ministers in policy implementation, as one minister noted, is fi rst ‘to lobby for 
mobilization of resources for the effective implementation’ of the policies. At the 
start of the implementation of a particular policy, Malawian ministers typically 
preside over a ceremonial opening or placing of a foundation stone. As the 
implementation process progresses, ministers perform monitoring functions. In 
this regard, they provide checks and balances to ensure proper implementation of 
the articulated policies. It is thus not uncommon to hear on radio, television or 
in the newspapers that a particular minister is touring institutions in his ministry, 
and inspecting progress being made on projects he or she has offi cially launched.
Principal secretaries are implementers of the policies formulated by the 
ministers, and are required to update ministers on the policy implementation 
process and propose options for overcoming any obstacles in the policy 
implementation process. They implement the policies through offi cers below 
them, such as deputy secretaries, directors, undersecretaries, chief human resource 
offi cers and various technical, professional and clerical staff, including artisans. 
As one informant observed, the PSs implement policies ‘to the best of their 
ability and enable the ministries to achieve their goals’ of effective public service 
delivery. Another respondent claimed that ‘PSs are therefore responsible for all 
the managerial functions of planning, organizing, directing, and coordination 
budgeting and reporting for the implementation of the policies.’
Policy monitoring and evaluation
Policy monitoring relates to ensuring that a policy is working towards achieving 
the objectives of an organization. In other words, it entails the routine collection 
of data on a particular policy in order for management to assess the progress it is 
making in the implementation process. Administrators produce reports on a 
daily, monthly and quarterly basis. Policy monitoring examines the schedule 
(trend) of impact of the policy regardless of whether positive or negative. 
According to Dunn (1994), policy outcome is an observed consequence of policy 
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action, and such observed consequences may be intended or unintended. The 
impact of any policy can be positive as well as negative on the target situation or 
group. It can also impact on the future as well as immediate conditions, or through 
direct costs in terms of resources devoted to the programme and indirect costs in 
relations to lost alternatives (Dye, 1995).
In Malawi, ministers are responsible for ensuring that the policies they have 
formulated with the help of PSs result in the expected impact or results. They are 
therefore keen to know the political consequences of their policies during and/or 
after implementation. As they are responsible for the organization of policy 
reviews and recommendation of improvements where applicable to cabinet and 
or parliament, a minister’s role during the evaluation process is to fi rst assess 
whether the policy objectives and goals were met and thereafter provide guidance 
on how to address the gaps, if any.
PSs, on the other hand, are ‘responsible for ensuring that they put in place 
mechanisms for evaluating the policies, and coordinate the process of reviewing 
these policies’. This can be undertaken through regular management meetings 
with heads of sections, quarterly reports and mid-term evaluation, as well as end 
of project evaluation. In some instances, PSs ‘use workshops to hear stakeholders’ 
views and perception on successes of the policies’ while on other occasions, ‘they 
also use consultants to undertake an independent review and provide a report on 
achievements and challenges as well as recommendations’. Thus, PSs normally 
brief their minister on the outcomes of the evaluations and advise on solutions.
From the above discussion, it appears that there is a division of labour between 
the minister and principal secretaries in policy formulation, implementation and 
evaluation. Indeed, there is no clear-cut dichotomy to suggest that ministers only 
formulate policy and principal secretaries only implement it. Each one of them 
has a role in the entire policy processes. Based on this preliminary discussion, it 
also appears that the integration school discussed above is more relevant in the 
context of Malawi in terms of the relationship between politics and administration 
in policy processes.
Human resource management processes in the Malawian 
public service
The main roles and responsibilities of top-level civil servants (or ‘principal 
secretaries’ (or PSs) as is the case in Malawi) in charge of ministries include 
managing the human resources of the ministry and to ensure increased productivity 
and quality of service to the citizenry. It is important to examine the human 
resource management processes in the Malawi public service in order to determine 
the nature and impact of the interface between elected politicians and 
administrative heads of ministries on people management because an effi cient 
and effective public service machinery needs proper systems of appointments, 
promotion, transfers and discipline handling.
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Recruitment, selection and appointment
Recruitment is the process of generating a pool of capable individuals who are 
stimulated to apply for employment in an organization (Dzimbiri, 2015; 
Armstrong, 2010). Selection is the process by which managers and others use 
specifi c instruments to choose from a pool of applicants a person or persons more 
likely to succeed in the jobs (Dzimbiri, 2015; Armstrong, 2010). Effective 
recruitment and selection practices identify job applicants with the appropriate 
level of knowledge, skills, abilities and other requirements needed for successful 
performance in a job or an organization. Positive economic outcomes for the 
organization are highly dependent on hiring people with the right skills or the 
highest level of these skills.
According to public service procedures in Malawi, the PS plays a very 
important part in the recruitment and selection processes in a ministry. The PS is 
required to ensure that the ministry has adequate staff with relevant knowledge, 
skills and attitudes to adequately support the minister in the implementation of 
the policies. Recruitment of staff and procurement of resources and other services 
are based on the activities identifi ed for achieving policy goals. Moreover, where 
good policies are in place, they will lead to recruitment of suitable and qualifi ed 
people, making it easy for the principal secretary to manage the implementation 
process. However, the provision of fi nancial resources (the minister’s respon-
sibility) in the policy cycle may positively or negatively affect the motivation of 
human resources in the ministry.
The PS’s role in recruitment is to declare and recommend vacancies to the 
Malawian Civil Service Commission for advertisement and selection of suitable 
candidates. Once candidates are selected, the PS is then directed by the 
commission to make an offer of appointment to the candidates. The fi rst Malawian 
Public Service Commission – established in 1961 – was modelled on the British 
system. Over the years, however, the Malawian public service has expanded 
greatly and more specialized service commissions have been created including the 
teaching services commission, civil service commission, health service 
commission, judicial service commission, police service commission and prison 
service commission. In order to fi ll vacancies in the ministry, the PS contacts the 
appropriate commission and provides information on the number of positions 
available and the qualifi cations, skills and experience required to fi ll these. The 
appropriate commission advertises these positions in newspapers and government 
circulars, and also receives applications, which it sends back to the PS for 
shortlisting. Thereafter, the commission conducts interviews either with the 
PS in attendance or with a representative of the ministry sitting on the interview 
panel. Once candidates are selected, the commission directs the PS to fi nalize 
the appointment.
The above procedure is largely followed for middle- and junior-level 
appointments in the ministry. Top-level public servants – including the Chief 
Secretary, PSs, CEOs of parastatals and under-secretaries – are appointed by the 
President. This trend of politically infl uenced appointments in the public service 
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is also increasingly the practice in the lower echelons. Indeed, as one PS argued, 
‘it is an open secret that some ministers infl uence recruitment by directing top-
level civil servants to favour relatives, friends and close contacts of the minister.’ 
Ever since the introduction of democracy and multiparty politics in 1994, 
successive governments have exercised their infl uence to appoint, promote, 
transfer and dismiss senior public servants of their choice without following 
correct procedures. This has often resulted in frequent allegations of political 
favouritism in important appointments, which have tended to overlook the 
qualifi cations and seniority of relevant candidates. Thus, it has become well 
accepted that almost all PSs are political appointees of the President. And this 
trend has resulted in a situation whereby the number of PSs in the public service 
increased to 96 in 2015, despite far fewer ministries. It is not uncommon, 
therefore, to fi nd more than one PS in certain ministries (e.g. education, which 
has three), creating problems of overlap of functions and power struggles. The 
government has attempted to address this problem in September 2015 by directing 
that PSs who were not called ‘Secretary for . . . ’ say education, heath, agriculture, 
would be demoted to the position of chief director, who is merely a section head. 
As a result of this strategy, the total number of PSs in Malawi has now been 
reduced to 21. The issue of political interference in appointment has been 
highlighted by the Public Service Reform Commission headed by the Vice-
President as one of the key perceptions held by various people in Malawi.
Promotion
Promotion is a change of assignment to a job at a higher level in the organization 
and includes the expansion of benefi ts and managerial authority over other 
employees in return for higher pay, benefi ts and privileges (Armstrong, 2010). 
Psychologically, promotions help satisfy employees’ needs for security, belonging 
and personal growth. Promotions should receive the same careful attention as any 
other employment decisions to minimize concerns by those who feel themselves 
to be more deserving than those promoted.
In the Malawian public service, the procedures for promotion are similar to 
those on recruitment, selection and appointment explained above. Thus, the 
relevant service commission advertises in the newspapers and government 
circulars, on the recommendation of the principal secretary of a ministry that has 
vacancies. The commission receives applications from qualifi ed individuals 
(invariably those already employed in the public service), which it then forwards 
to the relevant ministry for shortlisting. It conducts interviews of shortlisted 
candidates, in the presence of a representative of the ministry on the interview 
panel. The commission then directs the ministry (through the principal secretary) 
to promote the successful candidates. For other levels above S5, the commission 
submits a list to the President and recommends that the listed offi cers be promoted. 
Once the approval has been granted, the commission effects the promotion. That 
is, from position of undersecretary (S5) through deputy secretary (S4) and senior 
deputy secretary (S3), the Civil Service commission simply recommend names to 
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the Chief Secretary to the Government for the President to endorse the 
recommendations for promotion or even reject the list altogether.
In addition to the above procedure, political interference plays a crucial role in 
promotions in the public service. Particularly in relation to key appointments, 
the President has substantial power and infl uence, which may disregard the public 
service staff establishment and budgetary considerations. As one key informer 
lamented, ‘It is no wonder that instead of having 40 PSs, we ended up having 96.’ 
Several respondents in the study also cite the case of the Joyce Banda 
administration, which directed the Ministry of Education to promote all teachers 
at grade PT4 who had not been promoted since they started working. The 
consequence of this directive from the President was the promotion of almost 
20,000 teachers to PT4 level, which in turn posed enormous burdens on the state 
exchequer. To make things worse, and given budget constraints, the government 
was unable to pay these newly promoted teachers their new salaries for over two 
years. Indeed, this entire scenario could have been avoided had the decision on 
promotion been placed under the control of the PS in the Ministry of Education. 
In another instance, a respondent cited the case of ‘unqualifi ed offi cers promoted 
to district commissioner positions in Neno, Chitipa and Machinga districts, 
forcing the Minister of Local Government to bring them back to where they 
belong’. In other words, the minister demoted them to their original grades. This 
directive was resisted through court injunctions, causing inconveniences and 
stalemate to service provision in districts affected. As the injunctions still stand, 
the offi cers have continued to enjoy the privileges of a higher offi ce to which they 
were initially promoted.
Demotion
Demotion is the process of reducing an employee’s grade because of underperformance 
or misbehaviour at work. Thus, it is part of disciplining the employee for failure to 
perform according to a desired standard or for an offence committed while 
performing duties (Employment Act 2000; Dzimbiri, 2015) The appropriate service 
commission metes out demotion as a punishment and this applies for the majority 
of the employees whose appointment or promotion is not handled by the President 
or the minister. However, demotions can also be effected for senior positions on 
directives from the political and administrative leadership. The controversial case 
of district commissioners of Chitipa, Machinga and Chiradzulu (mentioned above) 
has often been cited by respondents as an example of improper procedures practiced 
in cases of demotion. There are further controversial cases demonstrating the 
negative impact of ministers in the public service:
• A directive was issued in 2015 by the Minister of Local Government which 
aimed at abolishing the position of chiefs in urban areas. This directive was 
severely contested by the concerned chiefs, who garnered support from fellow 
chiefs to challenge the decision. The said minister was left out in a cabinet 
reshuffl e of 2015 and the matter died a natural death.
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• The appointment, by the President, of a chief secretary to the government to 
become Malawi’s High Commissioner on a foreign posting. This act was 
viewed as a punishment as the former chief secretary – who was the supervisor 
of all principal secretaries in government – suddenly had to report to the PS 
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Such a situation should not have occurred 
if proper procedures of appointment or transfer were employed, as the offi cer 
in question was not at fault. The demotion simply occurred during a change 
of government, as the offi cer was perceived to be loyal to the former regime.
Transfer
Transfer is the placement of an employee in another job for which the duties, 
responsibilities, status pay and benefi ts are equal to those of the previous job. 
Others describe a transfer as reassignments to similar positions in other parts of 
the organization (Dzimbiri, 2015). A transfer requires the employee to change 
work group, work place, work shift or organizational unit. Transfers make it 
possible for an organization to place its employees in jobs where there is a greater 
need for their service and/or where they can acquire new knowledge and skills. 
Transfers can also be advocated to expose people to a wider range of jobs or to fi ll 
open positions with trained employees.
In the Malawian public service, transfer can be between posts or a move to 
another workstation where there is a vacancy to be fi lled. Transfer between posts 
occurs when for instance a secondary school teacher applies and succeeds in an 
interview for the post of protocol offi cer in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 
process also involves the relevant service commission that conducted interviews 
notifying the relevant ministry of successful candidates. The transfer between 
posts in this case is the joint responsibility of the two ministries.
However, as with recruitments and promotions, political interference in the 
transfer of public servants is commonplace in Malawi. There have been numerous 
such cases over the years – for example, an army commander was transferred to 
become a general manager of a parastatal body; political leaders without requisite 
qualifi cations have been appointed to senior management positions of parastatal 
bodies; offi cials from city councils and universities have been transferred to 
ministries at very high-level positions; junior offi cers have been transferred to 
prestigious posts at the direction of a politician. Such arbitrary transfers not only 
distort the well-established procedures of the public services, but also are a major 
source of demotivation among public servants.
With the consolidation of democracy in Malawi, political parties are getting 
accustomed to losing power at regular intervals. When a new government assumes 
offi ce, it appoints its preferred candidate to the post of Chief Secretary just as it 
may place its favourite offi cers in senior management positions and demote, 
transfer or forcibly retire those it considers loyal to the previous administration. 
The result of such practices is lack of continuity in experience and a tendency to 
encourage making hay while the sun shines. Consequently, there are considerable 
incentives in the public service to extract resources for personal gain while in 
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power, and before a new party is voted into offi ce. Another negative consequence 
is short-term policies that result from the fear that any long-term commitments 
will inevitably be reversed by a new leadership. And the PSs feel pressurised to 
bend rules and generally operate in an unprofessional manner simply to please 
their political bosses and save their careers.
It was therefore not surprising that most respondents in this study held the 
view that political interference not only routinely takes place in relation to 
promotions and transfers, but is often exacerbated when a new government 
assumes offi ce. The Public Service Review Commission reported the perceived 
political interference in the Malawi public service, and therefore recommended 
that certain key positions – Attorney General, Governor of the Reserve Bank, 
Chief Secretary to Government, Director General of Malawi Broadcasting 
Corporation, Inspector General of Police, Commander of the Malawi Defence 
Force, Secretary to the Treasury and Budget Director, amongst others – should 
follow presidential tenure of offi ce (GoM, 2014: 5). This is a controversial 
recommendation because of the impact such a system will have on the performance 
of public servants when they know that their careers terminate after a presidential 
term. As one informant rightly noted, an important consequence will be ‘a lack 
of continuity in organisational memory, ineffi cient utilisation of resources and 
misappropriation of public monies between governments’.
Discipline
Discipline can be defi ned as actions or behaviour on the part of authorities in an 
organization aimed at restraining all employees from behaviours that threaten to 
disrupt the functioning of the organization. It is thus the means by which 
supervisory personnel correct behavioural defi ciencies and ensure adherence to 
established company rules. The purpose of discipline is to correct behaviour 
and not just to punish or embarrass an employee. Disciplinary procedures and 
corrective-action policies establish guidelines for employee performance and 
behaviour and add an essential component to the overall management system. 
Disciplinary action initiated by management is a way of counteracting poor work 
performance and unacceptable behaviour at work. However, proper procedures 
must be followed in all disciplinary cases.
The Malawi Public Service Regulations stipulate 26 acts of misconduct, 
including insubordination, absenteeism, theft, corruption, involvement in party 
politics and fi nancial embarrassment, that can attract disciplinary proceedings. 
The PSs are keen to oversee the enforcement of discipline in their ministries to 
ensure that staff are adhering to the public service code of ethics and conduct, 
Malawi Public Service Regulations, the Public Service Act, Employment Act, 
administrative circular letters and relevant statutes. Procedures for handling 
disciplinary matters and the role of controlling offi cers (PSs) and relevant service 
commission in the disciplinary process are also stipulated in the Malawi Public 
Service Regulations. The suspected employee is interdicted from the work place 
while the alleged misconduct is being investigated. And a hearing must be 
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conducted in a fair and transparent manner, with the participation of the 
interdicted offi cer. The decision of the relevant commission – demotion, transfer, 
withholding of increment or dismissal – is subsequently communicated to the 
offi cer, who has the right to appeal.
There are several issues of discipline that the Public Service Commission 
has noted as prevalent in the Malawi public service. For example, the 
Commission noted that ‘there is a senior government management paralysis with 
regards to their supervisory roles’. The Commission also noted that junior staff 
continue to violate set rules and procedures relating to performance and time 
management, among others, and that PSs and other senior government offi cials 
continue to ignore such acts and/or omissions which have put government 
business in a state of paralysis. This has created what the Commission calls 
‘camaraderie buddy-buddy relationships between the senior government offi cials 
and their juniors’. The Commission further observed that the senior–junior 
government offi cial relationships are responsible for a state of ‘mental siege’ on 
the part of the senior government offi cials, and paralyses them into inaction 
(GoM, 2014: 2–5).
It is evident from the Commission’s sentiments that ‘there is fear by Senior 
Government offi cials of their juniors as well as lack of respect by junior staff of 
their superiors’ and ‘absenteeism [is] not sanctioned and is contrary to the 
provisions of the Malawi Public Service Regulations’. The Commission noted 
that ‘such unregulated absenteeism is leading to serious disruption of services and 
has a negative impact on delivery of services in most ministries, departments and 
agencies (MDAs)’. Hence, the Commission recommended that senior government 
offi cials should exercise their mandates and discipline insubordinate staff without 
fear or favour, in line with Malawi Public Service Regulations. They also 
recommended that, ‘any absence from the offi ce should be authorised, in line 
with the provisions and requirements of Malawi Public Service Regulations’. 
And that ‘all Controlling Offi cers be reminded that they have an obligation to 
enforce these regulations and ensure that Government services are always 
provided without disruption’. In addition, the Commission recommended that 
senior offi cers be empowered to enforce the rules and regulations of the public 
service in their MDAs (GoM, 2014: 2–5).
Minister–PS relationship in Malawi
Experiences of most Commonwealth countries in Africa indicate that a tension-
fi lled relationship between a minister and a principal secretary can divide a 
ministry and turn it into a micro-political battlefi eld – undermining the overall 
effectiveness of the organization (CAPAM, 2007). A positive relationship 
between these two on the other hand can motivate the whole organization to 
deliver, regardless of the level of technical, managerial and leadership 
competencies of the minister. Without the support of a competent civil service, 
political leaders would not be able to effectively translate the aspirations of the 
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people into policies; nor would they be able to ensure that the implementation of 
these policies have positive impacts on the lives of the people.
In order to avoid friction, the relationship between the minister and principal 
secretary needs to be founded on ‘trust, cultivating values of integrity, 
professionalism, respect, openness and learning’ (CAPAM, 2007: 5). Walter 
(2007) points out that PSs need to develop their collective self-confi dence and 
are to be responsive to but independent of the minister; they should take care of 
themselves to avoid burn-out and learn how to work with other PS colleagues 
instead of undermining each other. What then is the relationship between 
ministers and administrative heads of the ministries?
According to one of the key informants, ‘The relationship between the 
minister and principal secretary in Malawi varies from one personality to another.’ 
He went on to observe that ‘On average it is satisfactory, although in certain 
cases the professionalism of PSs may sometimes be compromised due to political 
pressures exerted by ministers especially in resource allocation.’ Another 
respondent noted, ‘PSs are political appointees and this sometimes makes it 
impossible for them to apolitical.’ Still others claimed that the relationship is 
harmonious in some ministries while in others it is ‘uneasy and full of suspicion’. 
Such realities create a number of challenges that PSs face. For example, ministers 
and their PSs may not have a common understanding and a shared vision of their 
ministry, and risk ending up making decisions at odds with one another and to 
the detriment of their ministries. Moreover, they also risk not articulating 
good policies or recruiting the right calibre of staff, which in the long term may 
result in the failure to manage the human resources as well as deliver effi cient 
public services.
As a minister noted ‘the minister typically wants to deliver results within the 
shortest possible time in order to win the next election or return to power’. As 
such he or she may want to take shortcuts in the implementation of the policies. 
In contrast, the PS may wish to follow correct administrative procedures and this 
often becomes the source of mistrust and confl ict between the two. Another 
challenge is when ministers make ‘ineffectual decisions’ for PSs to implement. 
This adversely affects morale, as professionalism starts to deteriorate. Examples of 
such decisions include a PS who was asked to open a bank account using a single 
signature for use by the minister and later, when allegations of misappropriation 
of funds emerged, the PS was interdicted and charged with misconduct, and 
eventually dismissed. Another case involved a minister who instructed a PS to 
procure items outside the procurement procedures. This led to the indictment of 
the PS on allegation of abuse of public offi ce and subsequent disciplinary hearing 
and dismissal. Under such instances, a senior offi cial observed that ‘PSs are always 
victims, yet the ministers come out clean.’ And a large majority of these incidents 
are revealed when the minister’s term is over or when new ministers have 
come in. As one PS noted, ‘one dilemma is that when the PS stands his ground 
and says “No” to an instruction from the minister, it is interpreted as 
insubordination.’ A case was cited of a PS who refused to withdraw money from 
a government account despite the instructions of his minister and was subsequently 
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removed from his position for some time before being posted to another institution 
outside the civil service.
A good working relationship built on trust and mutual respect between 
ministers and principal secretaries is paramount for the effective functioning of a 
ministry. Ministers provide political leadership and the overall direction for their 
respective ministries while PSs professionally manage and administer day-to-day 
activities of the ministry. In order for both sets of actors to perform their functions 
effectively, they need to have a common understanding as well as a shared vision 
of their ministries, in addition to open communication and a participative style 
of management. This will help ensure that public servants are encouraged to 
perform to the best of their abilities; and that good performance is recognized and 
properly rewarded and the reputation of neither minister nor the PS (or for that 
matter of the ministry) is not tarnished (Colley, 2005). As one respondent 
pointed out, ‘this requires reasonableness and understanding on both sides.’ 
He further argued that ‘properly organised management meetings where staff 
can appreciate each other’s shortcomings and develop mutual trust’ should be 
the proper modus operandi in ministries to create a conducive political–
administrative interface.
Apart from political interference in appointment and promotion in the public 
service, the lack of ethics and accountability are another set of challenges. There 
have been numerous cases reported over the past few years regarding corrupt 
tendencies in the ministries and government departments, local government and 
parastatal bodies. In spite of various public sector reforms in procurement, 
fi nancial management and functioning service commissions, there are enormous 
public concerns about the prevalence of corrupt tendencies, moral decadence 
and nepotism in both recruitment and procurement processes. Moreover, a 
culture of ‘allowances’ has been institutionalized and there is a tendency among 
public servants to encourage the organization of unnecessary workshops, seminars 
and training courses or jump from one holiday resort to another or one country to 
another (for these workshops, etc.) in order to enhance their incomes by 
pocketing daily allowances (Dzimbiri, 2014).
There is also growing evidence that the public service machinery has not been 
very effective in recent years. In addition to a consistent shortage of drugs in 
hospitals, there are numerous unfi lled vacancies in ministries and government 
departments while an army of unemployed graduates swarm the streets (Dzimbiri, 
2014). Moreover, the country witnessed in 2013 a major corruption scandal 
(termed ‘Cashgate’) where public funds worth over MKW 20 billion was syphoned 
from public coffers. It is even feared that, since 2005, Malawi has probably 
lost close to MK 577 billion with the active involvement of public servants 
and politicians.
Conclusion
The public service is the main tool governments use to implement various 
national development policies and deliver services in education, health, 
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community development, transport, maintenance of law and order among others. 
Governments rely on this machinery to design, formulate and implement their 
policies, strategies and programmes, and to discharge all routine government 
functions. However, the relationship between politics and administration has 
been a controversial subject since the early days of public administration as a fi eld 
of study. This chapter has analysed the role and impact of politics on human 
resource management in Malawi.
Central issues examined include the role of ministers and principal secretaries 
in recruitment, promotion, demotion, transfer and discipline of public servants in 
order to determine the impact of on human resource management and service 
delivery in a country struggling to promote development and reduce poverty. The 
role PSs play in recruiting, promoting, transferring and disciplining public 
servants affect the delivery of service in that where staff with appropriate skills 
are recruited or promoted there is effectiveness and effi ciency in service delivery. 
On the other hand, if PSs have not given proper guidance in the process or if they 
do not enforce discipline, then the service delivery may be adversely affected. 
Again, where ministers interfere through directives on whom to appoint, promote 
or transfer, public service morale suffers. There are a growing number of reported 
cases of laxity and under-performance among public servants who wilfully 
disregard procedures and regulations. Many do not show up for work on time and/
or leave their offi ces well before the stipulated time. Malawians have also 
complained about the arrogance of junior staff, a rise in corruption and deliberate 
efforts to solicit bribes in lieu of providing a service. And the general deterioration 
of public services is not only a problem of the immigration and traffi c departments, 
but characterizes the workings of most ministries and departments in the country.
While in theory ministers do not have a prominent role in recruitment, 
promotion, demotion or transfer of public servants in the ministry, the reality is 
quite different in practice. Political interference is rampant in the public service. 
The consequence of this is ineffective service delivery due to frustrations and 
appointment of inappropriate human resources. Legal suits due to premature 
termination of contracts, promotion without linking to budgetary provisions and 
a bloated public service, which becomes ineffi cient in the proper delivery of 
public service, are other impacts.
From the perspective of the three theoretical perspectives regarding separation, 
political and integration schools on the politics–administration relationship, the 
Malawi experience reveals complexities in the relationships between ministers 
and top civil servants. While the separation school with its emphasis on separation 
of politics from administration is relevant to Malawi at the formal level, the 
reality is very different. A politically neutral public service is recruited on merit, 
and given tenure to encourage frank and fearless advice and protect it from 
electoral whims. This enables it to serve a government of any political persuasion. 
However, the subtle interference of politicians in human resource management 
and lack of independence of the administrative heads of ministries shown in the 
discussion reveals the inadequacy of the separation school. The political school, 
which accepts the separation of politics from administration but rejects the 
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subordinate and instrumental role of public administration relating to elected 
offi cials, is also unrealistic in the context of Malawi. It is evident from the above 
discussion that administrative heads of ministries are subordinate to ministers to 
the extent of even doing what is professionally or ethically unacceptable. In 
reality, there is greater integration of the roles of ministers and PSs in policy 
processes. In public service human resource management, the degree of political 
interference (which is negative) in areas of appointments, promotion, transfer 
and discipline is very strong. Thus, the three schools of though discussed in this 
chapter have partial application in the Malawi context.
Recommendations of the system-wide public sector reforms, published as 
Making Malawi Work, include institutionalizing open competitive interviews for 
positions that have been reserved for presidential appointment as well as 
induction for ministers to understand their roles. If these and other 
recommendations are implemented, there is a greater likelihood that the public 
service human resource management function will in future experience minimal 
political interference and its effectiveness will raise the strategic role of the public 
service in national development.
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6 The political economy of fi scal 
decentralisation
Implications on local governance 
and public service delivery
Asiyati Lorraine Chiweza
Introduction
During the past two decades, many developing countries have implemented 
decentralisation reforms to strengthen local governments and bring the state 
closer to people and ensure greater accountability of the state in the delivery of 
services to its citizens. External donors and Malawian policymakers largely viewed 
the adoption of a democratic decentralisation policy in 1990s as a logical 
conclusion to the democratisation process and as a way of strengthening local 
government authorities to improve the delivery of public services. However, 
since the adoption of the policy in 1998, various studies have shown that the 
scope for realising the commonly advocated goals of democratic participation, 
improved service delivery, and poverty reduction have remained largely elusive. 
Dual administration has persisted and local government functions mainly as an 
extension of the central government. Studies have further noted that there has 
been limited participation of the public in local government decision-making 
processes (Chasukwa et al., 2014). Others claim that there has been a decline in 
democratic oversight and accountability (Cammack et al., 2007), with horizontal 
accountability given more emphasis than vertical accountability (Chasukwa and 
Chinsinga, 2013), which in turn has resulted in the fragmentation of service 
delivery that is moreover characterised by poor facilities and insuffi cient 
equipment (Cammack and O’Neil, 2014). There have been various narratives 
that have tried to offer plausible explanations to this fragmentation. The fi rst 
narrative relates the fragmentation to bureaucratic resistance to devolve 
appropriate sectoral functions and limited institutional integration of the local 
government system at the district level (Kaunda, 1999; Chiweza, 1998, 2010a; 
Chinsinga, 2008; Tambulasi, 2010). The second narrative locates the challenges 
within discourses of inadequate fi nancial, technical, and human capacities 
(Chinsinga, 2008; Chiweza, 2010b; Kutengule et al., 2014).
There is also a body of literature that relates the locus of these challenges to 
the logic behind the underlying structure of Malawi’s political economy – the 
nature of political organisation and competition, elite-dominated political 
settlements, and a broader social contract that puts in place powerful incentives 
that shape elite behaviour (Chinsinga, 2008; Cammack and O’Neil, 2014). This 
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chapter builds on this discourse and argues that one of the key avenues through 
which this political logic has become pronounced and has had a crippling effect 
on local public service delivery is fi scal decentralisation and resource allocation 
decision-making. This chapter addresses three main questions:
• What is the national pattern of fi scal intergovernmental arrangements that 
has evolved since democratisation and what are the political economy 
dynamics underlying this particular pattern?
• Who are the key political and bureaucratic actors in resource allocation 
decision-making within the District Councils, and how does their behaviour 
contribute to a weak and fragmented service delivery position for local 
governments?
• What potential do the 2014 local elections hold towards improvement of 
local governance and public service delivery for Malawians?
Fiscal decentralisation and political economy
The notion of fi scal decentralisation must be understood within with the context 
of a broader discussion of decentralisation because the ‘level of fi scal 
decentralisation corresponds to the degree of independent decision making that 
exercised at the local level’ (Bird and François 1998: 3). Fiscal decentralisation 
refers to the transfer of fi scal powers to sub-national governments. It can also be 
conceived as a process of reform that involves making choices among four types 
of policy decisions (Fjelstad, 2001):
• expenditure assignment – a process of defi ning the responsibilities of 
central and local government for providing and paying for specifi c services 
to citizens;
• revenue assignment, that is, establishing revenue sources as well as tax-
raising powers between the central and local governments and giving them 
authority to decide how to spend their revenue;
• the regulatory policy to monitor and set limits on local government 
borrowing; and
• inter-governmental policy on revenue sharing enabling a central government 
to transfer fi nancial resources in the form of grants to local governments.
Fiscal decentralisation is important because the extent to which revenue sources 
accompany the transfer of administrative responsibilities is crucial to the service 
delivery success of local government and ‘control of revenue sources is the 
thorniest issue of any decentralization’ (León-Alfonso, 2007: 27).
The combination of the different revenue sources is another important factor 
that infl uences the degree of autonomy and capability of district councils to meet 
citizen service demands. Scholars have argued that capacity for service delivery 
and accountability of local government to local clients is enhanced if local 
government has access to own-taxes with the right to adjust tax rates (Ahmad 
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et al., 2006). If local expenditures are fi nanced entirely out of grants or transfers 
from central government and not out of local tax bases, the capacity to implement 
service delivery programmes will depend on the goodwill of the central 
actors. Similarly, local voters may have little or no information regarding the 
resource envelope available to their local government and what those resources 
are intended to provide. Conditional transfers lead to a more hierarchical 
system of accountability with the centre holding the local government 
accountable for proper use of central transfers. Unconditional transfers fall in the 
category of discretionary resources, for which local government is directly 
accountable to its local citizens (Bird, 2003). From a theoretical perspective, 
what are the considerations that determine the selection of a particular form of 
fi scal decentralisation?
The literature on welfare economics assumes that politicians are driven by 
public interest concerns, and hence several contributions treat each level of 
government as a benevolent social planner, maximising the welfare of the 
residents of its jurisdiction (Lockwood, 2006). Thus the factors that would 
drive decisions on the optimal assignment of expenditure and tax responsibilities 
would include economies of scale, spill over benefi ts, cost of administering taxes, 
and equity. In practice, there is an emerging consensus in the literature that 
resource distribution across sub-national governments cannot be explained by 
effi ciency and equity considerations alone, but political variables representing 
the incentives of central political agents become additional and signifi cant 
determinants (Ahmad et al., 2006). Bird and François (1998), in their review of 
fi scal decentralisation in developing countries, have noted that the design of 
intergovernmental transfers is always and everywhere an exercise not solely in 
normative economics but also in political economy. Therefore a political 
economy approach can offer an account of these effects that is plausible 
because politicians are driven purely by self-interest, for it is individual 
politicians’ preferences in securing and maintaining offi ce by winning elections 
that shapes the evolution of a fi scal intergovernmental contract (Ordeshook and 
Shvetsova, 1997).
The preferences of politicians are basically centred on re-election concerns, 
driven by median-voter demands and competition with other parties. 
Understanding political elite choices in the shaping of intergovernmental fi scal 
arrangements in Malawi is particularly pertinent because the logic of national 
politics since the introduction of multi-party elections has been characterised by 
patronage and competitive clientelism (Cammack and O’Neil, 2014). In the 
presence of patronage, and clientelism, decisions are generally taken on other 
grounds rather than effi ciency or equity (Cammack et al., 2007). Thus, instead of 
acting for the common good, offi cials tend to follow their self-interest of both 
political and economic kinds because it is in their self-interest to target policies 
and public spending towards their respective clienteles in order to secure political 
support (Ahmad et al., 2006).
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The evolution and pattern of fi scal decentralisation in Malawi
Devolution of functions to councils and expenditure assignments
Assigning expenditure responsibilities between levels of governments is the fi rst 
element of any fi scal decentralisation strategy, as it is believed that fi nance follows 
functions. However, the main incentive for ruling party politicians in Malawi is 
the need to be re-elected and retain power so considerations of decentralisation 
have not been fi rst and foremost about promoting effective implementation of 
service delivery functions to the general public, but rather how it might affect the 
power balance at the local level and enable the party to stay in power. Within the 
local government arena, Cammack and O’Neil (2014: 67) argue that the most 
visible effect of competitive clientelism is the incentives it creates for political 
leaders to be seen to be directly ‘delivering development’ to their supporters. 
They argue that the calculated political return of different activities is thus 
shaped by how visible a good is. As such political leaders will tend to be more 
inclined towards sector outputs for which they can more obviously claim credit, 
or that citizens will associate with the particular politician. All successive 
presidents have fed this dynamic from the top by encouraging citizens to vote for 
Government MPs as they are the only ones who can ‘bring development’ to 
them. These national political discourses create local expectations and have 
structured the decision-making logics of the political leaders with respect to the 
implementation of decentralisation.
Driven by these political interests, successive presidents have infl uenced the 
pace and extent of devolution of functions in such a way as to retain access and 
control over allocation decisions of visible development projects in the 
countryside. Legally, the expenditure powers of local government councils and 
central government ministries in Malawi are specifi ed in the 1998 Decentralisation 
Policy and Local Government Act (Malawi Government, 1998b, 1998a). Table 
6.1 provides a summary of the functions assigned to Local Government Councils.
The decentralisation policy devolves the service delivery planning, budgeting, 
expenditure, and management responsibilities of the earmarked services and it 
makes central government ministries responsible for overall policy coordination, 
setting and enforcement of sectoral guidelines and standards, quality control, 
provision of services of a national character, and other functions required to 
maintain macroeconomic stability.
However, despite the formal articulation of expenditure responsibilities in the 
policy and legal framework of local government, the actual decentralisation of 
functions and expenditure responsibilities from the central ministries has been 
dragging on. There has also not been any overt force by successive presidents to 
deal with the bureaucratic blockages affecting sector devolution, a feature that 
demonstrates the reluctance of ruling party leaders to devolve authority, and 
decision-making power over certain functions. Both President Muluzi and 
President Mutharika were fearful of opposition party mobilisation via local 
councils and any formal processes that would have made them lose decision-
making control to lower-level offi cials and the patronage opportunities linked to 
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Table 6.1 Functions devolved to local government councils
Nature of services Key functions devolved to local government councils
Education services Nursery and kindergarten; primary schools; and distance 
education centres.
Medical and health services Health centres, dispensaries, maternity clinics and health 
posts, control of communicable diseases, health 
education, and environmental sanitation.
Agriculture, livestock and 
irrigation
Livestock extension, control of livestock diseases, land 
husbandry, crop husbandry, food and nutrition, and 
construction, rehabilitation of small dams.
Environmental services Burial services refuse disposal, sewerage removal and 
disposal, environmental reclamation, and environmental 
education.
Roads and street services District roads, township roads, city roads; estate roads (if 
done to acceptable standards), street naming, issuing of 
road permits; and issuing of drivers’ licences.
Community development Women in development, community development, street 
children and orphans; youth and cultural affairs, district 
information services.
Public amenities Sports stadiums, community halls, recreational parks and 
playgrounds, and public conveniences.
Water services The provision and maintenance of water supplies 
including boreholes, piped water projects, protected wells, 
distribution of water, and gravity fed piped water schemes.
Forestry Establishment of wood lots and forests, forestry surveys, 
inventory of forests, Forestry extension, and Forest 
management.
Fisheries Licensing and inspection of fi shing gear i.e. nets and 
boats, fi sheries extension; and community participation in 
fi sh management.
Source: Malawi Government (1998)
these. They therefore played the politics of local governance very deftly by 
carefully and selectively promoting the transfer of functions at the expense of 
others even while making rhetorical commitments to decentralisation.
As a result, by 2014, 15 ministries were on record of having devolved some 
functions to the district councils but very few ministries had actually devolved 
the whole array of the earmarked functions and resources (Kutengule et al., 2014). 
Dual administration thus continued to exist in the district councils, with central 
ministries retaining control over development budget expenditures and capital 
investments. Only expenditure responsibilities for recurrent budgets over the 
selected functions have been fully devolved, but, even then, some functions 
remain under the control of central ministries, for example procurement and 
distribution of school and teaching materials, recruitment, discipline, and 
promotion of senior council staff.
Retaining central government control over expenditure responsibility for 
development and capital investments is an important political strategy of ensuring 
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higher political returns by enabling the ruling president to have access to 
development resources, which they can use to be visibly seen by the public. These 
are particularly important as politicians can project themselves as being responsive 
to local development needs and can allocate the resources they promise at 
political rallies. Such resources also enable ruling leaders to build their networks 
and alliances by distributing part of them to government ministers, ruling party 
MPs and their supporters. The consequence of the selective nature of the 
implementation of sector devolution is that ministries such as education and 
health have still maintained their own parallel district implementation plans 
developed through parallel processes geared towards meeting the sector standards 
and targets. As a result, there is uncoordinated planning and decision-making 
over service delivery, with sector and district processes occurring in parallel and 
overlapping ways (Cammack and O’Neil, 2014). While this may not promote 
rational planning and integrated delivery of services, there is an explicit political 
advantage that is gained from these policy implementation incoherencies and the 
confusion such disjointedness may cause.
Revenue sharing arrangements and an intergovernmental fi scal 
transfer system
The same trend has been evident with respect to revenue sharing agreements 
between central and local governments, the design of the intergovernmental 
fi scal transfers, as well as the rules governing such transfers. Malawi has not had 
the comprehensive fi scal decentralisation policy and principles that should guide 
allocation of fi scal resources from central government to local government in 
such a way as to enhance the capacity of local government to effectively deliver 
public services in a systematic manner. While some effort towards the development 
of intergovernmental fi scal transfer formulae was evident during early 2000, this 
was not allowed to mature into a comprehensive set of policy and principles to 
regulate central government transfers in an objective manner. Instead, over 
subsequent years, the executive as well as parliamentarians from both ruling and 
opposition parties have taken a selected set of decisions that have shaped a 
compromised pattern of intergovernmental fi scal transfers strategically conceived 
to shore up their political interests and visibility in delivering local public goods 
and services.
The main sources of local government fi nance for the assigned responsibilities 
are outlined in the Local Government Act (1998) and the Malawi Decentralization 
Policy (Malawi Government, 1998b, 1998a). Both the Act and the Policy 
identify three main sources of revenue for Councils which are:
• locally generated revenues, which include property tax, ground rents, fees 
and licences, commercial undertakings, and service charges;
• ceded revenue (non-tax revenue), which includes toll fees, gambling and 
casino fees, fuel levy/fee (road maintenance levy), motor vehicle registration 
fees, and industrial registration fees; and
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• central government transfers, which include the General Resource Fund 
(GRF) and sector transfers.
The principles of assigning revenues to local government require that own source 
revenues should ideally be suffi cient to enable sub-national governments to 
fi nance all locally provided services primarily benefi tting local residents from 
their own resources (Bird and François 1998: 11). The experience on the ground 
has been that locally generated revenues barely sustain the operational and 
development activities of district councils, who are heavily dependent on central 
government transfers. On average, locally generated revenues fi nance only 5 per 
cent of district council recurrent operational expenditures while central 
government transfers fi nance 90 per cent of these expenditures. The root of the 
problem lies in very limited taxing powers available to the councils. While the 
central government controls the most buoyant and lucrative sources, the district 
councils are expected to implement a variety of service delivery functions assigned 
to them.
Since central government transfers became the mainstay of district council 
fi nancing, it was deemed important to have clear rules of distribution and 
allocation between districts. Discussions about the need for such principles 
started back in 2001 when the Government of Malawi, with the support of 
external donors, commissioned a study on intergovernmental fi scal transfers. The 
result was that the National Local Government Finance Committee (NLGFC) 
proposed a set of formulae to Parliament that emphasised use of population (80 
per cent) and poverty (20 per cent) as the basis for the distribution of the General 
Resource Fund (GRF), the District Development Fund (DDF), and allocation 
principles for sectors funds across the districts. The formulae were meant to serve 
as a building block of formal institutions for resource sharing towards equalisation 
of development and service delivery across the country. Parliament approved the 
inter-district allocation formulas for the GRF and DDF in October 2002, with a 
provision for review after three years. The expectation was that the GRF would 
serve as an unconditional transfer for meeting the development of districts and 
providing relief on recurrent expenditures of local governments. The National 
Local Government Finance Committee, donors and other decentralisation policy 
architects had also anticipated that over time the DDF would evolve into a 
nationwide discretionary mechanism for development fi nancing that would 
‘enhance the democratic basis for development across local governments by 
improving the public’s access to the locus of decision making as the fund allows 
local governments to play a greater role in the policy making process’ (Chinsinga, 
2009: 9). Indeed, there was an emerging consensus in 2004 among central policy 
makers, district council offi cers and development partners that while the DDF 
was an effective approach of providing discretionary development grants to 
district councils and consolidating central–local transfers, it needed to be 
transformed into a harmonised Local Development Fund (Ssewankambo et al., 
2004). It was felt that such a mechanism would provide a foundation for a 
predictable and transparent grant mechanism for local governments.
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Until 2014, none of these aspirations was realised and central government was 
transferring not the required 5 per cent of net revenue but less than 1 per cent. 
The 2002 formulae approved by Parliament had not been subjected to review 
after three years as planned and Parliament did not play an active role of 
monitoring and ensuring that the formulae and the policy requirement of 5 per 
cent GRF was being adhered to. Neither Parliament nor the executive 
demonstrated a willingness to support the growth of a set of formal institutions to 
guide the determination and distribution of central transfers and an integrated 
fi scal devolution mechanism over the long term. Discussions with key informants 
revealed that the National Local Government Finance Committee, an institution 
that is constitutionally mandated to provide guidance on the distribution of 
resources, submitted formulae review proposals to Cabinet to guide both recurrent 
and development resource allocation but there was no response.
Similarly, the idea of a single nationwide integrated development fi nancing 
mechanism did not come to fruition. The initial discussions regarding such a 
mechanism were spearheaded by the National Local Government Finance 
Committee and the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development 
based on lessons from the implementation of the DDF. Around the same time the 
Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF) APL 1 programme was coming to an end 
and the MASAF Secretariat had started developing a new concept note for 
World Bank funding under MASAF APL II but one which also focused on the 
LDF mechanism.
The precise agreements that were made between central government and 
World Bank are not well known, but what became clear at the inception of the 
fund was that government adopted a different variant of the LDF. The 
discretionary element that was a key plank of the design of the fund was lost and 
central government tightened control over district council development 
expenditure by earmarking about 90 per cent of the LDF fi nancing to centrally 
determined projects, mainly building teachers’ houses and school blocks. The 
fund was also set to be managed by an institution outside the regular framework 
of government called the Local Development Fund Technical Support Team 
(LDF-TST) but reporting to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
instead of being managed by the constitutionally recognised body – the National 
Local Government Finance Committee. This decision demonstrated policy 
incoherence and was not consistent with the need for a nationwide discretionary 
mechanism for development fi nancing that would allow local governments to 
play a greater role in the district resource allocation making process. It was around 
the same time that the Mutharika government was preparing for 2009 elections 
and the issue of school blocks and teachers houses was a key aspect of his election 
campaign. This refl ects the political leaders’ incentives to maintain rules that 
actively undermine collective action but enable them to utilise the systems to 
shore up their visibility during electoral processes.
Indeed, a pattern of fi scal decentralisation that has evolved over the years has 
been characterised by increased amounts of sector recurrent conditional grants 
that are centrally controlled with limited discretionary funding for the councils. 
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Sector transfers constitute a bulk (90 per cent) of the operational related 
transactions (ORT) going to district councils, mainly for health, education and 
agriculture, and these have increased over time. One of the explanatory factors 
for increased transfers to these sectors is that donor pressure increased at this 
time, both as a condition for World Bank support and through the design of the 
health and agriculture sector wide approaches. The use of sectoral grants is limited 
because such funds are exclusively earmarked for the implementation of sector 
recurrent programmes and the council as a decision-making body does not have 
any latitude to vary the use of such funds for service delivery projects identifi ed 
through the district development planning system. With the withdrawal of donor 
aid and direct budget support in 2014, funding for most sectors has been drastically 
reduced and, as a result, service delivery activities in those sectors have been 
suffering (Kutengule et al., 2014).
The emergence of a Constituency Development Fund
Further policy incoherence was evident when government adopted the 
Constituency Development Fund in 1996, a programme that involves the use of 
public funds at local levels that are outside the formal planning, budgeting, and 
spending framework, and runs counter to the government’s professed objective of 
strengthening local government’s capacity to meet local needs (see Table 6.2). Its 
introduction was negotiated and initiated by the MPs through a private members’ 
motion that was presented by an opposition MP. The narrative justifying its 
creation was the following:
The house should consider the creation of the Constituency Development 
Fund under Ministry of Local Government and to be allocated under the 
District Assembly vote. The fund while controlled by the District Assembly 
should be overseen by the Member of Parliament. The purpose of the Fund 
would be to assist each constituency in maintenance of structures and 
undertaking minor community based development activities e.g. repairs to 
boreholes, blown out school roofs, broken bridges etc.1
There was unanimous agreement about the above proposal from both ruling and 
opposition MPs, who felt that this would provide an important alternative that 
would make elected representatives ‘warrant holders and give them a say in 
resource allocation for their constituencies’.2 Only two MPs opposed the motion 
and argued that this was not the right move given the devolution policy. One 
argued that ‘We must accept that we as Members of Parliament we are here to 
enact Laws … Each part has a duty to perform … We must therefore accept that 
members of District Assemblies have been given powers to make sure that these 
funds are directed to benefi ciaries.’3 The few voices against the motion were 
overruled and the motion was unanimously adopted in Parliament.
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Table 6.2 Constituency development fund in relation to gross district council capital 
expenditures, 2006–14







Contribution as a 




as a % of gross 
capital expenditure
2006/07 30,081,055 386,000,000 7% 93%
2007/08 23,782,202 471,383,013 5% 95%
2008/09 23,589,618 538,486,812 4% 96%
2009/10 47,113,701 537,754,748 16% 84%
2010/11 34,393,202 464,785,935 7% 93%
2011/12 149,665,559 565,488,989 21% 79%
2012/13 131,020,151 1,151,738,886 10% 90%
2013/14 106,512,481 1,151,738,886 8% 92%
Source: Computed from data from National Local Government Finance Committee
The narratives display the MPs’ overriding interest to access and control local 
development resources that would enable them to fulfi l their campaign promises, 
and boost their re-election prospects. The opposition MPs therefore took 
advantage of their majority in Parliament during this period to use the passing of 
the budget as a bargaining chip to gain control over local development fi nancing 
in order to serve their political interests. This case is thus ‘a very good 
example where formal institutions are exploited to sort out informal deals outside 
the formal governance framework to bolster selfi sh political goals’ (Chinsinga, 
2009: 9).
Over time the quest for MPs across the political divide to control local 
development fi nancing has been increasing and the motivation appears to be 
shifting from what was initially conceived as maintenance of structures and 
undertaking minor community-based development activities towards tangible 
development investments. Initially the amount was MK7 million p.a. for each 
MP but there have been increased demands from MPs to increase the amount. 
Later the fi gure went up to MK9 million pa. During the 2015/16 budget session a 
push for an increase of the CDF to MK30 million was presented through a private 
members’ motion placed by an MP from the Malawi Congress Party. He argued 
that in order to guarantee the allocations, ‘the CDF should be legislated and be 
fi xed as a percentage of projected government revenue in each year’.4 This request 
was supported by the Budget and Finance Committee, although after some 
negotiations the amount was increased by 58 per cent to MK12 million. By 2014, 
the Constituency Development Fund had become the largest discretionary central 
government transfer for development purpose to local government accounting for 
an average of 90 per cent of district councils gross capital expenditure.
However, the story of the CDF in all the districts is littered with reports of 
abuse, politicisation of development projects by MPs, and lack of accountability 
both for the money and for the results that the fund has achieved.5 Since its 
introduction various stakeholders including the National Audit Offi ce have 
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raised concerns over the management of the CDF, including the identifi cation, 
implementation, and monitoring of projects selected, quality of projects, 
procurement processes, and accounting for project activities (Kutengule et al., 
2014). Project identifi cation and resource allocation is largely infl uenced by the 
MP with the aid of party functionaries with little or no control by the council as 
a decision-making body. The CDF does not promote rational planning processes 
since the projects on which the CDF funds are spent are usually not those 
identifi ed in district or village development plans but those that will enable them 
to gain votes and reward loyalists. This constrains the fund’s potential to 
contribute towards effective service delivery or contribute towards the 
achievement of district development plans.
In a review of the CDF implementation it was noted that project prioritisation 
and decision-making in an overwhelming majority of cases mainly rested with 
the MP (Chiweza and Munthali, 2012). Most MPs expressed an understanding 
that the main criteria which they use to select priority projects is the imperative 
to try and ensure that at least the projects are spread across the constituency so 
that they maintain some visibility across the constituency and please voters.
Over the fi ve rounds of elections, one consequence of these expectations and 
high turnover has been the ‘bidding up’ of promises made by MPs. Increasingly 
unrealistic promises of delivering development projects are made to unseat 
incumbents. Following elections, MPs are often not in a position to deliver on 
their promises and so they lose their seats because competing candidates are able 
to ‘bid’ higher and the process starts again. Victories are contingent on the ability 
to distribute large numbers of small gifts such as sugar, cloth, and soap to 
constituents both as an upfront resource transfer and also as a visible sign that the 
MP can continue to deliver promises after being elected. Competition drives up 
the investment needed to win and sets the bar higher for subsequent elections. It 
appears, however, that these issues are at the heart of elections and politics of 
development in Malawi. Although MPs in Malawi win elections using a variety 
of means, of primary interest is their ability to ‘deliver development’ and citizens 
are encouraged to vote for MPs from the government side, as they are the ones 
who can ‘bring development’.
The main incentive MPs face in the districts is the need to be re-elected. MPs 
win elections using a variety of means but of primary interest is MPs’ ability to 
‘deliver development’. Afrobarometer data suggests that MPs are seen more as 
local development offi cers than in terms of their legislative functions. Some 76 
per cent of Malawians expect their MP to deliver goods and services to people in 
their community in particular.6 And only 22 per cent would vote for a candidate 
who would support policies that benefi t everyone in the country. This is also seen 
in terms of how people perceive the role of an MP. Some 40.1 per cent of 
Malawians see the MPs’ primary role as directly delivering jobs and development, 
while 51.1 per cent believe it is to listen to constituents and represent their needs. 
Just 4.4 per cent understand that MPs’ primary role is to make laws for the good 
of the country. This leads to MPs having a strong focus on delivering very visible 
benefi ts to their constituents in the form of private goods for the benefi t of key 
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individuals or ‘club’ goods, which benefi t a small group. MPs also ensure that 
investment is placed in areas of high support within their constituencies to reward 
their supporters and guarantee re-election. The need for very visible development 
results means MPs often emphasise those investments that are most obviously 
seen, particularly capital expenditure. For example, where solving a service 
delivery problem involves changes at the centre, MPs typically aim to deliver a 
new clinic rather than ensuring that there are drugs available in existing clinics.
MPs are in practice not held to account for how they use CDF funds. The 
design of the CDF oversight system at the local level complicates the relationship 
between MPs as members of the council seeking accountability of district 
commissioners and the district commissioners as controlling offi cers over CDF 
resources. Formally the district commissioner is the controlling offi cer for usage of 
CDF resources. However, MPs bypass formal procurement and accountability 
procedures and control district commissioners through the use of threats of 
transfer to unfavorable postings or other informal sanctions. As a result, many 
district commissioners, and other offi cers are not able to stand up to the politically 
strong MPs and they tend to exercise their controlling functions cautiously for 
fear of repercussions.
District resource allocation and service delivery decision-making in practice
The complex way in which functional and fi scal decentralisation has evolved has 
had a direct impact on district decision-making and resource allocation. In 
practice, district consultative forums7 did not have much decision-making 
leverage on sector recurrent budgets and the Constituency Development Fund. 
They also did not carry out the core and legal oversight functions of a council 
such as approve or enforce by-laws that were out-dated. Further, they could not 
sanction the council to borrow money because section 15(1) of the Local 
Government Act prohibits councils (as in elected councils) from delegating its 
powers to borrow money, make by-laws and standing orders, and levy taxes. 
Meetings of the district consultative forums served mainly as information sharing 
forums and decision-making was limited to urgent matters with inadequate 
attention to examining the performance of the district councils, and over-seeing 
fi nancial roles (Chiweza, 2010a). While they were approving annual council 
budgets and work plans, they engaged less in scrutinising district development 
plans or accounts, monitoring staff, or managing sector committees or resources.
The district consultative forums regularly engaged strongly on questions of 
resource distribution particularly intra-district allocations of LDF resources. The 
practice was for the district commissioner and the sector heads to put proposals 
before the forums, which were then debated and approved by them, making 
amendments where they deemed necessary. The ability to infl uence decisions 
has often been dependent on whether or not the MPs are in government or 
opposition. For those in government, the seniority of the MP matters quite a lot. 
Cabinet ministers and senior party offi cials tend to wield more infl uence than 
ordinary MPs. Yet, in all districts, MPs face the same incentives to be re-elected 
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through the delivery of visible investment in their constituencies (Chiweza and 
Waldock, 2011).
The most contentious debates in the district consultative forums have emerged 
when offi cers have presented different allocations to different constituencies, 
often based on a district-wide approach to assessing local needs. Politicians 
usually prefer equal distribution of allocated funds along constituency lines 
rather than the needs-based evidence and technical criteria prioritised by 
offi cers. The formal process is that, once the LDF secretariat provides indicative 
planning fi gures to the district councils, technical offi cers are then expected to 
use relevant sectoral data to make proposals on how the funds received should be 
distributed within the district. Chiweza (2011) found that in practice, intra-
district allocation of LDF resources in many district councils was barely being 
done according to evidence of need. For example, the guidelines for the teachers’ 
housing project stipulate that, ‘it is expected that each Council will use the same 
criteria in allocating the projects within the district by computation of education 
zone data on number of schools, number of teachers’ houses, and number of 
teachers.’8 In practice, MPs prefer to ignore guidelines and push for ‘sharing 
the cake equally among constituencies so that each MP has something to show 
to his/her constituency for electing him/her’ (Chiweza, 2011). As one key 
informant put it:
pressure from MPs is less on NGO and donor projects as compared with 
projects coming through the Councils … Sometimes you wonder why we 
have District Development Plans to guide us because most of the things 
being implemented do not really refl ect priority ranking of the plans. Those 
development programmes put forward by MPs are given highest priority in 
the District Consultative Forum (Chiweza, 2011).
Thus, formal rules of the game are often suspended to accommodate the interests 
of powerful political fi gures and elites. This is often justifi ed on the grounds of 
serving the ‘greater good’ of the society where rules are perceived to be limiting 
e.g. lack of equity in distribution of resources between opposition and government 
MPs and between ministers and ‘ordinary’ MPs. These practices impact on the 
ability of the council sector staff to ensure that resources are targeted towards 
community needs and deal with existing service delivery inequalities.
There were also some feedback effects. When changes to sector allocations 
were submitted to the district consultative committee, it had implications for 
what sector offi cials presented the next time decisions were to be made. One 
major tactic adopted in virtually all districts was that sector offi cials made sure 
that their proposals for investments were distributed evenly between all 
constituencies. In many districts this served to neutralise district consultative 
committee debates on inter-constituency distribution (Chiweza and Waldock, 
2011). However, by distributing very limited resources evenly, the districts were 
not using local knowledge and evidence-based decision-making to tackle areas 
where poverty was highest – a key justifi cation for decentralisation.
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District commissioners and sector heads found the use of this tactic as a way to 
reduce pressure put on them by MPs. The position of district commissioners is not 
a politically neutral one and appointments are made directly by the executive – a 
practice strengthened by the 2010 amendments to the Local Government Act. As 
a result, district commissioners are vulnerable to political pressure from infl uential 
MPs, ministers and chiefs, which can result in their transfer to less attractive posts. 
This means DCs are often pragmatic, engaging in disputes they think they can win 
and allying themselves with different interests in the districts to ensure political 
cover. District commissioners and sector heads are more able and willing to stand 
up to less-powerful government MPs and opposition party leaders. However, with 
more senior government MPs, the willingness of the district offi cials to use their 
technocratic evidence to positively manage and stand up to such pressures is very 
much dependent on the offi cers’ calculation of how much informal power the 
political actors in question hold and the informal reprisals that are likely to be 
associated with such acts (Chiweza and Waldock, 2011).
Effects on public service delivery
A large number of decisions regarding infrastructural development at district 
level appear to be reactive and ad hoc (Cammack and O’Neil, 2014). As a result 
nearly 95 per cent of public expenditure is undertaken by central government and 
sub-national spending has been relatively low refl ecting minimal presence of 
local government in public service delivery. Table 6.3 illustrates that the share of 
ocal government spending in total government spending has since 2005 been in 
the 3–7 per cent range, with an average of 5 per cent. Although comparative data 
on the importance of local spending is hard to fi nd and interpret, other studies 
using different samples have found that the degree of fi scal decentralisation in 
terms of spending tends to be greater in richer countries than poor countries (Bird 
and François, 1998). For example, Bird (1995) found an average local government 
share of 22 per cent for developed countries and 9 per cent for developing 
countries while OECD (1991) found an average share of 26 per cent for developed 
countries.
Although the data and samples used in the other country surveys may not be 
directly comparable to Malawi, it is only illustrative of the low level of local 
government spending in Malawi. This indicates a high degree of centralisation in 
the responsibility for the provision of public services, despite adoption of a formal 
devolution policy. This has huge implications on the leverage that local 
government councils in Malawi can exert over service delivery decisions in their 
jurisdictions, but also for the services over which they can reasonably be held to 
account. Local governments have repeatedly been unable to ensure a suffi cient 
supply of infrastructure, essential materials and access to safe drinking water is 
undermined by the disrepair of many water points in rural areas. This explains 
why the implementation of decentralisation policy reforms has had little 
discernible impact on service delivery (Chinsinga, 2008: 93).
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Share of local 
government 
spending in total 
expenditure (%)
2005/06* 128,465,369,867 119,654,000,000 8,811,369,867 7%
2006/07 164,047,077,054 154,374,000,000 9,673,077,054 6%
2007/08 191,944,857,700 179,398,000,000 12,546,857,700 7%
2008/09 259,718,618,050 245,840,000,000 13,878,618,050 5%
2009/10 273,491,316,345 257,099,000,000 16,392,316,345 6%
2010/11 311,498,335,655 296,196,000,000 15,302,335,655 5%
2011/12 347,606,234,589 328,103,000,000 19,503,234,589 6%
2012/13 512,129,423,480 488,581,000,000 23,548,423,480 5%
2013/14 675,815,779,299 656,213,000,000 19,602,779,299 3%
Source: Computed from data from National Local Government Finance Committee
* Government started the process of devolving sector budgets to Councils in FY2005/06
Conclusion
The arrival of locally elected councillors is indeed an important milestone in 
Malawi’s local governance system, but the elections alone are not the full answer 
towards improved local governance and better public service delivery. For 
councillors to make a difference serious local government reform is essential – 
and the challenges are immense. A key argument arising out of this analysis is 
that the impact of the devolution policy on service delivery is largely negated 
when districts do not control key functions including staff recruitment and when 
fi scal devolution has not been properly implemented. The current status of 
district councils is like empty shells that are lacking substantive decision-making 
powers to drive service delivery effectively. Thus, for councillors to make a 
difference, functions and funds need to be further devolved. There are huge 
bureaucratic and political blockages that need to be dealt with. The legal 
framework and administration need rationalisation and this requires new 
legislation and policy.
Given a completely new cohort of councillors that was elected in 2014, the 
majority with little formal education and limited capacity to understand the 
complex system, the learning curve may take a considerable amount of time. 
Councillors and MPs from different parties need to cooperate and have a common 
agenda to improve service delivery in their jurisdictions as both have votes on 
councils. However, early signs are showing potential for increased confl ict and 
representation battles between the two key locally elected actors: the councillor 
and the MP, as each vies for control of limited resources as a tool for political 
recognition among the constituencies as ‘mwini chitukuko’ or ‘wobweretsa 
chitukuko’ (someone who brings development). Improved service delivery is 
unlikely to happen because the elite political settlement in Malawi has not 
changed. If anything, the 2014 elections and the distribution of votes – with four 
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main parties, none of them polling more than 36 per cent of the vote in the 
presidential elections, or seats in the National Assembly – may reinforce its 
competitive clientelist nature.
Notes
1 Excerpts from a UDF MP who presented the private members’ motion on CDF. 
Hansard, 39th session of Parliament, Thursday, 27 April 2006, p. 15.
2 Excerpts from a contribution by an MCP MP. Hansard, 39th session of Parliament, 
Thursday 27 April 2006, p. 20.
3 Excerpts from a contribution by a DPP MP. Hansard, 39th session, Thursday, 27 April 
2006, p. 18.
4 Suzgo Khunga, ‘Increase CDF to MK 30 million-MP’, The Nation, Friday, 26 June 2015.
5 Ephraim Nyondo, ‘Who Should Control the CDF Wallet’, The Nation, Wednesday, 17 
November 2014.
6 See http://afrobarometer.org/data/malawi-round-4-data-2008.
7 Up to April 2014, district consultative forums were the main decision-making bodies 
before the constitution of legally elected councils.
8 Guidelines for the Teacher Housing Project, Malawi Government (2010), p. 2.
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7 Searching for a holy grail?
The nexus between agriculture 
and youth unemployment
Blessings Chinsinga and Michael Chasukwa
Introduction
The question of growing youth unemployment is a pressing policy problem not 
only in Malawi but also across the African continent. This also rings true in the 
global context mainly due to the rapidly expanding share of young people as a 
proportion of the global population. It is estimated that young people (in the 
15–24 age bracket) make up as much as 1.2 billion of the global population 
currently estimated to be 7 billion, which represents a 17 per cent increase since 
1995 (de Gobbi and Anang, 2008). The enormity of the problem is borne out of 
the fact that the youth population boom has been unevenly distributed across the 
globe with almost 87 per cent of the total global youth population living in 
developing countries. Existing evidence suggests that the youth population is 
growing much faster than can actually be accommodated in the labour markets. 
Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced a disproportionate increase in the number of 
unemployed young people, rising from 8 million to 10 million between 2007 and 
2011. It is against this backdrop that Valle (2012) estimates that youth 
unemployment is about three times higher than in other age groups in sub-
Saharan Africa.
The situation in Malawi is not too far off from Valle’s (2012) estimates. While 
the offi cial unemployment in Malawi is estimated at 9.3 per cent, youth 
unemployment is projected at about 15.2 per cent, which suggests it is a serious 
problem, especially since Malawi is a predominantly youthful nation (Chinsinga 
and Chasukwa, 2012). The main concern is that chronic youth unemployment 
can be disastrous and entail adverse long-term consequences for the social, 
economic and political fabric of society unless appropriate measures are taken to 
deal with it. This chapter focuses on the nexus between agriculture and youth 
unemployment in Malawi motivated by the fact that, although agriculture is 
offi cially described as an engine of economic growth and is the largest employer 
in the country, efforts to comprehensively address the question of chronic youth 
unemployment have been few and far between (Chinsinga, 2008; Chirwa, 2008; 
Chapota, 2009).
The Technical Entrepreneurship and Vocational Education and Training 
Authority (TEVETA),1 for example, does not offer its apprentices opportunities 
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in any agricultural-related trades. Similarly, Malawi’s latest youth policy does not 
pay explicit attention to the agricultural sector even though its central theme is 
the promotion of youth empowerment. We argue that the problem of youth 
unemployment in Malawi can be successfully dealt with when serious attention is 
paid to the linkage between youth policies and the agricultural sector, as the 
agricultural sector is the engine of economic growth and the biggest employer. 
An agricultural-led industrialization strategy has potential to create decent jobs 
for young people because it can foster the development of other aspects of the 
value chain that are currently underdeveloped, such as input supply, processing, 
storage, marketing and distribution (Kamchacha, 2012).
The main challenge is that politicians have captured nearly all the efforts that 
have been implemented to address the question of chronic youth unemployment. 
Youth policies and interventions are primarily designed as a means of capturing 
young people as a voting bloc and not as a refl ection of genuine commitment to 
bringing about sustainable changes in the livelihoods of young people. Youth 
policies and interventions are often not well thought out in terms of institutional 
design, implementation modalities, and the underlying theory of change. This 
has greatly contributed to the marginalization of the agricultural sector’s efforts to 
combat youth unemployment even though agriculture is offi cially designated as 
the leading engine of economic growth and by far the country’s biggest employer. 
Political imperatives often take precedence since these initiatives are often 
launched either just before or after general elections and their implementation is 
often marred by excessive political interference. The marginalization of the 
agricultural sector in combating the problem of youth unemployment is further 
reinforced by the fact that the current emphasis in Malawi is still very much on 
primary production which is less attractive to young people compared to other 
aspects of the agricultural sector value chain such as input supply, processing, 
storage, marketing, and distribution.
We begin by examining the youth unemployment situation and the potential 
that agriculture has in terms of addressing the problem. Thereafter we briefl y 
examine how young people have featured in the country’s agricultural policy 
portfolio, as well as the extent to which the agriculture sector is featured in 
national youth policy as a potential catalyst for the participation of young 
people in mainstream economic activities and empowerment. We also discuss 
how agriculture has been neglected in the efforts to combat youth unemployment 
with particular reference to certain post-1994 initiatives such as the Youth 
Development Credit Scheme (YDCS), the Youth Enterprise Development 
Fund (YEDEF), and the Youth Job Creation Initiative (YJCI). We conclude 
by observing that the agricultural sector has been overlooked as part of a 
solution for youth unemployment because of the weak patronage platform it 
offers since the clients themselves have little interest in picking up a career in the 
agricultural sector.
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Youth unemployment in Malawi
According to De Gobbi and Anang (2008), Malawi currently has 6.1 million 
people in work out of the total population of 15 million. The majority of this 
workforce plies their trade in the informal sector since only 2.5 per cent are 
employed by the private sector and a mere 3.6 per cent work in the public sector.
The dominance of the informal sector implies that the majority of Malawians 
earn their livelihoods as smallholder farmers. Women dominate the informal 
sector as they make up only 20 per cent of wage employment. Thus, women are 
more likely to be engaged in informal sector work than men (Durevall and Mussa, 
2010). The majority of women work in the agriculture, forestry and fi sheries 
sectors. It is estimated that out of the 6.1 million potential workforce, about 5.7 
million are either unemployed or underemployed in subsistence farming or in the 
formal sector (Durevall and Mussa, 2010).
The National Statistics Offi ce (NSO) paints a grim picture about the status of 
youth unemployment in Malawi (GoM, 2008). It estimated that 82 per cent of 
young people (15–29 yrs.) were neither employed nor actively seeking for work. 
Youth urban poverty is estimated at over 50 per cent. It was further estimated that 
only 18 per cent of young people were self-employed, which is taken as a proxy 
indicator for the extent of youth involvement in the informal economy. To put 
things in perspective, the Methodist Relief and Development Fund (2012) ranked 
Malawi second in the world in terms of the magnitude of youth unemployment.
The prognosis for future youth unemployment is generally bleak, with young 
people fi nding it increasingly diffi cult to get absorbed into the labour market. In 
2008, for instance, 14 per cent of young people had completed tertiary education, 
but they faced serious challenges in securing formal sector employment. Malawi 
has also struggled to generate a pool of young people with basic numeracy skills, 
which is one of the critical requirements for improving employment prospects. 
And it is estimated that as much as 8.6 per cent of young people (10–29) years 
drop out of school before the completion of primary education (GoM, 2008, 
2010). Youth unemployment is particularly bad in rural areas where so many 
individuals depend on very small parcels of land for survival (Smith, 1999; 
Chinsinga, 2008).
Despite numerous challenges, the agricultural sector in Malawi has considerable 
potential to generate large-scale employment opportunities. Being the single 
most important sector of the Malawi economy, agriculture contributes 37 per 
cent of the country’s GDP, employs around 80 per cent of the workforce, and 
contributes over 90 per cent of foreign exchange earnings (Chinsinga, 2008; 
Chirwa, 2008). Malawi’s dualistic agriculture consists of smallholder and estate 
sectors. Despite being constrained by limited capital and technology, smallholder 
farmers cultivate as much as 2.4 million hectares, produce about 80 per cent of 
Malawi’s food and contribute 20 per cent of its agricultural exports (Chirwa and 
Matita, 2012). The dominance of the agricultural sector in the country’s economic 
portfolio has been further reinforced by the progressive decline of the 
manufacturing sector, from 16 per cent to 11 per cent since the early 1990s. 
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Chinsinga (2008) argues that, while agro-processing constitutes 26 per cent of 
manufacturing, it contributes less than 3 per cent to GDP, illustrating how 
various aspects of the agricultural value chain remain highly underdeveloped.
Thus, although agriculture is the largest sector of the economy, some have 
argued that it is not as productive as it should have otherwise been (Kamchacha, 
2012) and that the sector’s full potential is yet to be fully realized. Its limited 
productivity is mainly due to an overemphasis on primary production, neglecting 
altogether the complementary aspects of the sector’s value chain (Kamchacha, 
2012; Chinsinga and Chasukwa, 2013).
A key question concerns the reasons behind the agricultural sector not 
being prioritized in the efforts to address the problem of chronic youth 
unemployment in the country. The paradox therefore is that, while agriculture is 
the largest sector of the economy, it is not the largest employer of the largest 
demographic group in the country. This raises some serious questions about how 
the problem of youth unemployment features in the policy processes and in 
strategic decision making.
Youth and agricultural policy
Malawi witnessed a proliferation of policies for specifi c sectors following the 
transition to democracy in May 1994 (Chinsinga, 2007). Following the 1965–69 
development plan, the country developed two ten-year statements of development 
policies (1970–80 and 1987–96). These were basically programmatic outlines of 
the country’s development endeavours in various sectors of the economy. They 
provided the long-term developmental perspective, which in turn guided the 
medium-term and annual planning.
Although the statement of development policies did not specifi cally pay 
attention to young people, they were well taken care of by the establishment of 
the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP) in 1963. The MYP provided for an elaborate 
strategy for dealing with the question of youth employment and preparing them 
to take meaningful roles in society. According to Rupiya (2005), the MYP was 
structured around the Kibbutz model of Israel. The MYP established training 
bases across the country, which implemented entrepreneurship, technical, 
agriculture, and leadership programmes among the young people (Kamchacha, 
2012). These training bases were established in 21 out of 24 districts across the 
country and the MYP initiative consequently ensured that Malawian young 
people were self-employed in agriculture, trade, construction, and carpentry after 
their training.
The MYP enrolled young people of all backgrounds – from primary school 
dropouts to university graduates. Regardless of their qualifi cations, the young 
people had to undergo three years of rigorous training that emphasized respect, 
discipline, physical fi tness, and dedication to duty (Mandiza, 2009). Those with 
better educational qualifi cations were enrolled with various training colleges, 
whereas the bulk of those with little or no educational attainments returned to 
their respective communities with a clear mandate to fi ght three deadly enemies: 
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ignorance, disease, and poverty. The impact of the MYP recruits returning to 
their respective communities was reportedly quite signifi cant. One of our 
informants reported that ‘youth training at MYP had signifi cant multiplier effects 
at the community level because when back to their communities, the MYP 
recruits were working with everyone to promote modern methods of farming 
which guaranteed food security’.2
While the MYP initiative was viewed positively as an arena that linked young 
people to agriculture and various vocational training activities, it was condemned 
by the general public for also functioning as a paramilitary wing of the former 
ruling party, the Malawi Congress Party (MCP). The MYP was discredited 
because it progressively became an instrument of political control and social 
militarization of the Malawi society. Thus, in addition to promoting agricultural 
production, various vocational skills and entrepreneurship, the MYP acted as the 
vanguard for the defence of the nation (Rupiya, 2005; Mandiza, 2009).
The love–hate relationship with the MYP was expressed as much in the 
interviews with various stakeholders. While acknowledging the positive aspects 
of MYP, they condemned its use as an instrument of political control and terror 
that led to its abandonment in 1993. For instance, one of the interviewees 
described the MYP as ‘being a very good initiative that allowed youth to become 
meaningful and useful members of society but it was tainted because some of the 
youths were used to harass and torture the people that did not agree with 
government on some of its policies and practices’.3 The abandonment of the MYP 
created an institutional vacuum for rural youth, which stakeholders are still 
struggling to fi ll.
The transition to democracy in May 1994 was also accompanied by a swift 
implementation of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), which have had 
signifi cant implications on the role of the state in matters of employment. 
According to Changuta (2002), the apparent vacuum that followed the 
abandonment of the MYP is not surprising because SAPs recommend a passive 
role of employment creation to the government. This means that the state should 
not take deliberate strategic planning and active measures aimed at the generation 
of employment, especially the creation of youth employment.
The debilitating effects of SAPs invariably popularized what White (2012) 
calls ‘do it yourself employment strategy for the youth’. Instead of encouraging 
the state to actively drive the employment creation process, international 
organizations such as the International Labour Organization (ILO), World Bank 
and the United Nations Industrial Organization are encouraging the state to 
promote entrepreneurship among young people as a strategy to get them 
employed. The currency of this philosophy was clearly refl ected in the 1996 youth 
policy, which was designed to take care of the vacuum following the disbandment 
of the MYP. The major weakness of this policy is that ‘it did not foresee the need 
to link the youth to agriculture as a priority area’ (Kamchacha, 2012: 13). This 
linkage is still absent even in the current (2010) revised youth policy. Although 
agriculture is widely regarded as an engine of economic growth in Malawi, there 
is no clear link between the youth policy and the agricultural sector.
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The status of current policy
The revised draft youth policy whose mission statement is to create an enabling 
environment for all young people to develop their full potential in order to 
signifi cantly contribute to personal and national development, identifi es six 
priority areas although none of these makes explicit linkages to the agricultural 
sector. These priority areas include:
• education, science, technology and environment;
• sports and culture;
• health and nutrition;
• social services and recreation;
• youth participation and leadership; and
• youth economic empowerment.
This means that the failure of the draft youth policy to close this gap and ensure 
linkage to agriculture ‘will make it fail to achieve the intended goal of youth 
participation in key development activities’ (Kamchacha, 2012: 14).
There has generally been a silence on youth in major policies that have 
been formulated in Malawi since May 1994. This is evident in the critical 
reviews of these policies (Chinsinga and Chasukwa, 2012). Young people are 
not treated and targeted as a distinct category needing attention either in the 
Poverty Alleviation Programme (1994); Vision 2020 (1998); the Malawi 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2001); One Village One Product (OVOP) 
(2001); the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) (2006); or the 
Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) (GoM, 2012). Young 
people do not even appear in the sections on crosscutting issues dominated by 
gender, HIV/AIDS, environment and technology. Similarly, Bennel (2007) 
argued that young people, as a group, are not a priority for most governments in 
low-income countries. Consequently, ministries of youth are generally subsumed 
or combined with other government responsibilities, most commonly culture, 
sports and education.
Young people are moreover not given attention in the agricultural sector wide 
approach (ASWAp), which was inspired by the Comprehensive African 
Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). Through CAADP, African 
governments have committed themselves to allocate at least 10 per cent of their 
annual national budgets to the agricultural sector and aim to achieve a 6 per cent 
growth target per year (Chinsinga, 2012). The critical review of the ASWAp 
suggests that young people are not an integral part of the efforts to revive the 
fl edging agricultural sector in the country. According to the National Coordinator 
of the Civil Society Agriculture Network (CISANET), ASWAp ‘has overlooked 
the importance of youth in agriculture … yet youth make up the biggest proportion 
of the national population’. He argued that this is not unique to the ASWAp, but 
rather the trademark of all agricultural-oriented policies. They do not ‘actually 
talk about youth; they simply talk about males and females … and in the minds 
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of the policy makers the distinction between youth and adult farmers does not 
really matter’.4
The neglect of agriculture as a possible source of employment for rural youth is 
manifested in the country’s curricula for vocational training. According to Valle 
(2012), the curriculum shows a lack of connection between the demand of the 
labour market and the preparation by the government of the new generation. 
While 85 per cent of the population live in rural areas – and agriculture accounts 
for 39 per cent of GDP, over 80 per cent of the labour force, and over 90 per cent 
of total exports – agriculture is not among the courses offered by the TEVETA. 
The apparent neglect of agriculture explains why various aspects of its value 
chain remain hugely undeveloped for it to be fully exploited as a source of viable 
employment opportunities for young people. Agriculture is viewed by young 
people mainly in terms of primary production activities that are described as 
‘unattractive since they make farmers dirty on a daily basis yet these activities are 
not rewarding at all’.5
Young people’s perceptions of TEVETA are not encouraging either. They 
described it as lacking capacity to train as many young people as possible, as was 
the case with the MYP, but also that its training is perceived as substandard. In a 
focus group discussion, Likhubula youth club members observed that ‘those who 
have undergone TEVETA programs are not as competitive as those who undergo 
Trade Tests exams administered by the Ministry of Labour and Manpower 
Development [sic]’. Moreover, there are concerns that rural youth are marginalized 
in TEVETA activities because they do not often have adequate information 
about these opportunities. While these opportunities are meant mainly for rural 
youth ‘they are monopolized by the urban youth since they do not only have 
ready access to information about these opportunities but they also exploit their 
networks and connections’.6
Explaining the neglect of agriculture
The apparent neglect of agriculture as a potential source of employment for young 
people is mainly due to the political imperatives associated with a democratic 
political dispensation in a neo-patrimonial setting. Political elites are often 
preoccupied with devising strategies that can maintain them in power in the four 
or fi ve year electoral cycles. According to Poulton (2012), politicians in a 
democracy need to offer what people want in order to receive their votes, and as 
such politicians should be inclined to respond to the priorities of the most 
dominant constituency. However, Joughin and Kjaer (2010) argue that 
democracies may or may not promote technocratic policymaking that addresses 
the interests of the median voter. This is often the case because the multiplication 
of demands on the state resulting from the universal franchise of the citizenry 
makes democracies more inclined to direct rather than indirect methods of policy 
implementation, which include subsidies and related hand-outs.
The preference of direct over indirect methods of policy implementation 
suggests that politicians prefer policies that benefi t a large number of people in 
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the short term and are highly visible, such as social policies. They thus prefer to 
win votes by delivering clientelist privileges rather than the more unattainable 
development or even public goods (Lindberg, 2003). This implies that elections 
could be a double-edged sword in the policy processes in a democratic dispensation 
within a neo-patrimonial context. Competitive elections may reinforce 
clientelism rather than counteract it because the governing elite would need to 
have an even tighter grip on material and coercive resources in order to prevent 
competitive patronage networks from engaging and threatening the state from 
within the system.
The main question politicians often ask about each policy is how it will help 
them either to capture power or stay in power. This disposition shapes the kind of 
policies elites choose and how they are subsequently implemented (Whitfi eld and 
Therkildsen, 2011). The bottom line is that ruling elites want to stay in power, 
and staying in power requires building and maintaining a political organization, 
which can be achieved through clientelistic or programmatic means. The rest of 
this section therefore demonstrates how political imperatives have contributed to 
handling the problem of youth unemployment in Malawi since the transition to 
democracy in a manner that more or less neglects the agricultural sector in spite 
of it being a leading sector of the country’s economy.
The fertilizer subsidy programme (FISP)
While the implementation of FISP has led to the dramatic expansion of the 
volume of resources available to the agricultural sector, it has at the same time 
removed agricultural transformation from the agenda (Chinsinga, 2012). Although 
the implementation of the FISP since the 2005/06 growing season has greatly 
raised the profi le of the agricultural sector in terms of resources, these are spent 
almost exclusively on FISP and thereby neglect other potentially transformative 
activities such as extension, research, irrigation, and infrastructure development. 
Since the launch of the FISP, the share of the agricultural sector in the national 
budget has fl uctuated between 10.1 and 16.7 per cent. This is in line with the 2003 
Maputo Declaration on Agriculture and Food security that underlies the 
Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP).
However, Chirwa et al. (2013) argue that FISP has degenerated into a political 
tool – widely viewed by politicians as a quick fi x to the problem of food security 
that often affects the country. FISP is seen as such because it plays a critical role 
in shoring up a government’s legitimacy, as it has become the basis for a social 
contract between the people and rulers (Sahely et al., 2005). There is thus a 
political–economic binding of the FISP since the question of food security is 
fi rmly at the centre of Malawi’s electoral politics. Consequently, it is diffi cult for 
politicians to ignore FISP, as it has become the single most important vote 
winning issue (Chinsinga, 2010). This has greatly affected the way in which FISP 
is regarded by politicians and how the dynamics of its implementation take shape. 
Political leaders typically view FISP as primarily a programme to fi x the problem 
of food insecurity rather than a programme that can catalyse fundamental 
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agricultural transformation in the country. FISP is therefore viewed as a 
standalone programme without any linkages to a wide range of on-going rural 
development interventions because its main concern, especially from the 
politicians’ perspective, is simply to guarantee food security for the people so that 
they maintain themselves in power.
It is therefore not surprising that there is little or no effort to ensure strategic 
and balanced investments in the agricultural sector so as to spearhead fundamental 
and sustainable structural transformation. It is estimated that up to 75 per cent of 
the budget for the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (MoAFS) is spent 
on FISP. The amount of resources directed to the provision of extension services, 
conducting research, and rural infrastructural development is quite negligible, yet 
these investments are critical to facilitating sustainable development of the sector 
(Khaila, 2012). We have also previously argued that the young people are 
overlooked in the implementation of FISP because of the apparent political 
capture of the programme (Chinsinga and Chasukwa, 2012). The criteria for 
identifying benefi ciaries of FISP exclude young people, the main reason being 
that ‘they do not own land and are energetic enough to work elsewhere to 
generate income to purchase agricultural inputs on their own from the market’.7 
This means that FISP operates on the premise that young people have adequate 
skills to make them competitive on the labour market, and that employment 
opportunities are readily available, yet existing statistics show that it is almost 
impossible for these young people to get employment in either the formal or 
informal sectors.
The obsession of politicians with FISP as a vote-spinning machine has made it 
impossible to shape its implementation dynamics in a way that would make the 
agricultural sector more productive and attractive to young people. This is 
because FISP is narrowly focused on principally bolstering production of 
smallholders growing maize, its availability equating to food security (Smale and 
Jayne, 2003). This means that even if ung people were to be included in FISP, it 
would not readily contribute to solving the youth unemployment problem. The 
young people are not interested in primary production but rather in other value 
chain aspects of the agricultural sector, such as marketing, processing, storage, 
and distribution. These are, of course, an integral part of FISP, but they are 
monopolized by the political elites (World Bank et al., 2011). In one of the FGDs, 
the participants actually observed that:
[the] time for us to stick to traditional understanding of farming as in growing 
maize is long gone. We have seen our grandfathers and fathers growing maize 
but this has not made any difference in their lives. Farming has ended up 
being a source of misery. We should aim higher than them and this involves 
going beyond their way of understanding and practicing farming.8
The persistence of the traditional conception of agriculture as exclusively primary 
production is a cause of concern because it has contributed to the negative 
perception of agriculture as an occupation of choice among young people. In fact, 
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agriculture does not feature at all as a reliable livelihood strategy for young people. 
They generally view agriculture as old fashioned, an occupation of the poor, and 
an inconsequential enterprise. In a focus group discussion (FGD) with a youth 
club in Ntcheu district, agriculture was characterized as ‘an enterprise without a 
future … if it had a future our parents would have changed their status, yet they 
have been farming since we were young’.9 This indicates that the various segments 
of the value chain in the agricultural sector are not well developed. The point is 
that activities such as ‘input supply, processing, storage and marketing and 
distribution could provide smart employment with a status equal to white collar 
employment’ (Kamchacha, 2012: 10).
Youth empowerment initiatives after Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP)
The youth initiatives that have been implemented since the abandonment of the 
MYP initiative have almost entirely ignored the agricultural sector. The main 
initiatives include the Youth Development Credit Scheme (YDSC) and the 
Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YEDEF) (Chinsinga and Chasukwa, 
2013). The lack of an explicit linkage of these initiatives to the agricultural sector 
might be attributed to the framing of the youth policy. Neither the initial or 
revised versions of the youth policy prioritize the agricultural sector as a potential 
catalyst for sustainable employment opportunities for young people. The main 
contributing factor to the apparent lack of policy coherence of the youth 
initiatives seems to be related to the underlying motivations of politicians when 
they propose and implement these policies. Politicians, without any signifi cant 
technical input, often conceive these initiatives, which in turn are ‘driven 
primarily by political imperatives rather than a well-thought out vision to 
transform the livelihoods of the youth’.10 The political imperatives of these 
initiatives are underpinned by the timing of these initiatives. They are either 
launched just before or after elections ‘because they either target the youth as a 
signifi cant voting block or a way of saying thank you to them for voting the 
politicians into power’.11
The Youth Development Credit Scheme (YDCS)
The YDCS was funded to the tune of MK70 million when it was launched in 
August 1996 with fi nancial support from the Commonwealth Credit Initiative. It 
was conceived as a revolving credit facility, and it was managed by the now 
defunct Small Enterprises Development Organization of Malawi (SEDOM), a 
quasi-governmental body. The YDCS targeted young men and women aged 
between 15 and 30 who had developed viable business plans and were ready to 
get started. It was a credit facility with concessionary interest rates pegged at 15 
per cent against the prevailing market interest rates in the range of 20–25 per 
cent (Chinsinga, 2002).
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The Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YEDEF)
The YEDEF was launched in 2010 with an initial capital of MK3 billion. The 
main objective of YEDEF is to provide easily accessible loans to young 
entrepreneurs in the form of capital equipment and working capital enabling 
them to venture into various areas including the agro-food sector (Chinsinga and 
Chasukwa, 2013). The loans are provided groups of at least ten young people or 
in some rare cases to individuals who have gone through a self-selection process 
duly appraised by the YEDEF district committee. When it was introduced, YEDEF 
targeted young people aged between 18 and 30 but the eligibility age bracket has 
since been extended to 35. According to its guidelines, the fund caters for school 
leavers, both skilled and unskilled, who are expected to engage in various trades 
such as agricultural production, construction, carpentry and joinery, panel 
beating, welding, and metal fabrication. The vision of YEDEF is to support groups 
of young people who have proven technical business skills as a means for them to 
earn independent livelihoods and even create employment for their fellows, 
particularly in rural areas.
Performance review of YDCS and YEDEF
A critical analysis of both YDCS and YEDEF shows that they have not been very 
successful. The dismal performance of these initiatives is attributed mainly to the 
fact that they were characterized by excessive political interference. Even though 
they were championed as youth initiatives, ‘the primary targets were youths that 
were aligned to the parties in power at a particular moment’.12 Both initiatives 
have failed to pass the sustainability test because they have been heavily 
politicized (Chinsinga, 2002; Whitby, 2012). The administrators of these 
initiatives are often forced by politicians to skip the laid-down procedures. The 
argument is that ‘politicians put pressures on us to disburse loans to groups or 
individuals of their choice regardless of the laid out procedures. All they want is 
to gain political mileage.’13 With particular reference to YEDEF, this became 
more or less the offi cial policy when President Mutharika publicly declared that 
‘priority in disbursing YEDEF loans should be given to DPP youth cadets’.14
It is therefore not surprising that both YDCS and YEDEF have had dismal 
track records. YDCS could not be sustained as a revolving fund because the 
repayment rate was less than 10 per cent (Chinsinga, 2002). A recent assessment 
shows that the repayment rate for YEDEF is as low as 23 per cent (Chinsinga and 
Chasukwa, 2013). The prominence of politicians in deciding who should benefi t 
or not from these initiatives has ‘created the impression that the money given out 
is free money’.15 Consequently, the popular perception about YEDEF is that ‘the 
loan was meant to be a thank you to all those youth that contributed to the 
landslide victory of the party in the 2009 presidential and parliamentary 
elections’.16 The decision to extend the age bracket to 35 for YEDEF’s benefi ciaries 
was therefore meant to ‘expand the catchment of patronage as a strategy to 
mortgage the youth in readiness for the 2014 elections’.17
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While in its design YEDEF is also expected to serve as a source of readily 
accessible credit to graduates from various vocal education training institutions, 
the review revealed that this linkage does not exist in practice. No graduates from 
vocational training institutions have benefi ted from YEDEF (Whitby, 2012). 
Priority consideration is given to young people who are politically connected. 
Even if the graduates were to benefi t from YEDEF, this could not have had a 
positive impact on the agricultural sector. As noted earlier, the TEVETA 
curriculum does not include any modules on agriculture (Valle, 2012). 
Nevertheless, under the auspices of its Skills Development Initiative, TEVETA 
(2009) offers short-term training in agriculture but only upon request from 
communities. The demand for such training is essentially non-existent because 
communities are expected to shoulder the costs of delivery, which they cannot 
afford. The failure of this initiative to take off further reinforces the marginalization 
of the agricultural sector in the efforts to combat youth unemployment especially 
since the majority of new agriculturalists are reluctant to work in rural areas 
because ‘they cannot fulfi l their dreams as a network generation’.18 They can’t 
imagine themselves living in areas without electricity and Internet connectivity. 
This is greatly contributing to the emergence of an orphaned generation of 
farmers who are hardly supported by a coherent system of provision of extension 
services, which is quite critical to spearheading potential agrarian transformation.
Bringing back agriculture into youth development?
The Youth Job Creation Initiative (YJCI) launched by President Banda on 15 
March 2013 appeared poised to bring back agriculture to the fore of youth 
development. The YJCI was launched in pursuance of the aspirations of the 
national youth policy and the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy 
(MGDS II) (GoM, 2012). It was further justifi ed as a strategy for dealing with the 
problem of chronic youth unemployment by exporting unskilled, skilled, and 
semi-skilled labour to countries where they could acquire skills and knowledge 
that would in turn be put to productive use here at home upon return. The target 
countries for youth labour export included South Korea, Kuwait, and the United 
Arab Emirates.
The YJCI targets young people aged between 19 and 25 with aspirations to 
work in the services, tourism, and agricultural sectors. It was announced at the 
launch of the YJCI that the government had secured a youth labour export 
contract with South Korea under which up to 100,000 young people would be 
engaged.19 The Ministry of Labour fl oated two adverts for employment 
opportunities in South Korea, one of them generic in nature while the other had 
a particular emphasis on the agricultural sector. The generic advert stipulated the 
following attributes of the prospective applicants:
• must be Malawian aged between 19 and 25;
• should have a minimum of the Malawi School Certifi cate of Education 
(MSCE);
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• should be able to communicate in English;
• must be willing to undergo medical test at a designated hospital;
• should have a valid passport or be able to acquire one;
• should be able to raise money to pay for visa; and
• should have no criminal record.20
The advert with a bias towards the agricultural sector jobs asked for applicants 
with a degree in agriculture specializing in livestock management. This was 
touted as a programme that would:
build capacity for the youth by engaging them in productive agricultural 
activities throughout the period of the contract and, at the end of the 
contract, the youth would put into practice the knowledge and skills gained 
as part of youth participation and empowerment.21
The YJCU was further described as an opportunity to make most young people 
productive since ‘most of our youth are just sitting idle in villages and towns, they 
are not working, they are not in school, this is an opportunity for them to be 
productive’.22
The YJCI has more or less fallen through. It hit a dead end when the 
government of South Korea denied having sealed a youth labour export deal with 
the Malawi government. The rebuttal came through the African Division of 
South Korea’s Foreign Affairs Ministry observing ‘our government has not 
received any offi cial request from Malawi that they want to send their workers to 
our country.’23 Meanwhile the future of the initiative hangs in the balance. The 
fi rst batch of 336 successful recruits who were ready to take up their posts in 
South Korea have been told to wait for fresh communication as to when exactly 
they will leave for South Korea.
Had the YJCI succeeded, it could have made important contributions to the 
development and subsequent transformation of the agricultural sector. Agriculture 
in Malawi remains grossly undeveloped and the exposure of a good number of 
young people to the South Korean advanced agricultural system could have 
helped to modernize Malawi’s agricultural sector because the youth – often 
referred to as the ‘Cheetah generation’ – are not only receptive to new ideas, but 
also willing to adopt new practices quickly.
However, a critical review of the YJCI raises some serious doubts as to whether 
it would have facilitated the achievement of the desired transformation of the 
agricultural sector. The review shows that the institutional design of the YJCI 
would have made it extremely diffi cult for it to contribute meaningfully to the 
utilization of the skills and expertise that the benefi ciaries would have acquired at 
the end of their contracts in South Korea. This is the case because the recruitment 
of young people for the South Korea job opportunities was done entirely by the 
district labour offi ces without the involvement of their counterparts from the 
agricultural sector. Moreover, no programme document was produced that 
‘stipulated how upon returning to the country, the youth would be taken on 
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board so that they fully contribute to the country’s socio-economic endeavours 
particularly in the agricultural sector’.24 This shows that YJCI’s linkage to the 
agricultural sector was very much a political rhetoric rather than a well-thought-
out linkage at the technical level within the broader scheme of national 
development efforts.
It is therefore not surprising that the YJCI has been both praised and 
condemned as a strategic ploy to woo the youth vote ahead of the May 2014 
general elections. Just like with YDCS and YEDEF, the popular perception is that 
YJCI is motivated more by political imperatives of winning an election than the 
genuine commitment to bringing about sustainable changes in the livelihoods of 
the young people who constitute about 60 per cent of the total population and 
are thus the biggest single voting bloc. This perception was rendered more 
credible when the Minister of Labour said that ‘for the initiative to be fairly 
implemented there is need for the involvement of MPs who will help us identify 
youths from their respective constituencies’.25
Structural and funding constraints
There is an acknowledgement that the promotion of youth visibility in a coherent 
fashion in policy circles is undermined by structural constraints and limited 
funding for the sector (GoM, 2012). In terms of structural constraints, there is 
destructive competition between the Ministry of Youth Development and Sports 
(MoYDS) and the National Youth Council of Malawi (NYCoM) because there 
is a lack of clarity regarding their mandates. This has resulted in fi erce contests 
between the two bordering on which is best positioned to champion the youth 
agenda. The persistent confl ictual relationship between them has made it diffi cult 
for the two institutions to work together in championing the youth cause with a 
sense of purpose and unity of direction. This has made collaboration with other 
stakeholders diffi cult, to the detriment of young people, especially in view of the 
fact that youth issues are crosscutting in nature. The failure to collaborate with 
other sectors, particularly agriculture, is underlined by the absence of any 
reference to it in the revised draft policy, which makes it diffi cult to ensure that 
young people participate in key development activities (Kamchacha, 2012).
The youth sector is not prioritized in terms of funding and expenditure. 
Though young people constitute the largest proportion of the population funding 
for the youth sector has been quite negligible as a matter of routine. In the 
2010/11 fi nancial year, for instance, only MK826.69 million was allocated, which 
is hardly adequate to empower the MoYDS and NYCoM to implement their 
activities on notable scale and in a transformational manner. Funding projections 
in MGDS II to the youth sector are not encouraging either (GoM, 2012). It is 
projected that by the 2015/16 fi nancial year, the government will have increased 
budgetary support for child development and youth empowerment from 1.6 per 
cent out of the 39.1 per cent of resources allocated to social development.26
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Conclusion
There is no doubt that Malawi grapples with the question of chronic youth 
unemployment. This is, of course, not unique to Malawi. It is a serious problem 
across the developing world. It is a particular cause of concern in Malawi because 
some 60 per cent of its total population falls into the youth category. The future 
socio-economic prosperity depends on young people getting adequately prepared, 
and fi nding opportunities, to put their skills and expertise to proper use. The 
problem of chronic youth unemployment threatens to put to waste the potential 
demographic dividend that comes with predominantly youthful populations.
There have, of course, been concerted efforts on the part of the government to 
address this problem. Apart from the MYP, however, none of the initiatives 
developed to combat youth unemployment has paid particular attention to the 
agricultural sector in spite of its being Malawi’s leading employer. This has further 
been reinforced by the fact that neither the initial nor the revised versions of the 
youth policy have made an explicit linkage between having a vibrant agricultural 
sector and empowerment of its young people. The preoccupation of politicians 
with agriculture as primary production focused principally on growing maize for 
purposes of ensuring food security has made it diffi cult to develop other aspects of 
the value chain of the sector that would have made it more attractive to young 
people (Anderson, 2011). Moreover, the support programmes to the agricultural 
sector do not include the young people, which makes it impossible to fully exploit 
its potential as the biggest employer in order to combat the problem of chronic 
youth unemployment.
The efforts to deal with youth unemployment such as YDCS and YEDEF are 
often not well thought through for them to achieve the desired strategic impact 
regardless of the fact they do not explicitly put particular emphasis on agriculture. 
Indeed, these programmes have received unfavourable reviews. This is mainly 
because the programmes are principally conceived and implemented to satisfy 
political goals rather than being a useful tool for improving the livelihoods of the 
young people. Both in terms of their timing and modalities of implementation, 
these programmes are designed to either capture or appease young people as a 
vocal political constituency. It is clear that policies or programmes directed at 
youth empowerment are driven by short-termism, motivated by the selfi sh desires 
of politicians to maintain themselves in power. This has greatly contributed to 
the marginalization of the agricultural sector in dealing with youth unemployment.
Notes
1 TEVETA is a semi-autonomous governmental organization mandated to facilitate the 
provision of technical, entrepreneurial and vocational education and training in 
Malawi. It is the operationalizing body of the 1998 National Policy on Technical, 
Entrepreneurial and Vocational Education and Training.
2 Interview with a project offi cer for YONECO, Ntcheu, 27 January 2013.
3 Interview with a principal offi cer at the Ministry of Sports and Youth, Lilongwe, 23 
January 2013.
4 Ibid.
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 5 Focus group discussion (FGD) with members of Likhubula Youth Club, Zomba, 2 
February 2013.
 6 FGD with members of Tithanidzane, Tigonjetse and Tipewe Youth Clubs, Ntcheu, 28 
January 2013.
 7 Interview with the district agricultural development offi cer (DADO), Ntcheu, 4 
February 2013.
 8 FGD participants with Likhubula Youth Club, Zomba, 2 February 2013.
 9 FGD participants with Bwalo la Ana Youth Active Community Organization 
(BLAYACO), Ntcheu, 27 January 2013.
10 Interview with an offi cial in the Ministry of Youth Development and Sports, Lilongwe, 
28 January 2013.
11 Interview with an NGO offi cial, Lilongwe, 31 January 2013.
12 Interview with an NGO offi cial in Zomba district, 6 February 2013.
13 See “YEDEF for DPP Youth”, The Nation, 6 March 2010.
14 Ibid.
15 Interview with the district youth offi cer, Zomba, 3 February 2013.
16 Interview with one of the senior offi cials of Ntcheu District Council, 24 February 2013.
17 Interview with an NGO offi cial, Lilongwe, 23 January 2013.
18 Interview with the Chief Economist in the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security 
(MoAFS), Lilongwe, 18 January 2013.
19 See “The Widening Gyre of Korea Saga: A Chronology”, Sunday Times, 9 June 2013.
20 See The Nation, 22 March 2013.
21 See The Nation, 28 May 2013
22 Ibid.
23 See “Youth Export Palaver”, Africa–Asia Confi dential, 6(8) June 2013.
24 Interview with an agriculturalist at Bunda College of Agriculture, Lilongwe, 10 April 
2013.
25 See “Malawi to Export Youth Labour to South Korea: President Banda Launches 
Initiative”, Malawi News Agency, 15 March 2013.
26 The MGDS II identifi es child development, youth development and empowerment as 
key priority areas under the theme of social development.
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Part III
Activism, aid and 
accountability

8 Against all odds




After almost two decades of embracing multiparty democracy, most legislatures 
in Africa continue to face the crisis of a dominant executive – a hangover of the 
military or civilian one-party state of the 1960s to the early 1990s where they 
rubber stamped the laws and legislations made by the executive. Indeed, the 
dividing line between party and state in Africa remain blurred. The persistence of 
a one-party culture is almost pervasive across the continent irrespective of regime 
change, making an over powerful executive endemic and destructive to 
democratic progression. Two interrelated factors are responsible for this:
• weak institutionalisation of democratic pillars, such as the rule of law, 
participation, representation and accountability; and
• the tendency to follow informal practices and norms, thereby setting aside 
formal rules and procedures.
The critical question is whether the democratic institutional reforms of the 1990s 
have been in line with an evolving culture of democracy with respect to adherence 
to the rule of law. Is there adequate space for representation of citizens’ interest 
and welfare?
The adoption of democratic order with embedded principles of checks and 
balances requires the legislature to be a vital democratic institution serving as a 
bridge between state and society by carrying out its legislative, oversight and 
representative functions in ways that strengthen the good governance values of 
accountability, transparency and participation (Parliamentary Centre Canada, et 
al., 2005). In this setting, legislatures typically perform three vital functions – 
legislation, representation and oversight – and parliamentarians owe their 
allegiance to the party, the electorate from their constituencies and to the nation 
at large. While the effectiveness of democratic legislatures is based on a plethora 
of factors – constitutional framework, political system, political culture, level of 
independence of constitutional bodies – much also depends on the effective 
utilisation of the tools for oversight that are at the disposal of the legislature 
irrespective of whether it is a presidential or parliamentary type of government. 
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The tools mainly refer to the parliamentary oversight committees and ministerial 
questions and the role these play as scrutiny mechanisms. In nascent democracies, 
the effective utilisation of these tools is often impeded by constraints of resources, 
capacity and political commitment.
The focus of this chapter is on a strong three-party scenario that emerged in 
Malawi in 1994, with the establishment of multiparty democratic order where the 
opposition (with a majority in parliament) could participate fairly effectively in 
exercising their accountability role through the parliamentary committee system. 
During this period, however, several bills that were subsequently deemed to 
violate the provisions of the Constitution were pushed through by the ruling 
party. The bills included an attempt to abolish the upper house of parliament and 
an attempt to extend the presidential term limit to a third term. The ensuing 
bitter disputes and deliberations in Parliament contributed to an overall 
weakening of the checks and balance system and generally weakened the role of 
the opposition.
The stable three-party composition of parliament collapsed with the 2004 
elections. The party system witnessed fragmentation, mainly due to the conten-
tious presidential third term issue, and there was a dramatic increase in the number 
of independent MPs (40) who were elected to parliament without party affi liation. 
The period between 2005 and 2008 was characterised by a tug of war between the 
executive and the legislature. The major cause of this was the formation of the 
Democratic Peoples’ Party (DPP) – a new political entity within a year after 
President Bingu wa Mutharika took offi ce and defected from the political party 
(UDF) that helped him get elected. Elected MPs were lured by the president to 
defect from their parties and swear allegiance to the newly formed DPP, and 
thereby provide support to the presidency. Thus, Mutharika survived an entire 
term with the support of MPs who had crossed the fl oor in violation of constitutional 
provisions. During this period, parliamentary sittings were shortened and once 
prorogued. Despite such hostile relations between the legislature and the executive, 
the Malawian parliament made a concerted effort to perform its oversight role 
amidst numerous challenges.
The landslide victory of the DPP in the 2009 elections not only vindicated the 
president’s decisions to form a new party, but also provided hope for democratic 
consolidation, economic development, and normalcy and stability in the 
executive–legislature relationship. Unfortunately, subsequent years witnessed 
the legislation for draconian laws that curbed freedoms and stifl ed dissent as the 
DPP enjoyed an overwhelming majority in parliament. When Vice-President 
Joyce Banda assumed offi ce following the death of President Mutharika in 2012, 
the executive–legislature tensions were once again revived. Despite being elected 
on a DPP ticket, Banda went on to form the People’s Party (PP) by encouraging 
MPs to once more cross the fl oor, and like Mutharika survived for the rest of her 
term despite heated debates in parliament on the unconstitutional manner in 
which the PP was created. In the run up to 2014 elections, the Cashgate scandal 
– labelled the biggest corruption scandal in Malawi’s history – brought renewed 
focus on the oversight role of parliament.
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In the ensuing sections, I analyse the Malawian Parliament’s oversight role 
during these critical junctures and draw conclusions on the prospects for it to play 
this role more effectively.
Theoretical perspectives on the legislature–executive relationship
In both long-established and new democracies, the legislature is given the power 
to check the power of the executive through a number of tools and mechanisms. 
Oversight is one of the tools of accountability to guarantee that government 
initiatives meet their stated objectives and respond to the needs of the community. 
Pelizzo et al. (2006) distinguish between ‘oversight potential’ and ‘effective 
oversight’. Effective oversight entails legislatures actually overseeing the actions 
and activities of the executive and the extent to which such oversight function 
has an impact on the political system and, more specifi cally, on governmental 
behaviour. In contrast, oversight potential denotes the set of formal powers and 
instruments that legislatures have to oversee government activities regardless of 
whether these powers and instruments are actually used. A legislature’s oversight 
potential is measured by the number of oversight tools available in a given 
country and how it affects the level of democracy. In most of the fl edgling 
democracies, there is a gap between the formal powers that exist on paper and the 
actual powers that are available.
Another dimension of oversight relates to ‘enforcement’ or ‘answerability’. 
Answerability refers to the obligation of the government, its agencies and public 
offi cials to provide information about their decisions and actions and to justify 
them to the public and those institutions of accountability tasked with providing 
oversight. Enforcement entails that the public or the institution responsible for 
accountability can sanction the offending party or remedy the contravening 
behaviour (O’Donnell, 1998) Even in mature democracies like the United 
Kingdom, the enforcement function of parliamentary committees is limited. 
There are very few explicit provisions for Parliament to enforce its will, or in 
which sanctions could be brought to bear on the non-compliant party (Gorden 
and Street, 2012). In the United States, the Congressional Committee has 
investigative powers, which it used quite extensively in, for example, the 
Watergate and Iran–Contra cases. Moreover, offi cials are compelled to testify at 
the hearings (except in matters of national security) and a refusal to testify can be 
cited for contempt of court – a criminal offence. However, in African democracies 
of the 1990s – which have largely adopted the American style of presidentialism 
– legislatures have not yet assumed the oversight role of the US Congress. We 
will, in subsequent sections of this chapter, discuss the legal frameworks available 
in Malawi for securing ‘answerability’ and ‘enforcement’.
The legislature’s role in approving the national budget is key, and it is often 
claimed that its ‘power of the purse’ is a fundamental feature of democracy. The 
vast majority of democratic constitutions require appropriations and taxation 
measures to be approved by the legislature in order to become effective (IEA, 
2009). This is a challenging role for many legislatures given their resource 
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constraints and limited capacity to undertake a delicate balancing act. However, 
it is now increasingly recognised that legislatures can play an important role in 
promoting economic governance, improving fi nancial transparency and holding 
the executive to account. Enhancing legislative scrutiny of the budget and 
oversight of its execution is thus considered as a means of strengthening 
government accountability and controlling corruption.
The committee system is crucial for legislatures to play the above roles. Some 
scholars have argued that viable (albeit undeveloped) committees are now 
emerging in African legislatures, and bills introduced by the executive for passage 
in the legislature are no longer ‘rubber stamped’, but increasingly scrutinised and 
often amended before being passed into law. The involvement of civil society 
organisations in the legislative process is increasing, and the extensive oversight 
of the executive by the legislature is bearing positive outcomes (Bolarinwa, 2015).
Whilst it is true that committees contribute signifi cantly to the vibrancy of the 
legislature, they are not decision-making bodies, except with respect to their own 
internal proceedings. They have no standing independent of the legislature. The 
committees report to the legislature, often with recommendations for decision for 
legislation and oversight. Generally, committees have a multiparty composition 
with members possessing expertise and experience in a specifi c fi eld. Therefore, a 
committee represents political diversity and yet strives to arrive at unanimous 
recommendations for action. Their key role makes them important and visible. 
Individuals from within the legislature and outside often seek to engage with 
committees in order to infl uence outcomes.
A myriad of factors impede the objectivity and effi ciency of parliamentary 
committees in countries like Malawi, including lack of technical expertise, 
inadequate resources and various types of pressure from administrative offi cials 
and party leaders. Indeed, the system of executive domination is often perpetrated 
by denying fi nancial autonomy to Parliament. Although Parliament should in 
principle be funded directly as an organ of state or statutory expenditure, it is in 
Malawi funded via the Treasury, making access to funds unpredictable. And, 
although the parliamentary reform programme undertaken with foreign donor 
support in 2006 strongly recommended the securing of adequate and predictable 
budget and adherence to a fi xed calendar for parliamentary sittings, these 
recommendations are yet to be implemented in the country (PRC, 2006).
The legislature alone cannot, of course, guarantee accountability across the 
entire range of governmental activity. There are other forms of scrutiny performed 
by extra-parliamentary bodies, and legislatures must work closely with these 
bodies. As Griffi th (2005) argues, ‘Parliament’s role is in disentangling the key 
political issues from technical scrutiny, interpreting their signifi cance and using 
this as the basis on which to challenge Government.’ As it forms the apex of a 
hierarchical structure of scrutiny, legislatures must maintain a strong and 
relationship with extra-parliamentary accountability bodies such as the Human 
Rights Commission and the Ombudsman in addition to maintaining regular and 
close contact with civil society organisations.
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Executive accountability to Parliament in Malawi
‘Cashgate’ – where large sums of public funds were stolen by a group of politicians 
and civil servants, causing major diffi culties for the Malawian state in providing 
basic services – created large-scale public anger and mounted considerable 
pressure on the parliament to perform its designated oversight role. And, since 
the 2014 elections, demands on the President to appear before Parliament to 
respond to questions on the budget have been mounting. Thus the Legal Affairs 
Committee has claimed that the President would be violating the Constitution if 
he did not appear before the House during the debates on the 2015/16 expenditure 
plan. The committee went on to draw attention to two distinct provisions in 
Section 89 of Malawi’s Constitution dealing with the requirement of the President 
to appear before Parliament (Constitution of Malawi 1994). Section 96(1)(e) of 
the Constitution requires ministers to be present in parliament and answer 
questions pertaining to their ministries when called upon to do so. This happens 
rather frequently in Malawi, although some ministers are summoned more often 
than others. Parliamentary records in the period 2005–2008 show that cabinet 
ministers have on average been asked around 200 questions during each sitting of 
parliament. For instance, in one session of 15 days, 200 questions were addressed 
by MPs to various ministers, largely on education, transport, health, irrigation 
and water (Institute for Policy Interaction, 2010). Indeed, as constituency 
infrastructure development was the focus of this particular sitting, MPs were 
asked to document visible changes in their constituencies after their elections. 
During this period, ministers in charge of statutory corporations or parastatals 
were similarly required to present annual reports to Parliament.
Section 97 of the Constitution, however, makes ministers responsible to the 
President for the administration of their own ministries/departments. Some argue 
that this has resulted in a skewed understanding of accountability for most public 
functionaries, who seem to offer their loyalty to their political and bureaucratic 
superiors and not to the citizenry. Therefore, accountability to rights holders 
remains weak, neglected and a missing link in Malawi’s democracy. While the 
Constitution highlights accountability of ministers to the President, it does not 
make any mention of their accountability to citizens (Kamchedzera and Banda, 
2012). Recent measures of public opinion in Malawi indicate that Malawians value 
their Parliament’s legislative and oversight roles, but are highly critical of the 
performance of parliamentarians (Afrobarometer, 2014). In a number of studies on 
political attitudes, Malawians have expressed their dissatisfaction on the 
performance of their elected representatives. There also appears to be an emerging 
consensus on the need for effective oversight role of Parliament in holding the 
government to account in general and to ensure that the executive appears before 
the legislature routinely on matters of public fi nance and fi nancial integrity.
Malawi has adopted a system whereby cabinet ministers are recruited from the 
ranks of the legislators, although it is not an absolute requirement; non-elected 
technocrats can serve as ministers. The wearing of two hats by some MPs has 
arguably diluted the accountability role of the Parliament. The practice also 
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contravenes the separation of powers principle, though it has become entrenched 
in the country’s political system with successive presidents infl ating their cabinets 
whenever they wished to garner support in Parliament for controversial bills (Patel 
and Tostensen, 2006). Thus, President Bakili Muluzi’s cabinet swelled to 46 when 
he was trying to secure a third term in offi ce. Similarly, President Bingu wa 
Mutharika’s cabinet size rose to 42 during the period when Parliament debated 
Section 65 of the Constitution, dealing with fl oor-crossing MPs. During both these 
junctures, all the 40+ cabinet ministers were drawn from the national assembly.
Parliamentary oversight via committees
The strained executive–legislature relations impeded the functioning of the 
legislature in many ways like curtailed sittings of Parliament, and less frequent 
meetings of parliamentary committees. A negative public perception evolved 
especially during 2005–8 on the role of Parliament in that it was viewed as 
wasting time on political bickering, especially in relation to the controversial 
Section 65 (crossing of fl oor by MPs), rather than discussing matters of public 
importance. While it is true that the committees often became the stage for a 
tug-of-war between the executive and the legislature, they also performed some 
notable work. The report of the Public Accounts Committee on the investigation 
into the operations and management of the credit scheme can be a case in point. 
The credit scheme account was purportedly opened as an operating account for 
Malawi Rural Development Fund (MARDEF). The Secretary to the Treasury 
had allegedly diverted MK20 million from the scheme, to an account with the 
Finance Bank of Malawi. The Finance Minister ordered an audit on the account 
by the National Audit Offi ce and the report was subsequently investigated by the 
Public Accounts Committee. The committee report accused the government of 
diverting the fund for clandestine political activities such as ‘buying’ members of 
the opposition to support the government. The government on its part dismissed 
the report as fl awed as it did not comply with provision SO 181 of the Standing 
Orders of Parliament, which gives an opportunity to the accused (and in this case 
some of the accused were cabinet ministers) to make submissions to the 
committee. The matter, commonly known as the ‘Kutengule case’, brought to 
light the role of the Public Accounts Committee and instilled hope in 
parliamentary oversight.
Similarly, the Budget and Finance Committee (BFC) made important 
contributions to parliamentary oversight by way of detailed and constructive 
responses to the budget; and many of its suggestions were actually accepted by the 
government. The budget session of 2008 was particularly heated as the ongoing 
wrangle over the constitutional section on the crossing of the fl oor by MPs 
reached its climax with the political climate warming up for the upcoming 2009 
elections. But what had gone rather unnoticed during these years of executive–
legislature tensions related to the Budget versus Section 65 saga was the 
commendable contributions of the BFC on the budget.1 The committee also 
made many other pertinent recommendations on the allocations for specifi c 
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items in the three key ministries – agriculture, health and education. For example, 
on the implementation of the farm inputs subsidy programme (FISP), the 
committee observed that the government paid excessive attention to the Ministry 
on Agriculture and Food Security and relegated other key ministries such as 
Natural Resources and Environment to the background. Concerns were 
particularly raised on rampant corruption emanating from the fertilizer subsidy, as 
it was the supporters of those in government who largely tended to benefi t from 
the programme.
The birth of the integrated fi nancial management information system (IFMIS) 
took place during this term of Parliament when, in 2006, the government 
announced that it would roll out IFMIS across all ministries with the aim of 
improving and strengthening public fi nance management. In the budget session 
of August 2008, the opposition expressed concern over the generally poor 
fi nancial management of ministries and departments, and urged the government 
to tighten up loose ends in the fi nancial management system in order to safeguard 
donor confi dence. This was perhaps indicative of an emerging problem, which 
exploded beyond anyone’s imagination a few years later in the scandal referred to 
as ‘Cashgate’.
The relationship between the Public Appointments Committee of Parliament 
and the President was adversarial and tense during the tenure of Bingu wa 
Mutharika. When the President submitted the names for executive appointments 
to Parliament, the committee rejected them. These included the candidatures for 
the Inspector General of Police and the Director of Public Prosecution. The 
committee and several civil society organisations demanded the recall of Malawi’s 
high commissioner to South Africa, whose credentials were apparently not 
adequate for the appointment. There was also agitation to the abrupt suspension 
of the Director of the Anti-Corruption Bureau. This acrimony between the 
executive and the legislature left many important offi ces vacant for long periods 
of time. One institution most affected by this was the Malawi Electoral 
Commission (MEC). When the tenure of four election commissioners expired in 
2006, the President appointed new commissioners without consulting the 
opposition. Thus several opposition political parties blocked these appointments 
through court injunctions. Throughout 2007 such executive appointments were 
challenged through the courts. The Electoral Commission fi nally became 
operational barely 14 months before the 2009 elections.
The Legal Affairs Committee played its oversight role perhaps by going to the 
extreme of initiating impeachment proceedings against President Bingu wa 
Mutharika on seven grounds. The main charges related to the President forming 
his party after winning elections on the ticket of another party, misusing public 
funds in poaching MPs to join his newly formed party (DPP), and the subsequent 
defections of MPs violating the constitutional provision on fl oor crossing (Section 
65). There were also charges of arbitrarily hiring and fi ring public offi cials. The 
impeachment petition was challenged by the President in court on the ground 
that Section 65 on crossing of fl oor contradicted the constitutional section on 
freedom of association. The Supreme Court in 2007 ruled on this matter, 
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upholding Section 65 to be an integral part of the Constitution, which could not 
be repealed. Despite the Supreme Court ruling, the Mutharika government 
completed a full term of offi ce with total impunity.
The Parliament then realised that impeachment procedures were not laid 
down in the Standing Orders of the House. Nonetheless, the Legal Affairs 
Committee drafted the impeachment procedure and presented it to Parliament, 
while the President decided to refer the procedures to the Supreme Court to 
determine their constitutional validity. The issue dragged on until 2013, when 
Parliament fi nally approved the new Standing Orders, which also included the 
impeachment procedure.
The new Standing Orders are a positive step towards enhancing oversight. 
They give opposition parties the chairmanship of crucial oversight committees 
and a stricter enforcement of the requirement for the President to be present in 
Parliament during the budget session. In the forthcoming sittings of Parliament, 
many of these features will be put to test. The revised Standing Orders also clarify 
the position of the leader of opposition, which at one time was a controversial 
issue as ruling parties have historically tried to interfere in the appointment 
process. The rule now clarifi es the leader of opposition must be a parliamentary 
leader elected by the party not in government and having the greatest numerical 
strength in Parliament at any point in time and offi cially announced as such by 
the Speaker.
Despite the tense executive–legislature relations, the Malawian Parliament 
has always been visible for one reason or another. Indeed, Parliament has been 
able to assert itself as an independent institution, particularly in the period 
2005–9, when each of the thirteen parliamentary committees conducted regular 
meetings for the fi rst time since 1994 (Freedom House, 2012). This signalled 
positive efforts to develop institutional capacity and greater legislative policy 
expertise. Given that the post-2004 election period was one of the most 
confrontational and tension-fi lled in terms of the relations between the executive 
and the legislature, it seems ironical that it was during this very period that the 
Parliament reforms strategy was passed. The reform strategy aims at giving 
Parliament the autonomy to set its own calendar, and control over its own budget 
to fully conduct all its activities without delay, including, among other things, a 
fully staffed and well-equipped secretariat.
Controlling corruption
In a political system where patronage and clientelist practices are deeply 
imbedded, there are an abundance of opportunities for corruption in the 
bureaucracy and in wider political circles. Moreover, the body that is primarily 
entrusted to curb corruption (i.e. Parliament) often turns out to be the main 
culprit. A number of cases demonstrate the existence of systemic corruption in 
the Malawian political system. For example, during the campaign for extending 
presidential term limit in 2003, four cabinet ministers led the campaign ‘Moving 
with a Bag of Money’ to buy off opposition MPs; 22 MPs were ‘abducted’ and 
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more that 40 MPs were allegedly bribed by the regime to support the Third Term 
Bill. One MP, however, refused the MK100,000 bribe and exposed the scam 
(Hussein, 2005). Similarly, when President Mutharika formed the Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP) in 2005 – abandoning the United Democratic Front on 
whose mandate he won the elections – over 70 MPs defected from their parties in 
violation of the Constitution to join the DPP. This mass defection perceivably 
was not free of charge. The MPs were allegedly ‘bought’ to give the Mutharika 
government the support in legislature. And when the UDF made an impeachment 
attempt to oust Mutharika, there were rumours of the former president Mulizi 
arranging large sums of money to buy parliamentary support in that mission.
The death of the sitting President in April 2012 and the subsequent revelation 
of his wealth, which was way beyond what he had declared at the time of taking 
over offi ce in 2009, gave momentum to the debate on declaration of assets by 
public offi ce holders.2 When Vice-President Joyce Banda assumed offi ce following 
a failed coup attempt by President Mutharika’s inner circle, it paved the way for 
some corrective measures to improve governance. In particular, legislative 
oversight was strengthened during this executive transition. Parliament passed 
the much-awaited Assets Declaration Bill, which mounted pressure on public 
offi cials to publicly declare their assets. The legislation also applied to the 
President herself, who was placed under public scrutiny. The Public Appointments 
Committee was reconstituted to include declaration of assets and empowered to 
monitor disclosure of assets under section 88(3) of the Constitution. There was 
considerable demand for the President to declare her assets after assuming offi ce 
in order to provide moral leadership in the fi ght against corruption. However, the 
President refused to comply with this requirement until the very end of the term. 
While Joyce Banda had declared her assets at the time of taking oath for the 
Vice-Presidency, the demand now was for her to declare her assets upon taking 
oath of the offi ce of the President. Her non-compliance was construed as disregard 
for Parliament and also disrespect for the demands of civil society, whose support 
she enjoyed in defeating the coup of Mutharika’s inner circle which attempted to 
prevent her from assuming the presidency following the death of Bingu wa 
Mutharika. The broader conclusion of this saga is the tendency of the executive 
to disregard formal legal requirements in particular and the rule of law in general.
The Assets Declaration Bill contained stringent punitive measures for failure 
to declare assets, including removal of offi cers guilty of non-compliance with the 
law and procedures to impeach the president. The legislation came in the wake 
of ‘Cashgate’ – the biggest corruption scandal ever witnessed in the country, 
which involved misappropriation and theft of an estimated US $20–$100 million 
(Smith, 2015). The scandal became public when Malawi’s budget director was 
shot under mysterious circumstances, and huge sums of cash in both local and 
foreign currency were found in the vehicles and homes of some civil servants, 
most of them low-ranking junior accountants. A British audit fi rm, commissioned 
by DFID, conducted a forensic audit of this scandal. However, when the report 
was submitted to the Public Accounts Committee, it was rejected on the grounds 
that the report was incomplete, as it did not reveal the names of those involved. 
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Indeed, the report did not provide details of transactions and names in order to 
‘limit the risk of prejudicing any current or future legal action’. The report went 
on to state that ‘Where we believe fraud, theft or unethical actions have taken 
place the details have been referred to the relevant Law Enforcement Offi ce of 
the Police and Anti-Corruption Bureau through the Offi ce of the Auditor 
General’ (Baker Tilly Ltd, 2014). The Auditor General’s offi ce subsequently 
provided a similar explanation explained to the parliamentary committee that 
the decision not to disclose intricate details on the case was reached to avoid 
prejudicing any criminal proceedings against those whose deeds were uncovered 
by the forensic audit. The failure to disclose such details, however, did not go 
down well with an increasingly agitated civil society in the country. The umbrella 
organisation of faith bodies, the Public Affairs Committee (PAC), held a 
stakeholders conference, where it demanded that Parliament examine the full 
forensic report together with other controversial issues such as reported loss of 
maize in the country’s grain reserves and the proceeds from the sale of the 
presidential jet. Similarly, a civil society organisation forum demanded an 
emergency sitting of Parliament to take stock of the dire economic situation 
created by the Cashgate scandal.
Challenges facing the legislature
Since the advent of multiparty democracy in Malawi, there has been a visible 
executive dominance over the legislature emanating largely from the presidential 
nature of Malawi’s political regime, which assigns Parliament a secondary role. 
The general framework of executive–parliamentary relations laid down in the 
Constitution provides opportunities for accentuating this subordinate position 
through iterative practices. The persistence of personalised patronage in Malawian 
politics has further entrenched the culture of parliamentary subservience. The 
numerical strength of opposition parties in the legislature since 1994 created a 
situation of adversarial relations between the executive and the legislature, 
whereby the executive felt threatened owing to its relatively small number in the 
legislative body. Consequently, the executive resorted to retaining political 
control by wresting the needed majority through overt and covert means without 
strengthening Parliament as an institution. Most importantly, the strategy 
included denying Parliament the resources necessary to operate, thereby 
transferring control to the executive. The executive further undermined the 
institution by convening parliamentary sessions only when it needed parliamentary 
approval to sanction its operations (e.g. budget approval). Parliamentary 
committees including the meetings of the Standing Committees were held subject 
to availability of funding, and government funds were released only when 
committees were expected to focus and cooperate on an executive-driven agenda.
The continuation of the asymmetry in access to various types of resources 
between the executive and legislative branches is detrimental to Parliament’s 
ability to perform its function. The current situation is one of a well-staffed 
executive with access to expertise and informed by its ministries, while the 
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national assembly relies on an overworked and under-resourced support structure, 
lacking adequate capacity to render much-needed support for legislative functions. 
The executive moreover uses popular items in the budget – creation of a 
constituency fund or an increase in sitting allowances – as instruments to garner 
support from MPs (Patel, 2008).
Since 2005, there has been much focus on giving Parliament the mandate to 
set its own calendar, prepare its own budget and develop institutional capacity 
that is needed to deliver its basic roles and responsibilities. However, a decade 
down the line, the situation is not very different except for the physical structure 
of a Parliament building that was built with aid from the Chinese government. 
Contrary to the provisions of the law, Parliament still does not determine its own 
budget. Each year, it prepares estimates against a credit ceiling predetermined by 
the Ministry of Finance and submits the same to the Treasury. The estimates are 
then included in the national budget, which is presented to Parliament by the 
fi nance minister before the commencement of the next fi nancial year. A recent 
report on strengths and weaknesses of the Malawian Parliament highlights a 
series of weaknesses, including:
• lack of autonomy from the government;
• readiness to set aside established rules and procedures;
• failure to implement operational guidelines;
• nonadherence to the budget;
• individual needs of MPs often override parliamentary service needs in 
relation to available fi nances;
• unclear distinction between political and administrative functions;
• lack of a communication strategy;
• failure to manage suppliers;
• low adoption of technology;
• inadequate offi ce space for MPs and staff; and
• lack of implementation of outreach programmes.
Moreover, the report notes that most MPs lack a clear understanding of what 
parliamentary oversight entails in practice (Gilfi llan, 2015).
Frequent changes of membership moreover pose a major challenge to the 
continuity and functioning of the committee structure (Manzi, 2013). The power 
to appoint and remove committee members rests with the party whips. There is 
no rule that guarantees membership tenure and hence committees witness 
frequent changes in their composition. And, according to the Secretariat, the 
survival of the committees continues to rely largely on the whims of the executive. 
For example, the erratic and inadequate availability of funds from the Treasury 
hinders committees from carrying out their desired activities. As a result, the 
committees almost invariably have a large backlog of reports from the Auditor 
General and fail to implement capacity building programmes for its members and 
the parliamentary secretariat. Although Parliament, through its Parliamentary 
Service Commission (PSC) is mandated to recruit its own staff, the PSC is 
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required to seek authority from the Department of Human Resource Management 
(DHRMD) to fi ll vacant posts.
DHRMD frequently declines to grant the authority to Parliament to fi ll vacant 
posts, resulting in a shortage of staff (Manzi, 2013). Thus, it is often not a matter 
of lack of competence or willingness on the part of MPs to exercise their oversight 
functions, but rather the lack of tangible and operational support (Rotberg and 
Salahub, 2013). For example, the Public Accounts Committee in 2013 was 
wrestling with audit issues from previous years, and was thus best prepared to 
examine and investigate the workings of Malawi’s government and its executive 
branch. Likewise, the Budget Committee was meeting very infrequently and was 
hardly an equal partner with the Minister of Finance and his staff.
Notwithstanding the functionality of the committees, it should be noted that, 
even in cases where the committees have scrutinised cases in the past and found 
proof of misconduct and/or irregularities, no further visible action has been 
forthcoming. Indeed, ministers stepping down on grounds of moral turpitude 
have not been heard of in the Malawian context. In other words, Parliament has 
been able to extract answerability to be some extent from the executive through 
the use of oversight tools but has largely failed to undertake the twin function of 
enforceability in terms of stringent punishment. But securing answerability has 
been in itself useful in raising public awareness and reaction to important and 
sensitive issues.
Conclusion
In its two-decade-long democratic journey, Malawi has faced some serious threats 
to democratic survival but has come out safely and successfully. However, there is 
no guarantee that there will not be future threats of democratic reversals. The 
tendency of elected politicians and leaders to blithely ignore the rule of law and 
get away with impunity persists regardless of party allegiance or educational and 
professional background. On a positive note, however, the strengthened position 
of the independent media offers a glimmer of hope in the same manner as the rise 
of a young and ambitious new middle class. These developments have raised 
demands on formal governmental institutions to deliver development and 
improve public services. It is against this background that the Malawian 
Parliament has demonstrated that it has the potential, and can be an effective 
mechanism, for ensuring accountable governance despite facing numerous 
practical weaknesses. Combatting these weaknesses requires concerted efforts, 
and the emerging positive public attitude towards Parliament in general and 
oversight in particular is an encouraging sign. It is therefore crucial that 
parliamentarians maintain professionalism by focusing on technical scrutiny 
while being detached as much as possible from political wrangles. This will 
require regular and rigorous training on understanding the oversight role of MPs. 
Moreover, MPs who also serve as ministers need to be guided on their 
accountability as ministers not only to the President but also to Parliament. A 
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sense of collective responsibility to Parliament as a cabinet should be demonstrated 
to gain pubic confi dence and trust in government.
Weaknesses in the political party system greatly hinder the functioning of 
democracy at large and of Parliament in particular. Factional politics largely 
emanating from lack of internal party democracy has plagued the Malawian 
Parliament as illustrated with reference to the presidential term limit case. Party 
transformation is a prerequisite for parliamentary transformation. Many scholars 
(e.g. Barkan et al., 2010) argue that legislatures in Africa are undergoing a 
noticeable change in terms of amending rules and procedures to be make 
themselves more robust, build stronger committees, expand professional staff, 
improve communication system so that greater infl uence can be exercised over 
government policies and their oversight responsibilities can be carried out more 
effectively. Thus legislatures in the continent including Malawi are evolving in 
order to enhance their power and function in the overall processes of democratic 
governance.
Notes
1 The BFC pointed out a number of assumptions of the government which were 
unrealistic and therefore untenable such as: the growth of money supply by 12.2 per 
cent in 2008/9. In 2007 money supply grew by 36 per cent due to increased economic 
activity by the private sector. In 2008 with the bank rate declining from 15 per cent to 
12.5 per cent private sector demand for liquidity was likely and price stability was 
unlikely to be maintained. The lack of correlation in 2007 between money supply and 
prices was striking when infl ation remained at 8 per cent while the money supply grew 
by 36 per cent. The committee queried the reliability of infl ation statistics as it did not 
seem to be refl ecting the reality on ground. Extracted from the Malawi Parliamentary 
Observation Reports 2005–8, Institute for Policy Interaction. 5th Meeting 38th 
Session, 11–31 October 2005.
2 Unoffi cial sources say he had MK150 million. The Speaker of the House refused to 
make it public. At the time of his death unoffi cial sources say it was MK61 billion.
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9 The impact of emerging donors 
on development and poverty 
reduction
Dan Banik and Michael Chasukwa
Introduction
The traditional foundations of foreign aid have been numerous. In addition to 
political ideology, foreign policy, commercial interests and national security, 
there are large elements of altruism and a desire to reduce global poverty. The 
world of foreign aid is complex and includes Offi cial Development Assistance 
(ODA, which are concessional fl ows with a grant element of at least 25 per cent) 
and development, humanitarian and emergency aid provided by non-
governmental organizations, civil society organizations, bilateral donors and 
multilateral agencies. Ever since the end of the Second World War, and the 
provision of capital by the United States to Europe, there has been considerable 
interest on the extent to which foreign aid promotes economic development. 
And many contributions, including feminist theory, participatory and human 
rights-based approaches, have challenged the assumption that economic growth 
and market liberalization alone will help to reduce poverty. Indeed, the entire 
concept of assisting poor countries to achieve economic development and social 
welfare has been much debated in recent decades. And the international discourse 
is currently focused on the rapidly changing objectives of aid, the instruments 
used to deliver aid, the effectiveness of aid measured in terms of concrete results, 
the players involved in the aid business, and the institutions governing the 
relationship between developed and developing countries.
In recent years, many of the so-called emerging economies are increasingly 
infl uencing social and economic policies around the world. In particular China, but 
also India, Brazil and South Africa, are interacting in numerous ways with poorer 
countries, including so-called South–South dialogues. These give access to natural 
resources and new and growing markets, and also reduce the dependence of African 
countries on traditional forms of aid from the Global North. These emerging 
countries and their policies represent a counterweight to the policies and 
development aid models that have for long been promoted directly or indirectly 
(e.g. through multilateral institutions) in poor countries by the Global North.
Malawi’s economy is heavily dependent on (Western) foreign aid, which funds 
almost 40 per cent of the national budget. However, China is increasingly 
supporting a wide range of projects (from infrastructure and health to education 
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and agricultural technology) that appear to complement Western efforts to 
promote development and reduce poverty. The purpose of this chapter is to 
critically analyse and highlight the impact of ideas, values and tangible benefi ts 
resulting from China’s engagement in Malawi. Rather than providing budget 
support to governments, and conditioning aid on support for democracy and 
gender equality, the Chinese model has consistently emphasized the principles of 
‘win–win’, ‘mutual respect’, ‘friendship’ and ‘non-interference’. China has further 
projected the idea that state-to-state relations ought to be benefi cial for itself and 
the aid recipient country, and conducive to each other’s national development. 
Hence, it has introduced in public discourse of Malawi terms such as 
‘complementarity’, ‘potential’ and ‘opportunity’.
The aim of this chapter is to provide a more nuanced understanding of the 
nature of foreign aid policies implemented by new donors such as China in 
Malawi. The study is based on fi eldwork carried out in several phases over a 
period of fi ve years during which we interviewed key informants from various 
ministries (e.g. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Trade and Industry), 
business communities in rural areas, civil society organizations, judges in the 
Malawian Supreme and High Courts, journalists and editors, Malawian employees 
involved in Chinese projects and Chinese project staff. We have also examined 
articles appearing in the print media (e.g. The Nation, Weekend Nation, Daily 
Times and Malawi News) as well as online media sources.
Starting with a brief overview of the history of foreign aid in Malawi, we 
examine how and to what extent Chinese aid to Malawi has had a positive impact 
on development and poverty reduction. We argue that Chinese foreign aid and 
investments have contributed signifi cantly to addressing macro-level national 
and community problems. Indeed, Chinese aid is remarkable because it focuses 
on the neglected and ‘orphan’ sectors such as infrastructure and energy. The 
spillover effects of macro-oriented projects have been the generation of new 
employment opportunities and the growth of small and medium-scale business 
enterprises run by Chinese nationals in urban and semi-urban areas where local 
communities have access to a large range of Chinese products at affordable prices. 
The controversies surrounding China’s activities in Malawi primarily relate to 
the inability of local businesses to compete with the Chinese, the quality and 
durability of infrastructure projects and disagreements between the Malawian 
and Chinese governments regarding who should cover the high costs of 
maintaining the Chinese-built infrastructure projects.
Development aid to Malawi: A brief overview
Malawi’s development indicators are not very impressive, and the International 
Monetary Fund ranked the country the second worst performing economy in the 
world in 2013. And in 2015, the World Bank placed Malawi among the poorest 
in the world based on the GDP per capita. Almost 54 per cent of the population 
lives on less than US$1.25 a day, and the country faces an acute shortage of 
foreign exchange, which makes important essential goods, including medicines, 
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extremely diffi cult to access. Moreover, the Malawian economy is highly 
vulnerable to various types of shocks as it is highly dependent on the agriculture 
sector, which generates over 90 per cent of foreign exchange earnings and 
employs around 85 per cent of the population (Chinsinga, 2008).
Tobacco accounts for 60 per cent of the country’s foreign exchange earnings, 
but the weak exporting base in general has put considerable pressure on an 
economy that is otherwise among the fastest growing consumer markets in the 
world (Euromonitor Research, 2014). Indeed, consumer spending grew 18.2 per 
cent in 2014 and total consumer expenditure was expected to reach US$5.6 
billion by the end of 2014, refl ecting spending of on average US$335 per capita. 
The precarious nature of the economy frequently results in budget defi cits, which 
in turn have highlighted the country’s dependence on foreign aid. Thus, aid as a 
share of GNI has averaged around 24 per cent over the past two decades. And 
van der Meer et al. (2008: 17) fi nd that foreign aid as a proportion of the national 
budget averaged 38 per cent over the period 1994–2006, the bulk of which were 
grants which constituted 72 per cent of all foreign aid received. Malawi regularly 
falls short of fi nancial resources to fund government activities, which in turns 
results in greater reliance on support from foreign donor agencies. Much of the 
aid from western countries is directed at supporting the national budget. For 
example, Norway provided NOK50 million in 2013 as budget support to Malawi 
while an additional NOK250 million was provided to the country through other 
actors, including government agencies as well as civil society organizations.1
The interaction between the government and various international 
organizations and donor countries has been consistently fraught with growing 
tension. While the government has complained of erratic disbursement patterns 
that have an adverse impact on its ability to deliver effective public service, 
donors have often frozen or cancelled aid allocations following allegations of 
mismanagement and large-scale corruption in the public services. Budget support 
was fi rst suspended in 2002 and then in 2003, 2011 and 2013 due to concerns 
about abuse of resources. For example, between 2002 and 2005, the Danish 
Government froze all its aid to Malawi because of allegations of widespread 
corruption and fi nancial mismanagement. A group of donors – the Common 
Budgetary Support Group (CABS) – suspended aid in 2003 when president 
Bakili Muluzi was trying his utmost to amend the Constitution that would allow 
him to extend the constitutionally provided two-term offi ce to a third term. 
CABS once again suspended aid during president Bingu wa Mutharika’s second 
term in offi ce (2009 to mid-2012) on the grounds of worsening economic and 
political governance, which included several controversial pieces of legislation 
and executive decisions such as the amendment of the penal code (Injunctions 
Bill), amendment of the Media Bill and postponement of local government 
elections. Similarly, Germany froze its general budget support in 2011 because of 
Malawi’s reluctance to improve local governance and be fi nancially prudent 
(Resnick, 2012).
Following the now infamous ‘Cashgate’ scandal in 2013 – where public offi cials 
were accused of siphoning off more than US$30 million – several donors 
150 Dan Banik and Michael Chasukwa
suspended budget support as well as reduced their aid allocations to Malawi. 
Thus, the CABS and other key donors suspended their budget support in 2013–
14, and are currently non-committal of supporting the national budget in the 
immediate future until Cashgate as well as other previous scandals (e.g. 
undocumented use of US$200 million by the Democratic People’s Party 
government in 2005) are resolved. The aid regime in Malawi has thus been 
characterized by withdrawals and suspensions. Indeed, every political leader in 
charge of the country since the onset of democracy in 1994 has faced numerous 
challenges in dealing with the donor community. And, in all cases of suspension 
and withdrawal of aid, donors have cited mismanagement of resources, poor 
political and economic governance and violation of human rights.
Aid volatility is also high because of the sheer number of donors implementing 
various projects in Malawi. According to some estimates, there are over 31 donors 
providing offi cial development assistance in Malawi with nearly 800 aid projects 
covering 2,900 activities (Weaver et al., 2014). Another source, the Malawi 
Government Aid Atlas (Malawi Government,, 2014b), puts the fi gure of 
development partners at 38 ‘including 10 United Nations funds, programmes 
and agencies; 16 bi-lateral donor agencies and a collection of 12 multilateral and 
other bodies’ (Taylor, 2014). The negative effects of aid withdrawal and 
suspension by the traditional donors have been partially offset by fi nancial support 
from the emerging donors. A quick glance of the budget atlas shows that China 
committed approximately US$96 million in the 2010/11 fi nancial year, and half 
of this amount was disbursed as loans. Similarly, India disbursed another US$73 
million and Arab donors contributed US$19 million in the same period (Malawi 
Government, 2014b).
The arrival of the new donors
The architecture of development aid has changed dramatically in the past decade, 
and there are numerous new entrants in the aid industry. These new donors 
include many so-called ‘emerging countries’ such as China, India, South Korea, 
Thailand, Turkey, Brazil, Russia, South Africa, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait 
and Venezuela (Woods, 2008; Callan et al., 2013). The Busan Partnership for 
Effective Development Cooperation (2011) emphasized the need to recognize 
emerging country donors because of the substantial amounts of aid that they are 
willing to provide to developing countries and the resulting change of the rules of 
the game in terms of aid modalities. Thus, Callan et al. (2013) fi nd that the 
contribution of emerging donors to aid aimed at developing countries is currently 
7–10 per cent of all aid provided. Chinese aid alone is estimated to be in the 
range of US$2–3 billion annually (Lengauer, 2011: 5) whereas Saudi Arabia 
provided US$5 billion in 2011 (Callan et al., 2013).
China has been one of the most dominant actors in relation to providing aid 
and undertaking investments in Africa. However, China is not a new actor in 
Africa, having been active on the continent for several decades. Nonetheless, its 
activities – and the volume of aid and related activity – have dramatically 
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increased, and China is now Africa’s largest trading partner with a substantial aid 
and investment portfolio in virtually every country on the continent. China’s 
development aid and investment activity has, over the years, been the subject of 
much scholarly attention. Most western analyses of China in Africa have, 
however, been overwhelmingly negative, focusing on the controversies around 
the blurred boundaries between aid and investments, the lack of transparency on 
aid practices, and the lack of focus on democracy, human rights and gender 
equality. The Chinese government insists that the assistance it provides to 
African countries is not based on charity, but rather on the principles of ‘win–
win’, ‘non-interference’, ‘mutual respect’ and ‘friendship’, underscored by China 
fulfi lling its obligations of international solidarity with developing countries 
(Banik, 2013: 7). The general framework of how development aid should be 
delivered from China to African countries is discussed and stipulated in 
proceedings of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) established 
in 2000. The actual details guiding bilateral agreement are discussed by Chinese 
and African government offi cials; more specifi cally by offi cials from the political 
leadership in the recipient country and, in Beijing, the Ministry of Commerce, 
Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The recipient country usually submits to the Chinese embassy a list of 
development projects that it wishes China to fund. The list is sent to Beijing, and 
the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) makes a decision regarding the number 
and type of projects it will fund. The list is then sent back to the recipient country 
government upon which both parties agree on the exact nature of Chinese 
assistance that will be provided – the volume of grants, the exact terms of 
concessional loans and the extent of investment activities by Chinese state-
owned enterprises. By funding projects at the request of the recipient country, 
China believes that, unlike western donors, it operates within the national 
development policy of the recipient country and thereby does not impose any 
restrictions or conditionalities. In trying to practice a ‘win–win’ relationship, 
China exercises ‘soft power;’ which embraces elements of grants, soft loans and 
cultural diplomacy (Ramo, 2004; Breslin, 2011; Li et al., 2014) without the typical 
requirements of democratic accountability and fi nancial transparency that 
characterizes western aid disbursements (Halper, 2010).
China’s development aid practices have often been praised by African leaders 
for its fl exibility and friendliness when compared to the practices of western 
donors. For example, former Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade noted that 
China ‘offers the same things Europe has been offering at a better price with 
excellent conditions and with absence of intrusive conditionalities’ (cited in 
Opoku-Mensah, 2009: 13). Other politicians and civil servants have similarly 
been grateful for much-needed capital that the Chinese have injected into local 
African economies in addition to improving infrastructural capacity through 
construction of roads, schools, hotels, universities, bridges, parliament buildings 
and presidential palaces. The rhetoric in most western countries has, however, 
been one of suspicion, questioning the true motives of China, and the western 
media has been quick to label Chinese aid practices as an important component 
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of China’s imperialist strategy with the aim of satisfying its hunger for natural 
resources and establishing itself as a global superpower. Accordingly, many 
traditional donors have lamented the lack of emphasis by the Chinese on good 
governance and respect for human rights, including respect for the rights of 
women and homosexuals – typically matters on which the West and Africa 
continue to disagree. Thus, China has from time to time been variously labelled 
a ‘rogue donor’ for providing aid that promotes authoritarianism, deepens 
patronage and encourages non-transparency (Naim, 2007; Lengauer, 2011). 
Others have argued that Chinese aid modalities in Africa have weakened local 
institutions (Moss et al., 2006), and that while the Paris Declaration of 2005 
stresses mutual accountability and transparency of parties, Chinese policies have 
sometimes used soft power to block western aid to African countries. For example, 
China is accused of blocking ODA from the World Bank to Nigeria in 2007 
when the two parties, after prolonged negotiations, had agreed to a US$5 million 
project to upgrade the national railway system. Apparently, just before the 
agreement could be signed, China offered the Nigerian government US$9 billion 
to radically improve the entire national railway network: an agreement based on 
‘no bids, no conditions, and no need to reform’ (Naim, cited in Lengauer, 2011: 
28). Some have therefore argued that emerging donors such as China are reluctant 
to participate in pooled funds, which require transparency and accountability.
China in Malawi
After decades of receiving development aid from Taiwan, Malawi switched its 
diplomatic ties to China in December 2005. By aligning itself with China, Malawi 
was able, like the rest of Africa, to access substantial grants, concessional loans, 
private sector investments and technical assistance on a scale much larger than 
what Taiwan was willing to offer. While government offi cials and even certain 
local communities have praised China for being ‘a friend in need, and a friend 
indeed’, some quarters of Malawian society have been critical of the so-called 
‘new colonist’ and ‘new imperialist’ motives behind China’s generosity 
(Makwerere and Chipaike, 2012; Ayodele and Sotola, 2014).
With traditional donors withdrawing or holding back vital budget support on 
the grounds of fi nancial mismanagement and lack of confi dence in domestic 
public fi nancial management systems, China’s importance in Malawi has risen 
considerably. The withdrawal (albeit temporary) of traditional aid has pushed 
Malawi to further cement diplomatic ties with China – a move signalled by 
current president Peter Mutharika, who in his 2014 inaugural speech stated, ‘We 
will continue with traditional relationships, but we are now looking for new 
friends in emerging economies such as Brazil, China, India, South Africa and 
Russia.’2 The current political discourse in the country gives the impression that 
the ‘Look East’ policy will continue to preoccupy the minds of the Malawian 
political leadership as several ministers are worried that traditional donors will 
not resume their aid practices anytime soon. The fi nance minister made the 
following observation in October 2015:
The impact of emerging donors 153
I would like to emphasize this very strongly. We should not proceed on the 
premise that the donors will come back soon with their budgetary support 
purses … I would have diffi culty in proceeding on the basis of expecting 
bilateral donors to come back.3
The statement of the fi nance minister followed a state visit to China by the 
president of Malawi in September 2015, and the president’s subsequent meetings 
with a high-powered delegation from China at the African Union Summit in 
Ethiopia as well as interactions with visiting government and business delegations 
from China to Malawi. Moreover, several ministers have in the recent past visited 
China at regular intervals to cement the ties between Lilongwe and Beijing.
Accessing information about the scale and magnitude of Chinese development 
assistance is extremely diffi cult, as China does not publish aid data for specifi c 
countries and sectors. As such, we have had to rely on news reports and offi cial 
speeches of Chinese offi cials, which highlight four overarching ‘pillars’ of 
assistance to Malawi:
• infrastructure development;
• agriculture and food security;
• health and medical care; and
• education and human resources.
On paper at least, these correspond relatively well to the six priority areas of 
Malawi’s Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS):
• agriculture and food security;
• irrigation and water development;
• transport and infrastructure development; energy generation and supply;
• integrated rural development; and
• prevention and management of nutrition disorders, HIV and AIDS 
(Government of Malawi, 2006).
Based on available information, it appears that China has stuck closely to the 
clearly defi ned set of activities categorized under the four pillars mentioned 
above. Successive Chinese ambassadors and visiting delegations have conveyed 
the message that ‘business is business’ and that Malawi should strive for social and 
political stability in order to achieve economic development (Banik, 2013). And, 
while we believe China indeed does not impose aid conditionalities in the 
manner in which western donors do, it is apparent that adherence to the One 
China principle is key to the China–Malawi relationship. Banik (2013) examined 
a large number of speeches, media reports and policy documents relating to China 
in Malawi and concludes that six broad sets of features characterize China’s 
relationship with Malawi:
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• predictable aid from a ‘sincere friend’ and a ‘reliable partner’, despite fi nancial 
crises and global challenges;
• assistance based on ‘visible and tangible results’, with priority given to 
so-called ‘landmark’ infrastructure projects that instil a sense of national 
pride and progress;
• Malawi is considered to be a special case of assistance, as China has seldom 
made such a large commitment to a country within such a short span of time;
• expectations on the volume of aid is kept at a realistic level with Chinese 
offi cials typically insisting that China is the world’s largest developing 
country, and must continue to address poverty reduction within its own 
borders;
• the leadership of Malawi (irrespective of ruling party) is effusively praised for 
its vision to promote better ties with China and promote economic 
development;
• China portrays its assistance to Malawi as a result of its international 
responsibility or show of solidarity with the world’s poor.
In the ensuing sections of this chapter, we will examine the impact of Chinese 
assistance on economic development in Malawi, structured around the following 
categories:
• addressing the fi nance and technical gap;
• promoting infrastructure development; and
• interrogating non-interventionist policy and development aid modalities.
Although China is active in numerous sectors, our focus in this chapter is on the 
infrastructure development component, which has been the most signifi cant and 
visible part of Chinese aid practices in Malawi.
Addressing the development fi nance and technical cooperation gap
Malawi’s switch of diplomatic relations from Taiwan to China was motivated by 
a number of reasons including casting the net wider for development fi nances. 
Malawi did not participate in the third Forum on China–Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC) held in November 2006, where 48 African countries (out of the then 
53 countries) that had diplomatic relations with China took part with most of the 
countries represented by heads of states themselves. This was a big blow to Malawi 
because the implication was that Malawi would not benefi t from the new type of 
strategic partnership that China pledged. Indeed, the FOCAC meeting declared 
that not only would China double its aid to Africa by 2009, but that it would 
establish a range of instruments to further African development:
• establish a China–Africa Development Fund to promote investments by 
Chinese companies in Africa;
• provide preferential loans and preferential buyer’s credits;
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• cancel all debt incurred from Chinese interest-free government loans that 
had matured by 2005;
• open Chinese markets for exports from 31 highly indebted and least 
developed countries in Africa;
• radically increase the number of Chinese government scholarships earmarked 
for African students; and
• increase the number of senior agricultural experts and youth volunteers sent 
on deputation to Africa; and build rural schools and hospitals.4
The diplomatic ties between China and Malawi, which commenced a year after 
the third FOCAC, opened the taps of development fi nancing and technical 
cooperation opportunities. The fi rst round of China–Malawi negotiations resulted 
in agreement on an assistance portfolio consisting of grants, concessional loans 
and contractor-investor package amounting to more than US$1.056 billion for 
the period 2008–12 (Banik, 2013: 11). With such a massive resource infl ow, 
pressure on the Malawian government was somewhat released given that budget 
support from western donors became increasingly unpredictable. In addition to 
fi lling the fi nancial gap, Chinese development assistance during 2008–12 was 
directly or indirectly crucial in alleviating the macroeconomic problems that 
Malawi was facing manifested in the shortage of foreign exchange and fuel.
China has also been fl exible in assisting Malawi to implement its development 
projects and responding to emerging issues. Thus, Malawi has benefi ted from 
extra grants and soft loans outside the fi rst round negotiation framework as 
determined by circumstances on the ground. For instance, China approved a 
US$500,000 grant in December 2014 for the China–Malawi–UNDP Disaster 
Management and Risk Reduction project to help support poor and vulnerable 
communities located within Malawi’s 15 identifi ed disaster-prone districts. 
Malawi also subsequently received several grants (US$25 million and US$16 
million) and an interest-free loan (US$8 million) in January 2015.5
In October 2015, a second round of negotiations between the two countries 
was concluded during President Mutharika’s offi cial visit to China with Malawi 
being promised a development assistance package worth US$2 billion. This latest 
round of negotiations on fi nance and technical cooperation has come at a critical 
juncture, when traditional donors have withdrawn their budget support and the 
Malawian government is facing enormous challenges in providing essential 
public services. The development package covers different sectors and ministries, 
and encompass infrastructure development, education, capacity building, defence 
and security, and agriculture. Following this new package of benefi ts, the president 
of Malawi has repeatedly praised China for being a ‘true and trusted friend’.6
Infrastructure development
The Chinese have registered their presence in Malawi much more in the 
infrastructure sector than in any other sector. However, it is the Malawian 
government that has in reality emphasised this focus on infrastructure. On their 
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part, the Chinese have lived up to their promise of negotiating and funding 
projects at the request of the recipient country, guided by the principle of non-
interference. Interviews with key government offi cials, professionals and 
politicians indicate that China’s involvement in infrastructure development in 
Malawi is not a one-sided affair. For the Chinese, infrastructure projects are 
commercially viable because they open up markets for the supply of goods. Such 
projects also encourage the Chinese private sector to diversify its geographical 
scope, investment outlay and business opportunities. Moreover, China has 
demonstrated throughout the world that they have sophisticated organizational 
capacity to undertake large and complex projects. In Africa alone, the so-called 
‘stadium diplomacy’ strategy of the Chinese has reaped rich dividends in the form 
of grateful local populations who are thrilled by the sight of soccer stadiums 
recently constructed in Cameroon, Mozambique, Tanzania, Ghana, Angola, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ivory Coast, and Zambia.7 Similarly, agricultural 
technology demonstration centres (ATDCs) – which provide training and 
exposure to high-yielding varieties of seeds and effective agricultural practices – 
have been constructed in Mozambique, Liberia, Mali, Cameroon, Senegal, 
Sudan, Uganda, Togo, Sierra Leone, Mauritania, Democratic Republic of Congo 
and Guinea.8 In other parts of Africa – including Malawi, Egypt, Ethiopia and 
Tanzania – hotels and international conference centres have been constructed in 
order to boost tourism.
Tables 9.1 and 9.2 provide an overview of the major projects undertaken in 
Malawi with assistance from China, including a newly constructed ATDC in 
Salima (Malawi) and a conference centre and stadium in Lilongwe. The Chinese 
package to Malawi has also involved projects fi nanced by private and quasi-state 
institutions such as the Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Company, which 
built the SAGECOA Golden Peacock hotel in Lilongwe. Other projects 
involving the Chinese include the Balaka Cotton Plantation and Processing 
project funded by China–Africa Development Fund, expansion of Chileka 
international airport in Blantyre and the construction of the Kam’mwamba coal-
fi red plant, both fi nanced by Export–Import Bank of China but implemented by 
Gezhouba Group Corporation.
Most Malawians, who see visible and tangible results of the cooperation with 
China, have celebrated the spate of infrastructure projects implemented in the 
country. Such projects are also a boon for national and local politicians, who 
believe the construction of much-needed infrastructure helps them gain political 
mileage with their constituents. A cabinet minister we interviewed indicated 
that ‘visibility is important in politics and the Chinese understand this element 
… The Chinese are wonderful because they are helping us with tangible projects 
that people can see for themselves.’9 President Mutharika has also recently 
observed that ‘Malawi is most grateful for tangible and visible projects fi nanced 
by China … These are transforming our country for the better.’10 Similar 
sentiments have been expressed in the past by different political fi gures, including 
former president Bakili Muluzi, who was extremely sceptical of invisible projects 
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when he famously argued that ‘Democracy alone is not enough … Malawians 
don’t eat democracy’.11 It is thus becoming evident that the political leadership of 
Malawi increasingly prefers Chinese development assistance rather than western 
aid. China is viewed to provide much-needed ‘hardware’ development projects as 
opposed to ‘software’ development interventions that traditional donors fund.
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Chinese assistance for infrastructure development has also received support 
from professional bodies. For example, the Economics Association of Malawi 
recently argued in favour of Chinese aid when it came out with the following 
statement:
If we don’t borrow, will we be able to construct an airport? It is a fact we 
cannot raise our own resources and the loans will be for good intentions such 
as Blantyre District Hospital. Only if we were borrowing for consumption, 
then we would be in trouble.12
A recent project that has been widely praised within the country is the Malawi 
University of Science and Technology (MUST), constructed on a private stretch 
of land donated by former president Bingu wa Mutharika. Built with a concessional 
loan of US$80 million from China, MUST opened its doors to students in October 
2014 with the aim of improving access to higher education. For many years, the 
country’s three public universities – University of Malawi, Mzuzu University and 
Lilongwe University of Science and Technology – were struggling with capacity 
constraints, and large groups of qualifi ed students were excluded from enrolment. 
With an enrolment capacity of 5,000 students (only 452 students had been 
admitted as of October 2015),13 MUST offers relatively new academic programmes 
in Malawi that are closely aligned with the Malawi Growth Development Strategy 
(MGDS II) and aimed at transforming Malawi from an importing to an exporting 
nation by exploring and expanding the manufacturing, processing and mineral 
sectors. Thus, a long term goal for MUST is to offer undergraduate and postgraduate 
degrees in technology and business-related fi elds, chemical engineering, medical 
bioengineering, metallurgy and mineral processing engineering, earth sciences, 
meteorology and climate science, innovation and entrepreneurship.14
Controversies about MUST being constructed on private land and perceived 
as a ‘patronage’ project for people in Thyolo district (home of both former and 
incumbent presidents) have been mitigated by national strategic reasons. The 
government has realized that fuelling the manufacturing and export agendas 
require well-trained personnel – a scarce resource in Malawi. MUST was thus 
commissioned to develop a highly skilled workforce which could adapt available 
technology to local situations. Furthermore, as Malawi is diversifying revenue 
resources, the minerals sector has become a priority although the country faces a 
major shortage of skilled workers.
Overall, borrowing from the Chinese for infrastructure development projects 
has the acceptance of a large number of Malawians primarily because of the 
resulting employment opportunities such projects create. These projects, apart 
from providing increased possibilities for job seekers, also make important 
contributions towards improving access to public services. They also additionally 
have important spill-over effects by stimulating economic growth in local 
communities where the investments are located. It comes therefore as no surprise 
that Malawi has continued to heavily support infrastructure development projects 
also in the second phase of its development assistance cooperation with China.
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Domestic antagonism: A recipe for invoking 
‘non-interference’ policy?
China’s aid and investments has been largely applauded by African leaders, who 
value the focus on infrastructure development as well as the Chinese policy of 
non-interference in the politics of their countries. The ‘non-interference’ policy 
has, unsurprisingly, attracted criticism from the traditional donors who argue that 
China is returning African countries to the age of dictatorship and bad governance 
(Collier, 2007; Wilkin, 2011). Similar concerns have also been raised in Malawi.
Trade between Malawi and China has increased following commencement of 
the diplomatic relations in 2008. Indeed, the volume of trade jumped from 
US$42.8 million in 2008 to US$250 million in 2013.15 However, by accounting 
for 18 per cent of all imports, there is a trade imbalance as China is currently 
ranked second in terms of countries from which Malawi imports various goods 
and services. China’s percentage share of trade with Malawi has been consistently 
high – 93 per cent in 2009, 86 per cent in 2011 and 82 per cent in 2012.16 The 
main benefi ts of the considerable increase of imports from China to the Malawian 
market have primarily been access to cheap goods for large groups of the urban 
and rural groups. The Chinese have also changed the market landscape for the 
better with an element of competition, which they have introduced in the local 
economy. Except for the construction projects that typically tend to bring senior 
managers and skilled workers from China, Chinese development projects have 
attracted numerous Chinese companies to invest in Malawi, thereby promoting 
employment generation. As of 2012, there were 196 companies from China 
registered in Malawi in the following sectors: manufacturing (132), tourism (15), 
services (37), agriculture/farming (8), import and distribution (1), building and 
borehole drilling (2) and mining (1).17
The rapid increase of trade relations between China and Malawi has not been 
without friction and antagonism. The infl ux of Chinese workers and small-time 
traders in the country has resulted in a small but growing amount of resentment 
among the local population, often amplifi ed by sensational stories appearing in 
the media highlighting abuse of privileges as well as economic crimes committed. 
For example, some Chinese nationals have been caught breaking the law – trying 
to externalize foreign exchange,18 copying trademarked Malawian products19 and 
violating workers’ rights.20 Local business owners have complained of having to 
face stiff competition from Chinese colleagues who not only have well-stocked 
shops, but also offer products at extremely affordable prices. A retailer in Karonga 
district – where the business community staged demonstrations against the 
Chinese in August 2015 – had the following to say: ‘This place is a hive of activity 
since it is a border area. Business used to be good until the Chinese invaded us, 
bringing cheap goods and taking away our customers.’21
Protests by the business community forced the government to enact a law 
banning foreigners trading in rural areas. The Business Licensing Act (2012) 
aimed at protecting local businesses by allowing foreign traders to do business 
only in the cities of Lilongwe, Blantyre, Mzuzu and Zomba. The new legislation 
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also required foreign traders to apply for a business permit that stipulates the 
nature and type of businesses they are allowed to conduct. Such applications are 
to be scrutinized by the Chief Business Licensing Offi cer and approved by the 
Investment Approval Committee, requiring that the applicants deposit a 
minimum of US$250,000 with Malawi’s central bank as initial capital.22
The Chinese government supported the Malawian government’s decision to 
ban foreign traders from operating in the rural areas on grounds that it was within 
the legal mandate of Malawi government to do what was best for its citizens. In 
the interest of keeping their non-interference policy intact, the Chinese 
ambassador to Malawi observed:
It is up to the Malawi government to thoroughly screen the Chinese nationals 
willing to invest in the country. These are small vendors and why should the 
Malawi government allow them to do business? They are capitalising on 
government’s failure to screen foreign traders.23
China has also been cautious about the damage that small-time Chinese vendors 
can unleash on its public image. However, to what extent China will keep 
avoiding interference in Malawian domestic affairs is unclear. For example, the 
Chinese embassy issued a warning in December 2014 stating that Chinese 
investors would relocate to neighbouring countries following growing insecurity 
of Chinese nationals in Malawi. For a poor country like Malawi that is struggling 
to bring traditional donors back, the above threats may be understood in some 
quarters as an indirect way of ‘interfering’ with local affairs.
Implications for aid modalities
Malawi is a signatory to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness that calls for 
ownership, harmonization, alignment, managing for results and mutual 
accountability in relation to foreign aid (Owa, 2011). It is also a party to other aid 
agreements (e.g. the Accra Agenda for Action, the Busan Partnership for 
Effective Development Cooperation) that are aimed at curbing aid proliferation 
and fragmentation as well as extracting commitments from donors and recipients 
to use aid for intended purposes. The aid effectiveness declarations have been 
domesticated through different policy frameworks including the Malawi 
Development Cooperation Strategy (2014–16), which outlines the preferred 
means of delivery resources from the Global North to include:
• general budget support;
• sector budget support and programme-based support;
• basket funds/trust funds;
• project support to government;
• project support channelled through NGOs or directly administered funds; 
and
• technical assistance and commodity aid (Malawi Government, 2014: 38–9).
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Budget support remains the preferred aid modality for most African governments 
as the funds go direct into the public fi nancial management system, over which 
the government exercises substantial control. China, however, does not provide 
its development assistance to Malawi through such channels. Moreover, China is 
not a member of any group of donors such as the CABS discussed earlier. Neither 
does it contribute to basket funds where donors pool their resources to fund a 
project/programme using government or NGO structures. And, although it is 
currently involved in an FAO trust fund with activities in Malawi, Chinese 
development assistance is primarily delivered through concrete projects. The 
Chinese government as well as contracted companies and investors use their own 
bank accounts and fi nancial management systems, which are very different from 
those of the Malawian government. Moreover, the concessional loans provided 
by the Exim Bank of China are extremely risk averse, and, in striving to meet 
targets on time and ensure quality and cost effectiveness, the Chinese are wary of 
using the apparatus of the Malawian government. The Chinese model in reality 
has a very explicit business component, as borne out in the institution entrusted 
to lead the aid process in Beijing – the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Commerce 
(Li et al., 2014). Interestingly, despite its obvious preference for budget support, 
the Malawian Government is not pushing for budget support from China, perhaps 
realizing that the Chinese will never consider the budget support option.
Although project-based aid by the Chinese has resulted in considerable 
benefi ts for Malawi primarily in terms of employment generation, it is not without 
problems as it has revived some of the failed aid modalities of the 1960s. For 
example, the World Bank admitted in the 1980s that 75 per cent of its agricultural 
projects in Africa had failed (Hancock, 1989). The dismal performance of project 
aid was a result of lack of ownership (well-designed technical projects that missed 
local input) and a lack of participation by the local constituents. The Chinese 
version of project aid has been relatively more successful primarily because it has 
been closely tied to commercial activity, which also ensures that projects are 
completed on time. For example, the Bingu International Conference Centre 
and an adjoining fi ve-star hotel and presidential villas were completed 10 months 
ahead of schedule (Banik, 2013). For the few projects that missed the schedule, 
the problems have been internal: shortage of regular electricity,24 theft of materials 
at the construction site25 and shortage of fuel.
Our interactions with civil society organizations, media persons and 
government offi cials have provided many valid arguments in support of China 
bypassing governmental structures on grounds. As one respondent argued:
The Chinese make use of every second available. You agree on timelines and 
they deliver. If their projects were forced to go through our public structures, 
they would have been stuck with procurement procedures and would have 
been severely delayed.26
The Cashgate scandal and subsequent withdrawal of budget support by CABS 
and other donors have strengthened the case for increased project aid from 
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China. Ironically, traditional donors have now begun channeling their aid 
through specifi c civil society-run projects, not very unlike the Chinese model, 
having lost faith in the public administration of Malawi to deliver aid-supported 
services effectively. Thus on a visit to Malawi in June 2015, the UK minister of 
development announced a major increase in DfID Malawi’s bilateral programmes 
in 2015 including a ‘broad portfolio of investments’.27 This aid, the minister 
observed, was aimed at NGOs, multilateral institutions and civil society 
organizations; and not intended for the Malawian government as the UK 
government could not risk channelling such large funds through government 
fi nancial systems.28
The Chinese model, however, is not without its limitations. For example, the 
simplifi ed and short-term oriented Chinese model of undertaking all activities on 
its own (mainly through tenders granted to Chinese private sector actors) is 
proving diffi cult to manage. The government of Malawi, like many other African 
nations, is demanding longer-term commitments from China, including support 
for the maintenance of recently completed infrastructure projects. At the same 
time, China is facing growing pressure to align its activities with other donors, 
including those from the west as well as emerging economies. There are also 
several initiatives afoot where China is collaborating with multilateral 
organizations (e.g. though fi nancing of strategic trust funds) and others in 
so-called trilateral initiatives implemented in Africa. All of these trends appear 
to be moving the Chinese model closer to western aid modalities. However, 
without a dedicated aid agency – such as the UK’s DfID, Norway’s Norad or 
Sweden’s SIDA – China will fi nd it diffi cult to undertake increasingly complex 
tasks associated with its aid and investments around the world. There is also 
growing worry within Africa that with the global economic slowdown and lower 
projected growth rates of the Chinese economy, development fi nancing from 
China will be sharply reduced in the near future.
Conclusion
China’s development assistance strategy in Malawi is based on very different 
practices and procedures from that provided for in the Paris Declaration. Indeed, 
unlike most western donors, China does not abide by the principles of 
harmonization, alignment and managing results. The Chinese aid and investment 
strategies primarily function in isolation to the strategies of other activities in the 
fi eld (i.e. are not harmonized) and China does not participate in providing basket 
funds. Similarly, China avoids involving the Malawian administrative service in 
the implementation of its projects, preferring to continue with a strategy of 
involving Chinese contractors, some of whom go on to make substantial 
investments of their own in the country upon completion of their contracts.
Despite the rhetoric often found in western media outlets, we do not fi nd 
substantial evidence to indicate that western donors and the Chinese are 
competing in Africa. Rather, the picture that emerges from our study is that 
western donors accept that they and China are involved in very different sectors 
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and very different types of activities. Although China also provides aid directed 
at the agricultural and medical sectors, in addition to stipends and grants for 
travel to China, this chapter has mainly highlighted Chinese activities related to 
infrastructural projects implemented in the country. The Chinese neither support 
the Malawian government through budget support nor explicitly promote 
democratic consolidation or gender equality. Therefore, western donors believe 
that their activities usefully complement those of China in Malawi. However, the 
Chinese believe their aid practices are much more in tune with what Malawi 
requires, rather than western practices that seek to impose western values and 
conditionalities on the recipient country.
What does cause concern and results in suspicion among both western actors as 
well as sections of Malawian society is the secrecy that exists in the Chinese aid 
management system. Without transparency in relation to disbursement patterns 
and volume of aid earmarked for certain activities, it is often diffi cult to understand 
Chinese strategies and practices. It also becomes diffi cult to evaluate the impact of 
Chinese activities in the absence of a dedicated aid agency and an evaluation 
department that can undertake impact evaluations. Moreover, without the active 
involvement of Chinese civil society organizations, the decisions by the Chinese 
government are not scrutinized with the aim of making aid policies even more 
effective. The secrecy in aid practices creates other problems, most importantly 
the lack of predictability in the recipient country administrative apparatus. For 
example, after the Malawian president had recently briefed the media regarding a 
new development assistance package from China worth US$1.3 billion, the 
fi nance ministry was unable to provide specifi c details of the arrangement including 
the repayment period of the concessional loan and the interest rates applicable.29
We have argued that, to a large extent, Chinese aid is working in Malawi and 
is making substantial contributions to development and employment generation 
in tune with local needs. As the foreign minister of Malawi recently observed, 
‘Today, we have no doubt that the decision (to switch diplomatic ties) was made 
for a good cause, especially looking at what China has done to this country’.30 
The availability of alternatives to western aid has been a blessing for Malawi, 
which now can approach several donors simultaneously. Despite the overall 
positive picture, the volume of Chinese aid to Malawi remains low, and most of 
the large projects are funded through concessional loans. As Chinese fi rms gain a 
stronger footing in Malawi, it will be interesting to follow the extent to which 
their business practices are in tune with national development priorities.
Chinese aid can indeed be a window of opportunity for Malawi as it seeks to 
reduce its aid dependency as well as demand different types of support from those 
traditional donors that choose to continue their presence in the country. As 
Whitfi eld and Frazer (2010) and Woods (2008) argue, developing countries can 
often exercise ‘reverse conditionality’ and enhance negotiation power by carefully 
making use of evolving domestic factors in their relations with external donors 
and multilateral institutions. The constant threat of the withdrawal of western 
aid may well provide the Malawian government with an incentive to exercise 
stronger control over its development trajectory.
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When Malawi gained independence in 1964, with Kamuzu Banda as its fi rst 
president, the country quickly reverted to a one-party state. Banda’s administration 
limited the rights and freedoms of Malawians while concentrating enormous 
power in the hands of the president. Although the president frequently referred 
to himself as a staunch defender of women rights, very little in terms of improving 
the welfare of women was achieved in the three decades during which he ruled 
the country. Indeed, there was a complete absence of legislation introduced in 
parliament aimed at promoting the interests of women in the social-political 
arena. Ironically, it was during Banda’s rule that Malawi signed the Convention 
on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 
1979. Civil society organisations and related networks were virtually non-
existent, except for a few affi liated with the ruling Malawi Congress Party (MCP). 
Apart from the MCP’s own Women’s League, women were also encouraged to 
join and be active in the Chitukuko Cha Amayi muMalawi (CCAM) – an 
organisation run by one of Banda’s closest confi dants, Mama Tamanda Kadzamira. 
CCAM was established as a charity in 1985 and started off as a sub-organisation 
of MCP’s League of Malawi Women (Tengatenga, 2006). The literal translation 
of its name is ‘Women’s development in Malawi’. It therefore mainly focused on 
the women’s developmental issues. In this regard, it disbursed small business 
loans and provided vocational training to women for income generation activities 
(Green and Baden, 1994). In the long run, its identity became blurred as it was 
partially incorporated in the mainstream government structure with a Principal 
Secretary of the organisation being represented in the Offi ce of the President and 
Cabinet. Since the organisation was deemed to be too close to the MCP, it didn’t 
survive after the 1994 multiparty elections.
The absence of a vibrant civil society was a major obstacle towards promoting 
the idea of gender equality in the country until 1994, when Malawi embraced 
democracy and a multiparty system. The current Constitution of Malawi 
highlights several provisions that relate to promotion of gender equality and 
women’s rights. Specifi cally, the Constitution prohibits discrimination in any 
form on grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
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nationality, ethnic or social origin, disability, property, birth or other status. 
Although Malawi has over the years passed several important pieces of legislation 
supporting the rights of women, translating these into practice in order to secure 
social, political and economic benefi ts has remained a major challenge. However 
the presence and acknowledgement of several networks, coalitions and alliance 
of actors – that regularly fi ght for gender equality in the country – has brought 
renewed hope (White, 2007; Kanyongolo and Wadonda-Chirwa, 2009).
This chapter focuses on the 2009 and 2014 parliamentary elections in Malawi, 
with a particular focus on the interplay between gender, media and culture. A 
gender equality campaign (also known as the 50:50 campaign) – which was 
launched by the Ministry of Women and Child Development (MoWCD) in 
collaboration with NGO Gender Coordination Network (NGOGCN) – was 
aimed at increasing the number of women representatives in parliament. In the 
spirit of the 1995 Beijing conference, the campaign recognised the media as a 
major player towards achieving the goal of gender equality. This is evident in the 
fact that a special media task force was established to facilitate and coordinate 
activities. It is generally agreed that media plays a critical role in shaping political 
views and social behaviour and that the media has the potential of dramatising 
and legitimatising the forces of political power. It is this perceived notion, that 
media creates the culture of how to behave and what to think, feel, believe and 
desire, that the Malawi gender campaign tried to take advantage of.
This chapter argues that, although the media enhanced the debate on women 
representation in parliament, the whole programme and process was based on an 
unsustainable political premise. To what extent was the overarching patrimonial 
culture challenged in the 50:50 campaign? What role did the media play in the 
50:50 campaign, and to what extent can its role be attributed to the success or 
failure of the campaign itself? I argue that political socialisation is more 
comprehensive but the approach that the media in Malawi has taken in relation 
to gender issues has been excessively narrow, over-simplistic and oriented towards 
the short term. Rather, the creation of a successful political culture requires a 
more inclusive approach with an emphasis on the development of new societal 
identities. These identities are typically built over time and hence the process 
aimed at promoting gender equality should not necessarily be limited to electoral 
periods. I will examine the 50:50 campaign within a cultural homogenisation 
narrative. Cultural homogenisation is a process whereby the international 
perceptive (in this case, gender equality) subdues the local perspective and 
ultimately dominates the local understanding and interpretation of the social 
phenomenon. The gender equality campaign in Malawi is an example of an 
international perspective that has not successfully been localised. The media in 
Malawi has been caught up in the pressure to domesticate the international 
cultural homogeneity against a strong patriarchal system. Using Afrobarometer1 
survey research results from 2002 to 2014, I argue that despite over a decade of 
efforts to encourage and promote the participation of women in politics, fewer 
women than men today are interested in political engagement. This implies that 
the core social fabric that defi nes social relations in the country – patriarchy 
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– and the conditions that allow it to thrive are yet to be thoroughly addressed. In 
this regard, the 2009 and 2014 electoral campaigns can be regarded as the failure 
cultural homogeneity in the area of gender relations.
Democracy and the gender equality goal
Several studies have examined the link between gender rights and quality of 
democracy. Rizzo et al. (2007) conducted a survey in Arab and non-Arab Muslim 
societies and found that respondents who subscribed to gender equality notions 
were also strong supporters of democracy. In another study – and based on their 
analysis of 65 societies that represent 80 per cent of the world’s population – 
Inglehart et al. (2004) argue that ‘countries that rank high on civil rights and 
political liberties, have much higher proportions of women in parliament than 
countries with low levels of freedom’. They nonetheless highlight the fact that 
there are some notable exceptions. For example, although China is not 
democratic, it has a large number of women parliamentarians. In contrast, several 
democratic countries such as the United States, Japan and France have low 
percentages of female representation in their legislatures. The overall trend, 
however, is that there is a strong and positive correlation between levels of 
democracy and increased female representation in legislative bodies. 
Consequently, Inglehart et al. conclude that ‘if the majority doesn’t have full 
political rights, the society is not democratic’.
To buttress the above-mentioned linkages, Yambo-Odotte (1994) examines 
the case of Kenya in 1992, when the country reintroduced a multiparty system of 
governance. She argues that the media played a critical role in enhancing a 
positive image of women candidates and, more importantly, she explains how the 
introduction of women as candidates enhanced the democratic discourse. When 
a growing number of women decided to compete for elected offi ce in 1992 
(through support from international bodies), Yambo-Odotte (1994: 21) observes 
that ‘one consequence of this was that the print and electronic media approach 
to women’s issues changed, literally overnight’, and the media now began 
claiming ‘that the democratization process was incomplete if women did not 
actively participate in the quest for political leadership’. Yambo-Odotte further 
explains that male candidates did not focus on substantive issues while their 
female counterparts ‘focused attention on issues which, for over thirty years of 
independence, had not been adequately addressed’. These included ‘the lack of 
clean water for all, inadequate health facilities, the lowering education standard, 
and the deteriorating agricultural sector’ (Yambo-Odotte (1994: 22).
The media provided a major boost for the women candidates, and a video 
entitled If Women Counted apparently transformed the mind-set of most Kenyans 
at that time. This video – produced by women activists – followed the campaign 
of 19 female parliamentary candidates and other local government contenders. 
The video inspired many future women candidates and with the contributions of 
other gender-sensitive media prompted many people to rethink their values to 
the extent that ‘it is now becoming commonplace to meet Kenyans of either 
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gender who are very proud to be associated with issues of gender sensitivity’ 
(Yambo-Odotte, 1994: 23). Although Kenya is not a model nation as far as 
gender representation in parliament is concerned, it has nonetheless made 
signifi cant progress since multiparty politics in 1992. This is precisely why 
information and communication rights, which are essentially the hallmark of the 
media ‘are essential preconditions for women to fully exercise their civil and 
political rights – to organise, network, make their knowledge and ideas visible 
and advocate for gender justice’ (United Nations, 2013: 24).
Similarly, Gallagher (2002) observes that the commercialisation of media in 
most Asian countries has signifi cantly transformed the way people perceive 
women. In this regard, commercial cable and satellite channels as well as 
privatisation of formerly state-run media have introduced market-oriented 
content in the media, and, in relation to gender equality, this type of content 
arguably projects a positive image of women. The market-oriented image contrasts 
greatly from the previously established perception that women’s role is limited to 
being a housewife and a mother. Thus, one of the most important challenges to 
gender equality is culture (United Nations, 2013) and an important instrument 
to combat negative perceptions of women is the media.
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to link democracy, gender equality and 
development, but I will try to summarise some of the important strands in this 
debate. Inglehart and Welzel (2009) argue that, apart from the need for the 
establishment of supportive social structures and inculcation of relevant cultural 
values, there is a strong correlation between democracy and development. 
Democratic ideals of inclusiveness, accountability, participation and transparency 
are essentially the building blocks of a realistic and holistic social-economic 
development of any society. At the global level, the linkage between gender and 
development has largely been championed by the UNDP through the wider 
human rights versus development nexus debate (Sano, 2000). Since the 
introduction of the fi rst annual Human Development Report by the UNDP in 
2000, the link between development and gender has taken a wider and more 
comprehensive appeal. A development agenda that ignores social and political 
rights of women is unlikely to be sustained. A quest for women’s rights is thus 
ultimately also a quest for development of society.
When the international women’s movement was gaining momentum in the 
1970s and 1980s, it placed considerable emphasis on issues of poverty, health and 
education for women. However, the movement did not pay much attention to 
media-related strategies in achieving the above-mentioned goals (Gallagher, 
2002). By the early 1990s, however, attention gradually shifted to appreciating 
the role of media in enhancing gender equality. Thus, although the media was 
seldom mentioned in the documents resulting from the fi rst three United Nations 
conferences on women (1975–85), the situation changed when the Beijing 
Platform for Action was adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women in 
1995 (Gallagher, 2002; Hassim, 2003). At this conference, the role of the media 
took centre stage and ‘media’ was subsequently included in one of twelve ‘Critical 
Areas of Concern’.
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At the centre of gender equality, which has a direct implication for democratic 
principles, are the basic issues of power, values, access and exclusion; and media 
is generally regarded as one of the main actors in addressing these issues. As 
Chimba (2006: 6) points out, the media can be ‘a major source of defi nitions and 
images of social reality, including the representation of women and defi nitions of 
femininity’. Thus in relation to politics, the media has the capability to strengthen 
the ‘status quo in power arrangements in society’ or even establish new suitable 
arrangements (Chimba, 2006: 6). This is why information and communication 
rights, which form the hallmark of the media, ‘are essential preconditions for 
women to fully exercise their civil and political rights – to organise, network, 
make their knowledge and ideas visible and advocate for gender justice’ (United 
Nations, 2013: 23). The way media operates and articulates issues is profoundly 
entrenched in political and economic contexts. The move towards gender 
equality involves inter alia the wider process of cultural change and democratisation 
(Inglehart et al., 2004).
The media and cultural homogenisation
Culture is broadly defi ned as the cumulative acquisition and internalisation of 
knowledge, experience, beliefs, values, attitudes, meanings, hierarchies and 
relations by a group of people, which is passed on from one generation to another 
(Castells, 2004; Ong, 2006). This defi nition of culture incorporates elements of 
language, ideas, customs, taboos, institutions and ceremonies. Cultural 
homogenisation as a concept implies that a perceived superior (wider or 
international) culture invades a local culture, and in the process the superior 
culture becomes the dominant culture (Fotopoulos, 1999; Strelitz, 2001; Neyazi, 
2010). Ultimately every member in the locality accepts this wider culture and 
society gradually becomes more homogenous.
According to Ogburn and Nimkoff (1964), there are two types of culture. 
Material culture refers to mode of dress, types of food consumed, use of technology 
and other related issues. The non-material aspects refer to values, customs, beliefs, 
norms and all other aspects, which facilitate the acceptance or rejection of the 
aforementioned material culture. Cultural homogenisation may take both of 
these forms, and although the material aspect is more visible the non-material 
has more long-lasting impact (Beynon and Dunkerley, 2000; Neyazi, 2010). In 
the ensuing sections, we will therefore focus on the non-material culture in 
gender relations.
Cultural homogenisation is not a completely top-down process. To the 
recipient community, the dominant culture has to be contextualised and this 
involves a process whereby new meaning is attached to the integrated foreign 
cultural elements (Beynon and Dunkerley, 2000; Lewellen, 2002). And 
Fotopoulos (1999: 5) argues that every community has a particular prevailing 
culture, which can be explained in relation to the social dominant paradigm: ‘the 
system of beliefs, ideas and the corresponding values which are dominant in a 
particular society at a particular moment of its history’. In other words, the 
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underlying argument is that, for any society to reproduce itself, it must ensure 
that its dominant beliefs, ideas and values are in tandem with the existing 
institutional framework. Thus, for a democratic society to fl ourish, the dominant 
social beliefs, ideas and values within it have to be consistent with the 
corresponding democratic institutions and practices. In exceptional circumstances, 
individuals may move from a minority position to challenge the social dominant 
paradigm and set in motion a process of irreversible social change. In such cases, 
societies may be looked upon not merely as collections of individuals but social 
individuals who have the capacity to create a new society according to their 
preferences while at the same time they are a creation of the society they belong 
to. Cultural homogenisation entails that the social dominant paradigm is 
increasingly taking a regional and international perspective. Accordingly, culture 
is becoming less complex and highly predictable in every society, and, in the 
political arena, the pressure for gender equality has been an important component 
of the international cultural homogenisation process.
From a gender perspective, the patriarchal notion may be regarded as a 
dominant social paradigm that needs to be interrogated if gender equality has to 
be achieved in most African countries, including Malawi (Allanana, 2013). The 
assumption in the patriarchal narrative is that the underlying inequalities 
between men and women can be explained by male-dominated social and cultural 
attitudes and institutions, which systematically subjugate women (Kramarae, 
1992; Stacey, 1993).
The 50:50 campaign as a form of cultural homogenisation
The past few decades have witnessed a substantial expansion of women’s political 
representation around the world. Despite such overall positive trends, women 
remained underrepresented in all national parliaments in 2012, except in Rwanda 
and Andorra (IPU, 2012). The increase in women’s presence in the political 
sphere has sparked a theoretical debate since the early 1990s regarding the 
appropriate thresholds for women’s representation (Hughes and Paxton, 2007; 
Krook, 2009; Krook, 2010; Muriaas and Kayuni, 2013). The debate has been 
highly infl uenced by Phillips’s (1995) critique of liberal democracy and her 
‘politics of presence’ argument. According to Phillips, the liberal framework 
places excessive emphasis on the importance of representing variation in ideas, 
and does not suffi ciently value representation of people for who they are. She thus 
promotes an understanding of representation that resembles what Pitkin (1967: 
60) termed ‘descriptive representation’: the notion that the demographic 
composition of a legislature should accurately refl ect that of the whole nation. In 
other words, the legislative assembly should ‘mirror’ the various identities found 
in the society.
The idea of mirror representation paved the way for a discussion of specifi c 
thresholds for women’s representation, using terms such as ‘critical mass’, ‘gender 
balance’, and the more recent phrases ‘50:50 balance’ or ‘50–50 parity’ (Meintjes, 
1996; Ahikire, 2009). In the 1990s, the women’s movement adopted the idea of 
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a critical mass. In other words, for women to have an impact in key political 
institutions such as legislatures and infl uence public policies, their representation 
should be increased to constitute 30 per cent of total membership. The term 
‘critical mass’ was adopted from nuclear physics, where a certain quantity is 
required to initiate an irreversible chain reaction (Dahlerup, 2006). At the turn 
of the millennium, the demands of women’s movements around the world grew 
stronger. They adopted a more explicit interpretation of mirror representation, 
arguing that since women make up about 50 per cent of the citizens in any given 
country, they should hold an equal share of seats in decision-making bodies. 
Consequently, the aim of many women’s activists was to reach 50:50 gender 
balance or parity in political decision making.
According to Melanie et al. (2007), the current discourse on gender quota may 
be regarded as the third wave in the international women movements’ goals and 
discourse. The fi rst wave focused on the right to vote, the second wave focused on 
increasing women’s representation and the current wave, which started in the 
1990s, focuses on settling specifi c thresholds for women’s representation. This 
current trend of debating threshold is, as Lovenduski (1993: 2) has argued, 
divided between two dimensions of representation. There are those who argue 
that a ‘critical mass’ is suffi cient as long as an assembly takes into account the 
interests of all its electors (Meier, 2004; Muriaas, 2011). Others advocate for a 
50:50 gender balance, stressing that the composition of the elected assemblies in 
democracies should mirror the composition of the society it serves. Still others 
(Rosabeth Kanter. quoted in Grey, 2006: 494) suggest differential critical masses 
to achieve different purposes. For example, Kanter suggests that if the 
representation of women increases to 15 per cent, national policies generated 
would probably be in favour of women, while a 40 per cent change would ensure 
that policies that favour women are introduced (Grey, 2006: 494). Tremblay 
(2006: 502) disagrees and argues that the concept of critical mass is often ‘elevated 
to law like status’ and moreover ‘quickly made the object of abusive interpretations, 
becoming synonymous with a relationship of cause and effect’. He blames political 
scientists for quickly adopting the concept and suggesting generalisations, which 
found their way into electoral systems. Dahlerup (2006: 517) admits that some 
countries may adopt the critical mass merely to appear ‘modern and democratic’, 
and that political parties also recruit women to gain votes and do not expect 
them to focus on women welfare.
The critical mass discourse has in recent years been discarded by demands for 
gender balance. Women constitute around half the population in most countries, 
and according to the ‘mirror’ notion of representation, women representatives 
should fi ll about 50 per cent of all political offi ces. One of the earliest international 
organisations to call for a 50:50 representation was the Women’s Environment 
and Development Organization (WEDO) (Dahlerup, 2006). In Africa, the 
ground-breaking moment was when the African Union decided to follow up the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in 
Africa (2003) by stating that gender equality in practice meant a 50:50 gender 
balance in decision-making. SADC decided to follow suit and at the Heads of 
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State Summit in Gaborone in 2005, a 50:50 gender target was introduced. While 
13 of the 15 SADC member states signed the protocol in August 2008 (with the 
exception of Botswana and Mauritius), only 7 of these governments have 
subsequently ratifi ed the document. Furthermore, while the Democratic Republic 
of Congo and South Africa have ratifi ed the document, they have failed to submit 
their instruments of ratifi cation to the SADC Secretariat (SADC Gender 
Protocol Alliance, 2012). Consequently, the protocol cannot be enforced in the 
whole SADC region until these two ratifi cations secure a two-thirds majority.
Malawi’s 50:50 campaign
Patriarchy is the dominant social paradigm in Malawi and the single most 
important impediment towards achieving progress towards gender equality in the 
country. When Malawi’s fi rst female president came to power in 2012, there was 
not much enthusiasm for her ascendancy as a female leader, and several women’s 
activists were in fact, at the forefront in criticising her policies. Indeed, the 
general narrative that emerged in the country – which was also echoed by one of 
the senior party offi cial – was that even when Joyce Banda was Vice-President, 
Malawi was not ready for a female president (Kamwendo and Kamwendo, 2014).
The 50:50 campaign during the 2009 general elections
The initial target for gender representation in elected political offi ces in Malawi 
was set at 30 per cent as a result of the SADC protocol on gender discussed above. 
This goal was not achieved in the 2004 general elections but, rather than reducing 
the standards, the bar was raised by Malawi in line with SADC agreement to 50 
per cent in the 2009 elections. The new dimension in the election campaign was 
the clear sense of organisation towards achieving the target. For instance, with 
assistance from various development partners, the 50:50 campaign was launched 
and coordinated by the newly created NGO Gender Coordinating Network 
(NGOGCN), established on the premise that it would function as a permanent, 
non-partisan committee with representation from various institutions including 
the Association of Progressive Women (APW), Gender Support Programme 
(GSP), The National Women Lobby Group (NWLG), Civil Liberties Committee 
(CILIC), National Election System Trust (NEST), Centre for Human Rights and 
Rehabilitation (CHRR) and the Society for the Advancement of Women 
(SAW). Some groups have questioned the principle of non-partisanship in the 
organisational arrangement taking into consideration the fact that the Ministry 
of Women and Child Development (MoWCD) initially coordinated the 
formation of the NGOGCN secretariat. The boundary between government and 
the political party in power in Malawi is often blurred. With MoWCD taking 
centre stage, there was a generally held view that NGOGCN was actually serving 
the interests of the political party in government (the Democratic People’s Party). 
Despite the above-mentioned limitations, NGOGCN went on to develop its 
own ambitious strategic objectives. These included:
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• improving gender equality and equity through advocacy and lobbying;
• developing the organisational and human capacities of various actors;
• effectively dealing with issues of gender equality and equity;
• ensuring effi ciency in communication and information fl ow;
• establishing and maintaining a well-developed organisational and 
management structure that will act as a nerve centre for the network 
activities; and
• supporting and sustaining activities of the network (NGOGCN, 2009).
The organisation further laid out detailed plans for capacity building, advocacy 
and lobbying, community mobilisation and socio-economic empowerment 
(MoGCCD, 2008). Regional meetings and training sessions were organised 
throughout the 2009 election period.
The 50:50 campaign during the 2014 general elections
Building on the success of the 2009 elections, the 50:50 campaign started off with 
much vigour in 2014. Specifi cally, the campaign was supported by a number of 
development partners such as the United Nations, the Royal Norwegian Embassy, 
Oxfam, ActionAid, GIZ and Active Learning Centre. However, coordination 
was undertaken by the National Technical Working Group (NTWG), which 
involved all stakeholders that were implementing the campaign’s activities. 
NTWG was a composition of diverse professional technocrats who were operating 
in different sub-committees created on the basis of their expertise. NGOGCN 
on the other hand was merely the umbrella body that brought together 
the committees of NTWGs. The NTWG not only identifi ed political aspirants 
who were women but also realized the signifi cance of advocacy and lobbying in 
its overall strategy. It pursued several avenues of engagement with political parties 
at the national level to ensure that political actors remained committed to 
fi elding and supporting female candidates. Meetings with community leaders at 
district and grassroots level were also organised as well as media outlets in order 
to ensure that there was positive coverage and profi ling of female political 
candidates. In addition, the NTWG placed considerable emphasis on capacity 
building through training sessions for female candidates that were conducted at 
regional and district levels. Apart from training, another element of capacity 
building included the production and distribution of T-shirts to candidates, 
which carried the image and slogan of their respective women candidates. About 
100 T-shirts were freely distributed to each female candidate aspiring to be an 
MP. However, almost all the candidates complained that these T-shirts were not 
adequate. Most importantly, however, the organisation provided cash support – 
MK200,000 for every candidate for the post of MP and MK90,430.62 for every 
candidate for the post of a councillor. All female candidates were also provided 
access to free legal services offered by the Women’s Lawyers Association of 
Malawi on a pro bono basis.
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The role of the media taskforce
As part of the preparation for the 2014 general elections, one of the sub-
committees of the NTWG was the 50:50 media taskforce with the specifi c aim of 
increasing publicity for female candidates and the 50:50 campaign itself. 
According to Chikunkhuzeni (2014), the taskforce was mandated to undertake 
the following tasks:
• coordinated coverage of the campaign and its activities including positive 
and ethically correct publicity of female candidates;
• promote coherent and coordinated messaging and information sharing 
regarding the campaign;
• support the NGOGCN secretariat on the appropriate modes of 
communication and available opportunities to ensure maximum publicity of 
female candidates.
In order to achieve these functions, the taskforce established an executive 
committee comprised of 6 journalists from all regions of Malawi, which was 
helped by a regular committee consisting of 17 journalists from various media 
houses, in addition to ex-offi cio members that included the NGOGCN 
communications offi cer. Some of the activities undertaken by the taskforce 
included training in gender-sensitive elections reporting, organisation of fi eld 
visits, training of women candidates in media relations and communication skills, 
production of radio and television programmes, and assistance with writing op-ed 
pieces. Despite its enormous potential, the media task force was unfortunately 
unable to make signifi cant breakthroughs in campaigning for the women 
representation. One of the main reasons for this failure was the huge demand for 
publicity by the candidates and the corresponding lack of capacity in the task 
force. Moreover, the task force faced considerable diffi culty in negating the 
infl uence of political patronage in ensuring that several media reports appeared to 
be explicitly or implicitly biased against women (Chikunkhuzeni, 2014).
Impact of cultural homogenisation on gender
Despite a female president leading the country from April 2012 until March 
2015, there was surprisingly no signifi cant impact in relation to the improvement 
of women’s political activism and participation in Malawi. Surveys by 
Afrobarometer conducted in the period 2002–14 on gender-related matters show 
that Malawi still lags considerably behind in achieving the gender parity as 
envisaged in its various 50:50 campaign activities. The survey results show that 
more men than women are interested in public affairs and political discussions, 
and the gap in interest of public affairs and frequency of political discussions 
between men and women is steadily increasing in favour of men. Additionally, 
the survey results indicate that women in Malawi are less likely than men to 
participate in political activities and activism that include attending political 
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rallies and campaign meetings, persuading others to vote for a candidate and 
working for a political candidate. More importantly, although more than half of 
Malawians hold the view that women should have the same chance of being 
elected to political offi ce as men, these numbers are steadily declining. Thus, the 
above results provide a relatively clear indication that efforts aimed at enhancing 
political participation of women in politics have not yielded much. It is no 
wonder therefore that women’s representation in the Malawian Parliament 
decreased to 17 per cent in the 2014 elections, after having risen from 6 per cent 
in 1994 to 22 per cent in 2009. Despite having enacted several laws aimed at 
promoting and strengthening gender equality, most notably through the Gender 
Equality Act (2012), an increase in female political representation remains 
largely elusive.
Participation of political discussions and public affairs
Political socialisation depends on, among other things, political discussions and 
interest in public affairs. The Afrobarometer surveys (see Figures 10.1 and 10.2) 
show that women in Malawi are less likely to be involved in political discussions 
than their male counterparts and that their interest in public affairs is also far 
lesser than men. While 79 per cent of men indicate that they discuss politics, 
only 65 per cent of women do so. Although this gap was 14 per cent in 2002, it 
widened to 21 per cent in 2005. And while the gap narrowed to 11 per cent in 
2008, it returned to the 2002 fi gure of 14 per cent in the 2012 and 2014 surveys. 
In relation to showing interest in public affairs, the results indicate that there is 
on average a 13 per cent gap between men and women. When compared to the 
2012 survey, the gap has signifi cantly widened from 6 per cent in 2002 to 13 per 
cent in 2014. With the exception of the 2014 results, there has thus been a 
downward trend in the percentage of men and women showing interest in 
public affairs.
Female political activism
One way of determining the potential of women taking up a more active part in 
politics is to analyse their political activism: attendance at campaign meetings, 
persuading others to vote and working for a political candidate, for example. It is 
quite well accepted in academic and policy circles that women in Malawi are less 
likely than men to participate in political activities and activism. More than half 
(56 per cent) of male respondents in the Afrobarometer surveys say they attended 
a political rally in the previous year of the survey, while only 44 per cent of female 
respondents did so. Similar gaps are refl ected in attendance at campaign meetings 
(27 per cent men, 17 per cent women), persuading others to vote for a candidate 
(25 per cent men, 17 per cent women), and working for a political candidate (19 
per cent men, 11 per cent women). Women are also somewhat less likely than 
men to join others to raise an issue or to participate in a demonstration or protest 
march. The gap between women and men who join others to raise an issue
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Figure 10.1 Participation in political discussion by gender, 2002–14
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Figure 10.2 Interest in public affairs, by gender, 2002–14
Source: Author’s own calculation from various Afrobarometer surveys
has not changed much (8 percentage points in 1999; 6 percentage points in 
2014). Similarly, women are less likely than men to contact local offi cials and 
leaders. Only 12 per cent of women had contact with an MP in the year before 
the survey, compared to 18 per cent for their male counterparts. Similarly, only 8 
per cent of women were in contact with government offi cials versus 13 per cent 
of men. This gap has also been fairly steady since 2002.
Support for female leadership
Women should have the same opportunities as men to take up leadership 
positions, according to 60 per cent of Malawians, refl ecting a sharp drop from 78 
per cent in 2012. Correspondingly, the proportion of respondents who agree with 
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the statement that ‘men make better political leaders than women’ rose from 21 
per cent in 2012 to 37 per cent in 2014. In the 2011–13 survey of 34 African 
countries, on average 68 per cent of respondents said that women are as capable 
as men of being political leaders. What is interesting with this 2014 fi nding is that 
it was at a time when Malawi had a female president in offi ce. It would be expected 
that those who support women leadership should actually increase when 
comparing the 2012 and 2014 results, but this was not the case. As explained 
below, having a female president had its own disadvantage in that the expectations 
from the electorate were higher than usual. The revelations of increased corrupt 
activities in government, which were infamously termed the ‘Cashgate’ scandal, 
may have negatively affected the president’s popularity as well as perceptions of 
female leadership in general.
The weak political performance of women in the campaign
The post 2014 general elections revealed a number of weaknesses in the 50:50 
campaign which are discussed below and they include:
• narrow media coverage on gender issues;
• lack of commitment from political parties; and
• confl ict among gender NGOs.
Narrow media coverage on gender issues
A Media for Southern African (MISA, 2010) study found that women as news 
sources in Malawi had increased to 20 per cent from the 11 per cent recorded in 
2003. Despite this increase, women still lag behind in access and use of the various 
sources of media. There was a conscientious strategy to involve the media in the 
50:50 campaign, and a media committee was set up, which aimed at propagating 
a positive image for women aspirants. Using advocacy and lobbying activity, the 
media provided much of the coverage in support of women candidates. Some of 
the special areas covered included advocacy meeting with party leadership, 
orientation meetings with journalists and sensitisation meetings with community 
leaders and religious leaders. Furthermore, airtime was bought by various well-
wishers on radio and TV to showcase the ‘women aspirants’.
Although the media may have contributed to an overall enrichment of 
democratisation in the country by covering the debate on female representation 
in parliament, the 50:50 campaign and process was based on a politically 
unsustainable premise. The media perspective, in relation to gender issues, was 
too narrow, over-simplistic and short term. It was too narrow in that the media 
portrayed the issue of men competing against women. The media campaign 
ignored the role of men in promoting women candidates and hence gave the 
impression that it was only a ‘women’s issue’. It was thus over-simplistic because 
it did not directly address the patriarchal system, which has perpetually 
undermined female political representation in the country.
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Another media-related weakness of the 50:50 campaign was the fact that 
media messages with a gender component typically competed with other existing 
messages which were targeting virtually the same audience (Chikunkhuzeni, 
2014). Thus publicity alone was not enough to create substantial impact. Indeed, 
the media strategies in the 50:50 campaign erroneously focused on publicity and 
not change of voter behaviour. There was little recognition or understanding of 
the interface between political communication and voter behaviour. Furthermore, 
Chikunkhuzeni (2014) observes that the campaign had a narrow focus on news 
media workers rather than a broader focus on including news presenters, 
advertisers, public relations offi cers, spokespersons and party campaign directors.
Lack of commitment from political parties
Although the number of independent candidates in the past two elections has 
been increasing, the reality is that most of these individuals were not completely 
independent. Rather they were previously members of a political party, but 
subsequently became frustrated with internal power struggles or were simply 
overlooked in the candidate selection process. This is evidenced by the fact that 
the majority of these so-called independent candidates typically return to their 
former parties as soon as they get elected to parliament. It has been argued that 
the increase in women parliamentary representatives in 2009 was mainly due to 
the fact that the Democratic People’s Party (DPP) had more women candidates 
than any other political party in the country and, more importantly, the DPP also 
won many seats in parliament (Kayuni and Muriaas, 2014). Consequently, there 
is general acceptance among Malawian scholars that political parties are the most 
important institutions that determine success for parliamentary candidates. Due 
to the highly competitive nature of the fi rst-past-the-post electoral system in 
Malawi, it is very diffi cult for aspiring female candidates to succeed. One way of 
addressing the issue has been the suggestion that political parties could adopt 
voluntary quotas. However, this option is very problematic in the current political 
set up of Malawi because political parties have not been able to demonstrate 
commitment to this end. Although all major political parties clearly outlined 
their commitment to gender equality in their electoral manifestos in 2009 and 
2014, such promises were not translated into reality.
Confl ict among gender NGOs
When Joyce Banda assumed the presidency in 2012 following the death of Bingu 
wa Mutharika in offi ce, it turned out to be both a blessing and a curse for the 
women’s political movement in Malawi. Banda’s position as president as well as 
her candidature in the 2014 elections raised the profi le of women seeking public 
offi ce. However, any weakness in her offi ce was deemed to be evidence of the 
failure of female leadership in general – even when such failures had nothing to 
do with the president’s gender. The issue was further complicated by the fact that 
several prominent women activists at that time belonged to or supported 
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opposition political parties, and they launched a concerted effort to protest 
against Joyce Banda’s leadership. This resulted in a scenario whereby it was 
generally perceived amongst voters that women themselves had declared a ‘vote 
of no confi dence’ on their female political leaders. Taking into consideration that 
Malawi has an entrenched patriarchal system, the role of other women activists 
to campaign against the female president of the country was political damaging 
not only to the incumbent but generally for the agenda of the entire women’s 
movement, which was championing for an incremental increase in female 
representation in public offi ce.
Short-termism in the campaign process
The electoral process is often regarded as a circle or process with each stage 
reinforcing the other. The 50:50 campaign in Malawi in 2009 and 2014 was 
limited to the electoral campaign period. This narrow view of the electoral process 
has had adverse implications in enhancing women’s political representation. 
Moreover, due to disagreements among NGOGCN members as well as donors 
regarding the implementation plan for the 2009 and 2014 elections, the gender 
campaign started off very late in both electoral years. Consequently, when the 
50:50 campaign was offi cially launched, the general national electoral campaign 
was already at an advanced stage. The original plan of the 50:50 campaign was 
largely meant to encourage aspiring women candidates through training 
programmes and workshops. However, due to the delay, it was too late to identify 
and inspire new candidates when these workshops were actually conducted.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the strategy to promote gender equality in Malawi, 
primarily viewed through the lens of the 50:50 campaign launched in 2009 and 
2014. I have argued that the campaign that Malawi adopted was not fully home-
grown but rather a product of cultural homogenisation, which began fi rst at the 
global level and was subsequently translated into the regional (SADC) and 
national levels. The media and the development partners (donors) played a 
critical role in ensuring that the global rhetoric of the 50:50 campaign was 
operationalised for application within Malawi. After more than a decade of the 
campaign, it was expected that there would be profound changes in the socio-
political environments through a radical increase in the number of women 
elected to parliament. However, the recent elections results proved that the 
opposite was true. Based on Afrobarometer survey results from 2002–14 as well as 
a comparison of the 2002 and 2014 parliamentary electoral results, I have argued 
that female political participation in Malawi continues to be signifi cantly lower 
than that of men. It is unlikely that women will be on an equal footing with men 
if the current strategies for gender equality are maintained. A deeper problem 
emerging from 2012 and 2014 Afrobarometer survey results is that an increasing 
number of women themselves are now believing the narrative that male leaders 
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are better than their female counterparts. This is after years of the gender equality 
campaign, which directly propagated a message where gender quality and respect 
for the talents and skills of women were supposed to be highlighted. The media, 
which was envisaged as a major player in addressing the problem, was thus not 
able to directly deal with the issue of the dominant social determinant: patriarchy. 
It did not genuinely question the patriarchal system but simply cut and pasted the 
overarching international gender narrative in a local context without adequately 
making persuasive arguments that took into consideration local sentiments and 
the Malawian socio-political context. From a social-cultural perspective, the 
50:50 campaign was organised in the context of cultural homogenisation and the 
failure of the campaign to address the gender inequality may largely allude to the 
failure of cultural homogenisation itself.
However, other factors beyond media may have contributed to the failure of 
the 50:50 campaign, the most signifi cant being the country’s electoral system. 
Almost all countries in Africa that have taken impressive strides in gender 
representation in the political arena have abandoned a pure fi rst-past-the-post 
system. Even with an elaborate 50:50 campaign, it is unlikely in the near future 
that Malawi will make signifi cant progress unless the electoral system is 
comprehensively overhauled. One might even say that the 50:50 campaign was 
actually misguided: it should have focused mainly on lobbying for the overhaul of 
the electoral system. Running the campaign in this highly constrained electoral 
system entailed essentially fi ghting a losing battle.
Note
1 The Afrobarometer (http://www.afrobarometer.org) is an independent, nonpartisan 
research project that measures the social, political, and economic atmosphere in Africa. 
Afrobarometer surveys are conducted in more than a dozen African countries and are 
repeated on a regular cycle. Because the instrument asks a standard set of questions, 
countries can be systematically compared. Trends in public attitudes are tracked over 
time. Results are shared with decision makers, policy advocates, civic educators, 
journalists, researchers, donors and investors, as well as average Africans who wish to 
become more informed and active citizens. In total six rounds or cycles of surveys have 
been conducted across Africa from 1999 up to 2015. Malawi has participated in all 
these rounds.
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11 Major conclusions
Dan Banik and Blessings Chinsinga
While democracy provides increased voice and infl uence for the poor than non-
democratic systems, many emerging democracies in developing countries are 
constantly struggling to achieve high rates of economic growth and reduce 
poverty. And the continued high rates of poverty not just in Malawi but also in 
other African countries beg the question as to whether democracies can indeed 
turn things around. Why is the democratic record at development and poverty 
reduction not better?
The chapters in this volume have offered insights on three broad sets of issues:
• democratisation and political culture;
• governance and policy implementation; and
• activism, aid and accountability.
Within these general categories, we have discussed a range of issues which, 
although focused on Malawi, have general implications for many countries on the 
African continent. These include:
• constitutional guarantees and regulatory and operational challenges and 
dilemmas related to enforcing fundamental rights;
• strategies to collectively organise voters and hold authorities to account 
through organisational behaviour and practices as well as specifi c awareness 
campaigns;
• the media as an instrument of policy infl uence, social awareness and political 
accountability;
• strategies and challenges related to the implementation of a set of crucial 
development and anti-poverty programmes;
• the impact of civil service motivation and demotivation on public policy 
implementation; and
• the growing importance and infl uence of aid and investments from non-
Western donors through South–South cooperation on economic 
development and poverty reduction.
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In the ensuing sections, we summarise the main fi ndings of this volume under 
four broad categories:
• challenges to democratic consolidation amidst entrenched political 
settlements;
• the disconnect between the formal and the informal and resulting impacts 
on judicial and legislative oversight;
• heavy top-down public policies implemented by demotivated bureaucrats; 
and
• the emergence of new donors and a way out of the traditional conditionality 
trap.
Challenges to democratic consolidation amidst entrenched political 
settlements
Many Western powers and multilateral organisations have in recent decades 
emphasised the crucial role that free and fair elections play in promoting 
development and freedoms of various kinds. There is indeed general agreement 
that elections can pave the way for the establishment of a political culture where 
civil and political rights on the one hand and social, economic and cultural rights 
on the other are respected, protected and promoted. There have been few success 
stories, however, particularly in Africa, with several recent setbacks in many parts 
of the continent. The usual problems have been ineffective electoral arrangements 
and electoral malpractices, but also, most importantly, rulers not willing to 
relinquish power even when they lose the popular vote. Although there have 
been some exceptions, many African leaders continue to harbour ambitions of 
extending their tenures even when they are barred from doing so by their 
constitutions. Thus, contested elections or attempts by leaders to seek to stay on 
in offi ce by manipulating the system often result in so-called ‘critical junctures’ 
during which young democracies are tested.
Transitions from authoritarian systems to democracy are not easy and there is 
considerable agreement in the literature that such transitions do not necessarily 
result in consolidated forms of democracy. Indeed, democratic transitions are 
typically characterised by the risk of regime collapse and a return to 
authoritarianism. Several chapters have in particular discussed the attitudinal 
views of democratic consolidation and examined the extent of anti-democratic 
behaviour and attitudes between political actors and the general public. We fi nd 
evidence of the important role of critical junctures and their impact on the 
survival of young democracies. Malawi has experienced numerous critical 
junctures since 1994, but four events in particular stand out:
• the bid by President Muluzi for a third term in offi ce;
• authoritarian tendencies exhibited by President Bingu wa Mutharika;
• the death of Mutharika in offi ce in 2012 and debates over the constitutional 
validity of the Vice-President to assume the presidency; and
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• the more recent Cashgate corruption scandal, where large sums of public 
money went into the pockets of ruling party politicians and their cronies.
These critical junctures have been extensively covered in this volume, and it is 
important to highlight that, during each crisis, there has been considerable 
erosion of public trust in the democratic political system.
The democratic dividend so far in Malawi appears to be modest gains on 
democracy together with a fi rm rejection of authoritarianism. Indeed, the country 
did not fall into the trap of reversing back to authoritarian and one-party rule. 
Rather, democracy in Malawi has survived despite being forced to weather the 
storm caused by numerous political crises. Consequently, a major conclusion is 
that Malawi is stuck in transition – neither consolidating its democracy nor 
regressing into authoritarianism. And there have been periods of progress followed 
by periods of regressions that have largely coincided with the critical junctures. 
There is nonetheless considerable evidence of strong public support for democracy, 
which provides an important barrier against further erosion of existing democratic 
institutions. Current evidence, nonetheless, suggests stagnation rather than 
consolidation. Democracy, in other words, is not the only game in town. Not yet, 
at least!
The slow pace of democratic consolidation can be partially attributed to 
Malawi’s long history of authoritarianism. Ever since the country achieved 
independence from Britain in 1964 and until the elections of 1994, one man – the 
dictator Hastings Banda – and his Malawi Congress Party (MCP) dominated the 
country’s politics. The three decades of Banda’s rule were characterised by brutal 
repression of all forms of dissent. The MCP dominated virtually all aspects of 
social, political and economic life in the country and Banda exercised supreme 
control over the party. The political settlement of the time was constructed in a 
manner where economic benefi ts mainly accrued to MCP elites and their 
supporters: selected politicians, civil servants, traders and estate owners. Indeed, 
we have argued that the elites who benefi ted from this settlement simply extended 
their support to Banda’s regime without necessarily looking out for the welfare of 
the country. The ensuing political settlement was, however, not inclusive, and 
resulted in widespread discontentment, which in turn required strong-arm tactics 
of the state to crush all forms of dissent. It was therefore inevitable that such a 
settlement would inevitably collapse, particularly in the face of economic hardship.
Since the transition to democracy in 1994, there has been a rapid growth in 
the number of political parties operating within the country. Several chapters in 
this volume have examined how and to what extent these parties have shaped (or 
placed obstacles in the way of) the country’s democratic and development 
trajectories. The major conclusion – based on analyses of selection of leaders and 
their successors, electoral candidates, available funding, ideological commitments 
and party discipline in the legislative process – is that the political system remains 
fragile. The legal framework enabling the creation of political parties and their 
regulation – the Political Parties (Registration and Regulation) Act of 1993 – 
does not provide for transparency and accountability in daily operations. The 
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Act, moreover, is silent on how parties are fi nanced and does not require parties 
to publicly declare their sources of wealth and reveal their assets.
Some have claimed that political parties, especially during the fi rst two decades 
of democratic politics, contributed signifi cantly to the evolution of a defective 
democracy in Malawi. Indeed, without an ideology-based platform, and often 
operating without a specifi c manifesto, parties today are unable to offer a visionary 
socio-economic and political agenda. Several chapters in this volume have offered 
various explanations of how and why parties are unable to distinguish their 
policies from their rivals, and how the party organisation has primarily become a 
vehicle for contesting state power every fi ve years. But, once in power, parties 
appear incapable of charting new pathways and setting their particular stamp of 
public policies, largely pursuing the very same policies that they criticised while 
in opposition. Thus, this volume offers evidence confi rming that political parties 
in Malawi have largely failed to create a political settlement that could result in a 
process of sustained social and economic development. Rather than ideology, four 
sets of interrelated factors appear to determine the formation and functioning of 
parties in Malawi like in many other African contexts. These include patronage, 
clientelism, ethnicity and tribalism. Party conventions are seldom held, and, even 
when they are occasionally held, the primary agenda is simply to confi rm the 
inevitable: the endorsement of the party president (who is often the main 
fi nancier) as the candidate for presidential elections. Moreover, very few offi ce 
bearers of political parties are ever elected to their positions, which gives the party 
leader enormous power and unrestricted infl uence over the entire party apparatus. 
These features make it diffi cult for parties to successfully manage internal confl icts 
and develop long-term visions based on a consistent policy message.
Disconnect between the formal and the informal: Impacts on judicial 
and legislative oversight
Malawian courts routinely profess fi delity to formalist legal theories that advocate 
a strict separation between law and politics. However, we fi nd that the highest 
courts often intervene in political contestations and thereby exercise a signifi cant 
amount of infl uence on the construction of the political discourse. Such infl uence 
is evident with respect to the contribution of the country’s Supreme Court and 
High Court towards the ‘judicialisation’ and ‘informalisation’ of the country’s 
politics. Although there have been attempts to prevent the courts from involving 
themselves in political matters, the judiciary has, on occasion, adjudicated in 
matters that fall within the realm of politics. Some of the reasons behind this 
increased politicisation of the judiciary include the constitutional provisions that 
allow judges to adjudicate beyond ‘law’, in addition to provisions that authorise 
the court to mediate in political disputes. Thus, for example, Malawian courts 
have dealt with cases that relate to the succession of traditional chiefs, and have 
thereby reinforced contested provisions of customary law and related informal 
institutions that are not subject to formal constitutional provisions that guarantee 
and protect human rights. The actions of the courts have on occasion also resulted 
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in the weakening of formal mechanisms of accountability. For example, the 
courts have ruled that a constituent has no right to force his or her MP to attend 
Parliament and that the party leadership need not be consulted when a party 
member is appointed to a Cabinet position. However, the judiciary has also on 
occasion constrained the informalisation of politics – for example by branding 
certain behaviours as corrupt even when local communities accept such actions. 
The main conclusion in this respect is that the judicialisation and informalisation 
of politics can contribute positively to inclusive development if the judiciary 
overtly acknowledges its political role and develops a clear legal doctrine that 
legitimises only those informal institutions that promote inclusive development.
While the judiciary has asserted its independence in Malawi’s recent political 
history, the legislature has largely been dominated by the executive ever since the 
introduction of multiparty democracy. This is partly because of the country’s 
choice of a political system, which provides substantial powers to the President 
and assigns a subservient role to the legislature. The routine presence of 
personalised patronage in Malawian politics has further entrenched the culture of 
parliamentary subservience. However, this is not unique to Malawi as most 
legislatures in Africa continue to face the challenge of a dominant executive. 
Other challenges that prevent greater legislative control of the executive relate 
to inadequate availability of resources, lack of technical expertise, frequent 
changes in the composition of its committees and various types of pressure exerted 
by administrative offi cials and party leaders. Despite these constraints, the 
Malawian parliament has demonstrated that it has the potential, and can be an 
effective mechanism, for ensuring accountable governance. A major success for 
Parliament, despite strained executive–legislative relations, has been the 
performance of committees particularly during critical junctures in the country’s 
efforts at democratic consolidation. Such events have included the fl oor-crossing 
saga of MPs repeatedly changing party loyalty, the attempt by former President 
Bakili Muluzi to abolish presidential term limits, and the reluctance of the 
executive to publicly declare their wealth and assets. During these junctures, 
parliamentary committees have played a pivotal role in holding the executive to 
account. For example the Public Accounts Committee has been instrumental in 
probing corruption cases while the Public Appointments Committee has withheld 
crucial appointments when key offi cials have been suspended or appointed by the 
government without proper consultations with all parties concerned. Similarly, 
the Legal Affairs Committee has initiated impeachment proceedings against a 
sitting President on the basis of allegations of fi nancial misconduct and formation 
of a new political unit in parliament with breakaway factions from the party that 
elected him to offi ce. However, not all contributions of these committees have 
been adversarial in character. For example, the Budget and Finance Committee 
has frequently provided constructive feedback and recommendations to the 
government on a range of issues related to allocations on agriculture, health 
and education.
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Heavy top-down public policies implemented by demotivated 
bureaucrats
A major obstacle to development efforts in poor countries, be they democracies 
or non-democracies, has been ineffective implementation of anti-poverty 
schemes. There has traditionally been an overwhelming emphasis on ‘top-down’ 
approaches where experts, often far removed from the problems faced by the 
poor, attempt to defi ne what disadvantaged groups need. In contrast, there is far 
less emphasis on ‘bottom-up’ processes where the poor themselves are involved in 
articulating their needs.
This predominance of a heavy top-down approach together with the lack of 
correspondence between programme goals and implementation realities has 
rendered many anti-poverty schemes in developing countries ineffective. As 
several chapters in this volume have demonstrated – most notably the cases 
related to fi scal decentralisation, youth employment policy and the gender 
equality campaign – typical challenges to successful implementation include:
• the lack of knowledge or disinterest among policy formulators on the 
problems facing local communities;
• lack of communication among implementing offi cials; and
• lack of continuity in the top ranks of the public services as personnel are 
constantly shunted from one department to another either as a form of 
reward (e.g. promotion) or as a punishment (e.g. demotion or transfer to less 
attractive posting).
For example, the politics surrounding fi scal decentralisation, resource allocation 
and decision-making has contributed to the weak and fragmented service delivery 
capacity of local governments in Malawi. Indeed, a major conclusion is that the 
impact of the devolution policy on service delivery is largely negated when 
district administrations do not control key functions including staff recruitment. 
Thus, even though the country now has elected offi cials (councillors) at the local 
level in place, improved local governance and more effi cient public service 
delivery will only result when further devolution of functions and funds and 
rationalisation of the legal framework are undertaken. Political leaders have 
similarly not shown much interest in fi nding solutions that will improve the 
agricultural sector. The pressing policy problems relating to youth unemployment 
– which have not received much political attention – is a case in point.
Similarly, when Malawi decided to initiate a gender equality campaign aimed 
at increasing the number of women representatives in parliament during the 
2009 and 2014 parliamentary elections, the entire initiative was based on an 
unsustainable political premise. Indeed, the major cause of policy failure was that 
the dominant social paradigm of patriarchy that is entrenched in the country was 
never really challenged. Although the Malawian media was roped in as a major 
actor to spread the message of gender equality, it has consistently pursued 
strategies that are excessively narrow in focus, over-simplistic in their 
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operationalisation and short-term oriented. The gender equality campaign also 
illustrates some of the challenges associated with implementing policies that are 
sometimes initiated, advocated and funded by external actors without substantial 
local ownership or ‘buy-in’.
The successful formulation and implementation of public policy requires the 
presence of a well-functioning administrative apparatus. Even when a country 
transitions to democracy, it does not necessarily inherit a strong, stable and 
competent administrative infrastructure. A major challenge for most developing 
countries is to establish clear merit-based procedures for recruitment and training 
of competent civil servants. This requires a strong political will to undertake 
substantial administrative reforms that risk being opposed by powerful bureaucrats 
who fear the loss of their privileged positions.
Patrimonialism is often a major barrier in the democratic consolidation phase, 
and in Malawi, as in other developing countries, civil servants often complain of 
increasing political interference in administrative activities. Such interference, 
they argue, seriously undermines bureaucratic initiative and bureaucratic 
neutrality, and is a major source of demotivation in the public service. While 
ministers in Malawi do not formally have a prominent role in recruitment, 
promotion, demotion or transfer of public servants in the ministry, the reality is 
quite different. Political interference is rampant in the public service, which 
often negatively impacts service delivery. Excessive political interference can 
indeed contribute to implementation failures as dubious political interests may 
override the wisdom of qualifi ed civil servants.
However, civil servants themselves also try to align themselves with selected 
politicians in the hope of being awarded plum postings or partaking in corrupt 
transactions. Consequently, the unholy nexus between corrupt politicians, 
private contractors and favour-seeking bureaucrats contributes to an enormous 
wastage of public resources and continued misery for Malawian citizens. 
Nonetheless, political disinterest can also be lethal in that, without sustained 
political support, civil servants do not possess the power and infl uence to 
implement policies or radically change or adapt policies which have inherent 
weaknesses. There is thus a greater need for civil servants (as implementers) to 
provide critical and regular feedback to politicians (as policymakers) without the 
fear of reprisals. It is the lack of such contact (or the fear of providing critical and 
honest feedback) between policymakers and implementers that often explains 
implementation failure in many developing countries.
Emerging donors provide fl exibility and a way out of the traditional 
conditionality trap
Malawi has a long history of being dependent on external actors (mainly Western 
donors and multilateral organisations) who have traditionally made substantial 
contributions to the country’s national budget in addition to providing support at 
project and programme levels. However, fi nancial support from these donors has 
often come with certain strings attached: demands for good governance, tolerance 
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of dissent, combating corruption, focus on gender equality, respect for gay rights, 
etc. Many African governments have, in recent years, expressed frustration over 
the growing list of donor demands and conditionalities. Indeed, some governments 
(e.g. Malawi under President Bingu wa Mutharika) have accused Western donors 
of pursuing a development agenda contrary to the actual needs of the nation. 
Accordingly, there is a feeling in many quarters that Western aid agencies do not 
practice what they preach and that the Western experience of development and 
poverty reduction does not appear very relevant to solving problems in aid 
recipient countries.
In recent years, however, a new set of donors – from so-called emerging 
countries of the South – have made their presence felt in Africa. In particular 
China, but also India, Brazil and many other Asian donors, are interacting in 
numerous ways with countries in sub-Saharan Africa, including through so-called 
South–South dialogues. Such developments not only provide emerging countries 
with access to natural resources, in addition to new and growing markets, but 
they also tend to reduce the dependence of African countries on traditional forms 
of aid from the West. Emerging countries and their policies thus represent a 
counterweight to the policies and development aid models of the West that have 
for long been promoted directly or indirectly (e.g. through multilateral 
institutions) in poor countries.
Although China is a new donor in Malawi, it has already made its presence felt 
in many sectors. Indeed, Chinese foreign aid and investments have contributed 
signifi cantly to addressing macro-level national and community problems. 
Chinese assistance, based on principles of ‘win–win’ and ‘mutual respect’, is often 
very ‘visible’ as the emphasis has traditionally been on infrastructure projects as 
opposed to, for example, budget aid, which has been the preferred option for 
Western donors. The downside of China’s activities in Malawi primarily relate to 
the inability of local businesses to compete with the Chinese, the quality and 
durability of infrastructure projects, disagreements between the Malawian and 
Chinese governments regarding who should cover the high costs of maintaining 
the Chinese-built infrastructure projects and secrecy around the Chinese aid 
management system. There have also been concerns in some quarters about 
China’s ‘neo-colonist’ aspirations and that the Chinese tend to benefi t more than 
African countries.
Despite some very valid concerns, an important conclusion is that despite the 
rhetoric often found in Western media outlets, there is very little evidence to 
indicate that Western donors and the Chinese are competing in Malawi. Rather, 
the picture that emerges is that Western donors accept that they and China are 
involved in very different sectors and very different types of activities. Indeed, 
Chinese aid in Malawi primarily focuses on the neglected and ‘orphan’ sectors 
such as infrastructure and energy. In addition, the spill-over effects of macro-
oriented projects initiated by the Chinese government and private sector 
companies have resulted in a rapid growth of small and medium-scale business 
enterprises run by Chinese nationals in urban and semi-urban areas. Such 
enterprises are providing local communities with access to a large range of 
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Chinese products (albeit some of poor quality) at affordable prices. The presence 
of China has added a new dimension to the development agenda as many African 
leaders openly express their frustration over the inability of Western donors to 
provide aid related to infrastructure development. African governments have 
now greater fl exibility in fi nancing their needs, and are in a better position to play 
the fi eld – requesting different types of assistance from different categories of 
donors and well-wishers.
The way ahead
Many democracies in the developing world appear to fulfi l the procedural 
requirements of democracy although the actual functioning of the system is often 
detrimental to the needs of the large majority of the population who continue to 
live in poverty. Thus, the challenge for democracies is not merely to achieve 
economic growth but to also undertake successful interventions aimed at 
redistributing the benefi ts of growth in order to reduce poverty and address 
growing inequality. It is against this backdrop that this volume has revisited broad 
theoretical and practical assumptions on the relationship between democracy, 
development and poverty reduction. Democracies must re-examine the reasons 
that explain their limited success in providing social welfare. This not only 
includes revisiting the ability to formulate and implement public policy, but also 
how such policies are fi nanced. For example, while a major form of accumulating 
public resources is through taxation, most developing countries face the problem 
of whom to tax (e.g. due to the presence of a large unorganised sector), the 
appropriate level of taxation, and how tax revenue can be collected effi ciently. 
The general consensus for many years has been that democracy has a greater 
impact on development and poverty reduction in less patrimonial societies. In 
sub-Saharan Africa, this requires radical political and administrative reforms 
aimed at reducing the impact of patrimonialism and increasing the effectiveness 
of democratic political institutions. While it is unrealistic to expect that such 
reforms will be implemented overnight, recent events in Malawi as well as in 
many other African countries provide hope that change will indeed take place 
even if the pace of reforms may at fi rst appear to be slow.
Index
Locators in bold refer to chapter notes
Locators in italic refer to fi gures/tables
50–50 campaign: fi led as spelled out
accountability 188, 190, 192; and 
decentralisation 95, 97; democratic 
62–3, 172; government 9, 64, 81; and 
parliamentary oversight 133, 134, 
136–8, 144; public service 91
activism, political 9, 179–80
adjudicatory powers, judicialisation of 
politics 65
administration: infrastructure 77, 82, 194; 
and politics dichotomy 78–80, 92–3
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights of Women in Africa 175
Africa, general context 1, 2, 3, 5
Afrobarometer survey 19, 32n3, 137, 
184n1; consolidation of democracy 6; 
demand and supply framework 30; 
demand for democracy 24, 24, 25, 27, 
29, 29; gender equality 170, 183–4; 
perceived quality of democracy 22–3, 
23
age factors, demand for democracy 25, 28, 
29
agricultural sector wide approach 
(ASWAp) 117
agricultural technology demonstration 
centres (ATDCs) 156
agriculture: Chinese model of foreign aid 
153, 157; economic performance 149; 
fertilizer subsidy programme 119–21; 
political history overview 38, see also 
youth unemployment
Aid Atlas, Malawi Government 150
Alliance for Democracy 45
Anang, R. 114
Andrews, M. 2
answerability, parliamentary oversight 
issue 135, 144
Anti-Corruption Bureau 139, 142
appointment of public servants 84–5, 194
Arab Spring 3
Assets Declaration Bill 141
ASWAp (agricultural sector wide 
approach) 117
ATDCs (agricultural technology 
demonstration centres) 156
attitudinal view of democratic 
consolidation 17, 21–4, 23, see also 
support for democracy
Auditor General’s Offi ce 142
authoritarianism 189, 190; Chinese model 
of foreign aid 152; and consolidation of 
democracy 15, 16, 17, 21, 22, 24–6, 26, 
28; political history overview 37, 38, 
39, see also one-party rule
autocracy 9, 18, 19, 21, 25
Banda, Aleke 37
Banda, Hastings Kamuzu 44–5, 53, 169, 
190; political history overview 36, 37, 
38, 40; public service 77, see also 
Malawi Congress Party
Banda, Joyce 15, 18, 22, 43, 47–8; gender 
equality 182–3; parliamentary oversight 
issue 134, 141; political ideology 51; 
public service 86, see also People’s Party
Banda v Banda case 63
Beijing Platform for Action 172
Bennel, P. 117
Bill of Rights, political history overview 
37, 38, 45
198 Index
Bingu International Conference Centre 
163, see also Mutharika, Bingu wa
bishops of Malawi, pastoral letter 37–8, 45
Bratton, M. 18, 18, 19, 25, 26
Brazil, foreign aid 3, 147, 150, 152, 195
British Central Africa Protectorate 35
Budget and Finance Committee (BFC) 
138, 144, 145n1, 192
budget defi cits 149
Busan Partnership for Effective 
Development Cooperation 150
Business Licensing Act (2012) 161–2
CAADP (Comprehensive African 
Agriculture Development Programme) 
117
cabinet crisis, Malawi Congress Party 37, 
45
CABS (Common Budgetary Support 
Group) 149–50, 163
career service model, public service 79
Cashgate scandal 18, 32n2, 190; demand 
for democracy 28; and foreign aid 
149–50, 163–4; measures of 
democratisation 22; parliamentary 
oversight issue 134, 137, 141, 142
Catholic bishops of Malawi, pastoral letter 
37–8, 45
CCAM (Chitukuko Cha Amayi 
muMalawi) 169
CDF (Constituency Development Fund) 
103–6, 104
CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination 
of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women) 169
Centre for Multiparty Democracy (CMD) 
35







China–Africa Development Fund 154
China–Malawi–UNDP Disaster 
Management and Risk Reduction 
project 154
Chinese model of foreign aid 2, 9–10, 143, 
147–8, 150–2, 164–5, 188, 195–6; 
fi nance and technical gap 154–5; 
infrastructure development 154–60, 
157–9; non-interference policy 161–4; 
rising importance in Malawi 152–4
Chinsinga, B. 115
Chipembere, Henry 36, 37
Chirwa, D. 112, 114, 119
Chirwa, Orton 36, 37, 44
Chisiza, Dunduzu 36
Chisiza, Yatuta 37
Chitukuko Cha Amayi muMalawi 
(CCAM) 169
citizen-centric view of democracy 
consolidation 17
citizen participation 5
citizenship, judicialisation of politics 62, 
63
civil servants 188, 190, 194; foreign aid 
151; judicialisation of politics 60; 
parliamentary oversight 137, 141; 
political parties 39, 45, 47; public 
service 75, 78, 82–5, 89, 91, 92
Civil Society Agriculture Network 
(CISANET), 117
clientilism 62, 63, 65, 97, 119, 191
CMD (Centre for Multiparty Democracy) 
35
colonialism, legacy 35–6, 37, 77
committee system, parliamentary oversight 
issue 136, 138–40
Common Budgetary Support Group 
(CABS) 149–50, 163
community development 75, 77, 92, 99
complementarity, Chinese model of 
foreign aid 148
Comprehensive African Agriculture 
Development Programme (CAADP) 
117
consolidation of democracy, see democracy 
consolidation
Constituency Development Fund (CDF) 
103–6, 104
Constitutions: of 1964 37; of 1966 38; of 
1994 57, 60, 63, 65, 78, 134, 137
consumer spending 149
context specifi city: development 2; public 
service 76
Convention on the Elimination of all 
Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) 169
corruption: consolidation of democracy 
18; and foreign aid 149, 161; 
judicialisation of politics 65; 
parliamentary oversight issue 9, 139, 
140–2; public service 79, 87, 88, 91, 
149, see also Cashgate scandal
court practice in Malawi, judicialisation of 
politics 59–61
Index 199
critical junctures, consolidation of 
democracy 17–18, 189–90
critical legal studies movement 59
critical mass, gender equality 175
cultural homogenisation narrative 170–1, 
178–9, 184; 50–50 campaign 174–6; 
media roles 173–4
customary law 63
data sources, democratic consolidation 15, 
19
DDF (District Development Fund) 101
De Gobbi, M. 114
decentralisation 7, 8, 95–6, see also fi scal 
decentralisation
defi nitions: development 2–3; informal 
institutions/informalisation 57, 62; 
judicialisation of politics 59; political 
parties 41–2; public service 81
demand and supply framework, democratic 
transition 19, 24, 24–31
democracy: and development 1–4, 18, 188; 
and gender equality 171–3, 174; model 
of regime consolidation 18, 19, see also 
support for democracy
democracy consolidation 15–16, 31–2, 
189–92; conceptualizations 16–18; 
data 15, 19; economic performance 
28, 29, 29–30; human resource 
management 87; measures of 
democratisation 19–22, 20, 22; 
model of regime consolidation 18, 
18–19; perceived quality of 
democracy 22–3, 23, see also 
demand and supply framework; 
democratic transition
democratic accountability 62–3, see also 
accountability
democratic governance 4, 7, 62–3, 145
Democratic People’s Party 43, 134, 176, 
182, see also People’s Party
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 35, 
46–8, 50–1; corruption 141; 
participation in parliamentary elections 
44; results from parliamentary elections 
45, see also Mutharika, Bingu wa
democratic transition 4, 5, 6–7, 10, 189; 
challenges to multiparty democracy 
142–4, 145; future prospects 196; and 
parliamentary oversight 133–4; 
political history overview 40, see also 
democracy consolidation
demotion, public servants 86–7
Denmark, foreign aid 149
Department of Human Resource 
Management and Development 
(DHRMD) 77, 144
development: defi nition/concept of 2–3; 
and democracy 1–4, 18, 188; factors 
that characterize successful 3; as 
freedom concept 39; inclusive 10, 57, 
58, 66–8, 69; and poverty 147, 188, see 
also foreign aid
devolution 98–100, 99, see also 
decentralisation
dichotomist rhetoric: politics and 
administration 78–80, 92–3; politics 
and law 59–61, 66
digital technologies 3
Director of Public Prosecution 139
discipline, public servants 88–9
discussion, political, female participation 
in 179, 180
distribution of income, as defi nition of 
development 3
District Development Fund (DDF) 101
district resource allocation, fi scal 
decentralisation 106–8
doctrine of necessity, judicialisation of 
politics 61
dominant executive 134–6, 139, 140, 
142–4, 192, see also parliamentary 
oversight issue
donors, see foreign aid 95,
DPP, see Democratic Progressive Party
drought 81
Dunn, N. 82
economic growth: defi nition/concepts 2, 3; 
redistribution of benefi ts of 2, 4, see also 
sustainable growth and development
economic performance: and consolidation 
of democracy 6, 18, 28; demand for 
democracy 28, 29, 29–30; historical 
overview 38–9; and poverty 147
Economics Association of Malawi 160
education 3; Chinese model of foreign aid 
153; and demand for democracy 16, 25, 
26, 29; devolution of services 99; 
political history overview 38; 
propaganda 47
Edwin Ingelesi Ganya v James Goodson 
Ganya et al. case 63
elections, free, fair and credible 4
elites, see ruling elites
employment status, and demand for 
democracy 25, 26, 28, see also youth 
unemployment
200 Index
enforcement, parliamentary oversight issue 
135
environmental services, devolution and 
expenditure assignments 99
ethnicity 49, 53, 191
executive dominance 134–6, 139, 140, 
142–4, 192, see also parliamentary 
oversight issue
farm input subsidy programme (FISP) 47, 
119–21, 139
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 36, 
44
feminist legal theories 59
50–50 campaign 10, 170, 184; cultural 
homogenisation narrative 174–6; 
general elections 176–7; media 
coverage 181–2; media taskforce 178; 
non-governmental organisations 
182–3; political party commitment 
182; short-termism 183, see also gender 
equality
Finance Bank of Malawi 138
fi scal decentralisation 95, 109–10, 193; 
Constituency Development Fund 
103–6, 104; devolution and 
expenditure assignments 98–100, 99; 
district resource allocation 106–8; 
intergovernmental fi scal transfer system 
100–3; and political economy 96–8; 
public service delivery 108–9, 109
fi sheries, devolution and expenditure 
assignments 99
FISP (farm input subsidy programme) 47, 
119–21,139
fl oor-crossing provision 46–7, 134, 138, 
139, 141, 192
FOCAC (Forum on China–Africa 
Cooperation) 151, 154–5
focus group discussion (FGD), youth 
unemployment 121, 127n5
food security 116, 119, 126, 153; fertilizer 
subsidy programme 119–20; 
policymaking 76, 81
foreign aid 9, 9–10, 147–8, 188; and 
democratization 3; donor demands and 
conditionalities 95, 103, 194–5; 
emerging sources 150–2, 194–6; 
historical perspectives 148–50; and 
poverty reduction 76, 147–8; World 
Bank 76, 102, 103, see also Chinese 
model of foreign aid
forestry, devolution and expenditure 
assignments 99
Forum on China–Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC) 151, 154–5
Fourth World Conference on Women 
172
fragmentation: party system 134; service 
delivery 95
Freedom House index of democracy 15, 
19–21, 20, 32n7
friendship, Chinese model of foreign aid 9, 
151, 154
GDP per capita 148
gender equality 10, 169–71, 183–4, 193–4; 
cultural homogenisation narrative 
173–4, 178–9, 184; and democracy 
171–3; leadership 180–1; media 
taskforce 178; participation in political 
discussions and public affairs 179; 
political activism 179–80, see also 
50–50 campaign
Gender Equality Act (2012) 179
General Resource Fund (GRF) 101
Germany, foreign aid 149
Gini coeffi cient, inequality 5
good governance 1, 2, 3, 4
governance 1, 2, 3, 4, 7
government accountability, see 
accountability
GRF (General Resource Fund) 101
Group Village Headman Kakopa et al. v 
Chilozi et al. case 63–4
growth, see economic growth
Hayes, W. 82
health services, see medical care




High Commissioner 87, 139
high courts 57, see also judicialisation of 
politics
historical perspectives, political parties 
35–40
HIV/AIDS 76, 81, 117, 153
human development index (UNDP) 3, 
172
human resource management, public 
service 75, 83–91, 93
human rights 3, 4; Chinese model of 
foreign aid 152; development as 
freedom concept 39; judicialisation of 
politics 7, 58, 63, 65, 66; political 
history overview 38
Index 201
hybrid regimes 16; consolidation of 
democracy 31; model of regime 
consolidation 18, 19
Hyden, G. 5
Ibrahim Index of African Governance 
(IIAG) 15, 19, 21–2, 22
ideology, political parties 35, 40, 41, 
48–53, 191
If Women Counted video 171
IFMIS (integrated fi nancial management 
information system) 139
ILO (International Labour Organization) 
116
inclusive development 10, 57, 58, 66–8, 
69
inclusiveness, democratic ideal of 172
independence (1963) 36
India, foreign aid 150, 195
inequality, Gini coeffi cient 5, see also 
poverty; redistribution
informality/informalisation of politics 5, 7, 
191–2; judicialisation of politics 57, 58, 
62–8; parliamentary oversight 133
infrastructure projects, Chinese model of 
foreign aid 148, 153, 154–60, 157–9
Inglehart, R. 171
Inspector General of Police 139
integrated fi nancial management 
information system (IFMIS) 139
interaction school, politics and 
administration dichotomy 80
internalization of democratic attitudes 17
International Labour Organization (ILO) 
116
International Monetary Fund 148
international relationships, successful 3
irrigation, Chinese model of foreign aid 
153
iterative approach 2
jobs, public service 84–5, 194
Joughin, J. 118
judicialisation of politics 7, 57–9, 68–9, 
191–2; court practice in Malawi 59–61; 
inclusive development 57, 58, 66–8, 





Law Enforcement Offi ce of the Police 142
lawlessness, democratic transition 78
LDF-TST, see Local Development Fund 
Technical Support Team
leadership roles: gender equality 180–1; 
political parties 42; public service 91
Legal Affairs Committee 137, 139, 140
legal frameworks: parliamentary oversight 
issue 135; political parties 7
legal positivism 68
legislative council 36, 54n4
legislature 9; and executive relationship 
134–6, 139, 140, 142–4, 192, see also 
parliamentary oversight issue
letter by Catholic bishops of Malawi 37–8, 
45
Levitsky, S. 57, 62–3
life expectancy at birth, defi nitions of 
development 3
Likhubula youth club 118
Linz, J. 17
lip service for democracy 19, 25
Lipset, Seymour Martin 1
literacy 3, 47, see also education
liveable life conditions 2
‘Living our Faith’ (pastoral letter by 
Catholic bishops of Malawi) 37–8, 45
Local Development Fund Technical 
Support Team (LDF-TST) 102
local development funds 101
local government decentralisation 8, 109, 
see also fi scal decentralisation
Local Government Act 64, 98, 100, 106, 
108
Making Malawi Work (GoM) 93
Malawi Civil Service Commission 84
Malawi Congress Party (MCP) 35, 44–5, 
46, 190; agricultural policy 116; gender 
equality 169; participation in 
parliamentary elections 44; political 
history overview 36, 37, 38; political 
ideology 49–50; results from 
parliamentary elections 45, see also 
Banda, Hastings Kamuzu
Malawi Decentralization Policy 100
Malawi Development Cooperation 
Strategy 162–3
Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC) 139
Malawi Government Aid Atlas 150
Malawi Growth and Development 
Strategy (MGDS) 66, 76, 117, 153
Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy 76, 
117
Malawi Public Service Regulations 88, 89
202 Index
Malawi Rural Development Fund 
(MARDEF) 138
Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF) 
102
Malawi University of Science and 
Technology (MUST) 160
Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP) 38, 
115–16, 121, 126
management, see administration
manifestos, political parties 52, 191; 
Democratic Progressive Party 50, 51; 
Malawi Congress Party 49, 50; People’s 
Party 51; political ideology 41; United 
Democratic Front 50
Maputo Declaration on Agriculture and 
Food Security 119
MARDEF (Malawi Rural Development 
Fund) 138
Marxist legal theories 59
MASAF (Malawi Social Action Fund) 
102
Mattes, R. 18, 19
Mbwana v Kanthiti case 63
MCP, see Malawi Congress Party
measures of democratisation 19–22, 20, 22
MEC (Malawi Electoral Commission) 
139
media roles 188, 193; gender equality 10, 
170–4, 181–2
media taskforce, gender equality 178
medical care: Chinese model of foreign aid 
153; devolution of 99
Methodist Relief and Development Fund 
114
MGDS, see Malawi Growth and 
Development Strategy
MIIAG, see Ibrahim Index of African 
Governance (IIAG)
military rule 16; demand for 25, 26, 27, 27
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
6
Minister of Local Government 86
ministers 89–91, 92; public service 75, 
80–3; recruitment 137
Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security 
139
Ministry of Commerce of the People’s 
Republic of China (MOFCOM) 151
Ministry of Economic Planning and 
Development 76
Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning 102
Ministry of Women and Child 
Development (MoWCD) 170, 176
Ministry of Youth Development and 
Sports (MoYDS) 125
mirror representation, gender equality 
174–5, 175
misconduct, public servants 88–9
model of regime consolidation, democratic 
transition 18, 18–19
morale, public service 8, 90, 92
Moving with a Bag of Money campaign 
140–1
Mpinganjira, Brown 43
MPs 46, 47, 48, 192; fi scal decentralisation 
98, 100, 103–9; judicialisation of 
politics 67; parliamentary oversight 
issue 134, 137–41, 143, 144; youth 
unemployment 125
multiparty democracy 7, 40, 192; model 
42; parliamentary oversight issue 133, 
142–4; public service 76, see also 
democratic transition
Muluzi, Atupele 50
Muluzi, Bakili 15, 21, 43, 45, 46; 
consolidation of democracy 23, 26, 
27–8, 31; fi scal decentralisation 98, see 
also United Democratic Front
MUST (Malawi University of Science and 
Technology) 160
Mutharika, Bingu wa 43, 45, 46, 47, 
145n2, 189; authoritarian tendencies 
17; and democracy consolidation 15, 
17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 27, 28; foreign aid 
149; parliamentary oversight issue 134, 
138, 139, 140, 141, see also Democratic 
Progressive Party
Mutharika, Peter 18, 31, 47; Chinese 
model of foreign aid 152, 154, 156, 
159; and democracy consolidation 18, 
31; fi scal decentralisation 98; political 
history overview 40; political ideology 
50
mutual respect, Chinese model of foreign 
aid 9, 151
Muwalo, Albert 37
MYP (Malawi Young Pioneers) 38, 
115–16, 121, 126
NAC (Nyasaland Africa Congress) 36, 44
National Audit Offi ce 104, 138
National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 43
National Governing Council (NGC) 
50–1
National Local Government Finance 
Committee (NLGFC) 101, 102
National Statistics Offi ce (NSO) 114
Index 203
National Technical Working Group 
(NTWG) 177
National Youth Council of Malawi 
(NYCoM) 125
neo-colonialism, Chinese aid 152, 195
neo-liberal agenda 4
neo-patrimonialism 9, 62, 63, 65, 67
New Public Management (NPM) 
movement 80
NGO Gender Coordinating Network 
(NGOGCN) 170, 176–8, 183
NLGFC, see National Local Government 
Finance Committee
NPM (New Public Management) 
movement 80
non-governmental organisations (NGOs): 
50–50 campaign 182–3; fi scal 
decentralisation 107; foreign aid 163, 
164; parliamentary oversight issue 9; 
policymaking 82; political history 
overview 38
non-interference, Chinese model of 
foreign aid 9, 151, 161–4
Northcote– Trevelyan Report (1854) 77, 
79
Norway, foreign aid 149
Norwegian Agency for Development 
Cooperation (NORAD) 6
Norwegian Programme for Capacity 
Development in Higher Education and 
Research for Development (NORHED) 
6
Nseula v The Attorney General case 65
NSO (National Statistics Offi ce) 114
NTWG (National Technical Working 
Group) 177
nutrition disorders, Chinese model of 
foreign aid 153
Nyambi v Kambalame case 63
Nyasaland Africa Congress (NAC) 36, 
44
Nyasaland Order in Council, 
constitutional framework 35
NYCoM (National Youth Council of 
Malawi) 125
O’Donnell, G. 16–17
Offi ce of the Auditor General 142
Offi ce of the President and Cabinet, 
Department of Human Resource 
Management and Development 77
Offi cial Development Assistance (ODA) 
147
one China principle 153
one-man rule, demand for 16, 25, 26, 27, 
27
one-party culture 5, 133–5, see also 
parliamentary oversight
one-party rule 16; demand for 25, 25, 26, 
27, 27; political history overview 37, 
38, 39, see also authoritarianism
operational related transactions (ORT), 
fi scal decentralisation 103
opportunity, Chinese model of foreign aid 
148
oversight issue, see parliamentary oversight 
issue
PAC (Public Affairs Committee) 142
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
162
parliamentary oversight issue 9, 133–5, 
144–5, 192; accountability 137–8, 
144–5; challenges to multiparty 
democracy 142–4, 145; committee 
system 134, 136, 138–40; corruption 
140–2; legislature–executive 
relationship 135–6, 139, 140, 142, 192
Parliamentary Service Commission (PSC) 
143–4
participation, democratic 4, 5, 7, 8; 
decentralisation 95, 99; democratic 
transition 21; female 10, 170, 178, 179, 
180, 183; judicialisation of politics 58; 
parliamentary oversight 133; youth 
113, 117, 124
pastoral letter, Catholic bishops of 
Malawi) 37–8, 45
patriarchy 170–1, 174, 176, see also gender 
equality
patrimonialism 39, 194, 196, see also 
neo-patrimonialism
patronage 191; Chinese model of foreign 
aid 152; and fi scal decentralisation 97
People’s Party (PP) 35, 43, 47, 48, 134; 
corruption 150; participation in 
parliamentary elections 44; political 
ideology 51; results from parliamentary 
elections 45, see also Banda, Joyce
perceived quality of democracy 22–3, 23, 
see also support for democracy
policymaking 1, 194; and fi scal 
decentralisation 96; political parties 41, 
49, 53; politics and administration 
dichotomy 78, 80; public service 81–3
political activism 9, 179–80
political culture, one-party, see one-party 
culture
204 Index
political discussion, female participation 
179, 180
political economy, and fi scal 
decentralisation 96–8
political ideology, political parties 35, 40, 
41, 48–53, 191
political parties 7, 35, 53, 190; defi nitions/
conceptualisations 41–2; emergence of 
major parties 43, 44–8, 45; functioning 
51–3; gender equality 182; political 
history overview 35–40; political 
ideology 35, 40, 41, 48–53; results from 
parliamentary elections 44, see also 
Democratic Progressive Party; Malawi 
Congress Party; People’s Party; United 
Democratic Front
Political Parties (Registration and 
Regulation) Act (PPRRA) 42–3, 
190–1
political school, politics and 
administration dichotomy 78, 79
political settlement 2, 35, 39, 53, 189–91
politics/administration dichotomy 78–80, 
92–3
Polity Index 15, 19, 20, 20–1, 32n8
polygamy 65
potential, Chinese model of foreign aid 
148
Poulton, C. 118
poverty 3–5, 9, 188; and demand for 
democracy 26, 28, 29; and 
development 147; and foreign aid 
147–8; public service 81; top-down 
approaches 193–4
Poverty Alleviation Programme 117
PP, see People’s Party
Press Corporation 38
principal secretaries (PSs) 75, 80–3, 
89–91, 92; human resource 
management 84, 85, 87, 88
promotion, public servants 85–6
propaganda, Democratic Progressive Party 
47
pro-poor governance 4
Przeworski, A. 1, 4, 17
PSC (Parliamentary Service Commission) 
143–4
Public Accounts Committee 138, 141, 
144, 192
public affairs, women’s participation 179, 
180
Public Affairs Committee (PAC) 142
public amenities, , devolution and 
expenditure assignments 99
Public Appointments Committee of 
Parliament 139, 141
public perceived quality of democracy 
22–3, 23, see also support for 
democracy
public policy, see policymaking
public service 7, 8, 75–8, 91–3, 193; 
context specifi city 76; corruption 
149; decentralisation 96, 108–9, 
109; human resource management 
83–91, 93; ministers and principal 
secretaries 75, 80–3; politics and 
administration dichotomy 78–80, 
92–3; recruitment, selection and 
appointment 194
Public Service Act (1994) 77–8
Public Service Commission 77, 84, 89
Public Service Review Commission 88
public support for democracy, see support 
for democracy
quotas, gender, see 50–50 campaign
Radelet, S. 3
Ranny, A. 41
recruitment, public servants 84–5, 194
redistribution: benefi ts of growth 2, 4; 
wealth 3
referendum (1993) 25, 28, 42, 45
resolutions, Malawi Congress Party 49
resource allocation 90; fi scal 
decentralisation 96, 102, 103, 105, 
106–8, 193
respect, Chinese model of foreign aid 9, 
151
revenue sharing, fi scal decentralisation 
100–3
roads: devolution 99; infrastructure 
development 76, 151, 153, 157–9
rubber stamp legislation 33n9, 36, 64, 
84–5, 93; fi scal decentralisation 100–3, 
120, 127n5; legislature–executive 
relationship 136; parliamentary 
oversight issue 9
rule of law 7, 21, 133, 141, 144; 
judicialisation of politics 58, 59, 62, 63, 
64
ruling elites, political 4, 6, 190; 
decentralisation 95, 97; political 
history overview 40; political parties 
38, 39, 52, 53; public service 75, 79, 
194; youth unemployment 118
rural development, Chinese model of 
foreign aid 153
Index 205
rural Malawians, demand for democracy 
16, 25, 26, 28, 29
Southern Africa Gender Protocol Alliance 
175–6, 183
Save the Children 38
Schedler, A. 17
selection, public servants 84–5, 194
Sen, A. 1, 39
separation of powers principle 138
separation school, politics and 
administration dichotomy 78–9
settlement, political 2, 35, 39, 53, 189–91
Shively, W. P. 41
short-termism: 50–50 campaign 183; 
gender equality 194
Skills Development Initiative, Technical 
Entrepreneurship and Vocational 
Education and Training Authority 123
Skinner Commission (1964) 77
Skinner Report: political history overview 
37
SOs (Standing Orders of Parliament) 138, 
140
soccer stadiums 156
socio-demographic factors: demand for 
democracy 25, 28, 28–9, 29; 
judicialisation of politics 68
stadium diplomacy 156
stagnation, democratisation 15–16, 19, 31; 
demand and supply framework 19, 24, 
30–1; measures of democratisation 20, 
21, 22; perceived quality of democracy 
23
Standing Orders, parliamentary oversight 
issue 138, 140
State v The President of the Republic of 
Malawi case 60
The State v Speaker of the National Assembly 
et al. case 65–6
The State v The Minister of Finance and the 
Secretary to the Treasury case 60
‘Statement of Development Policies’ 76
Stepan, A. 17
street services, , devolution and 
expenditure assignments 99
‘Strengthening capacity for democratic 
and economic governance in Malawi’ 
project 6
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), 
agricultural policy 116
succession politics 47
supply and demand, see demand and 
supply framework
support for democracy 15–16, 190; 
authoritarianism 26; demand and 
supply framework 19, 24–9; 
internalization of democratic attitudes 
and values 17; lip service 19, 25; 
measures of democratisation 21; 
perceived quality of democracy 22–3, 
23
Supreme Court ruling, parliamentary 
oversight issue 139–40
survey data 6, see also Afrobarometer 
survey
sustainable growth and development 1, 2, 
7, 10, 21, 40, 43, 76; agricultural 113, 
120, 121, 125
Svasand, L. 15
taxation 135, 196, see also fi scal 
decentralisation
technical aid, Chinese model 154–5
Technical Entrepreneurship and 
Vocational Education and Training 
Authority (TEVETA) 112, 118, 123, 
126n1
Tembo, John 37
The State v Speaker of the National Assembly 
et al. case 65–6
The State v The Minister of Finance and the 
Secretary to the Treasury case 60
Third Term Bill 141
third term issue 45, 134, 189, 192; 
democratic consolidation 17, 21, 26, 
27; and foreign aid 149; and 
parliamentary oversight 134, 138, 141
tobacco 149
‘top-down’ approaches 173, 189, 193–4
training initiatives 112, 115–16, 118, 123, 
126n1, 156
transfers, public servants 87–8
transition to democracy, see democratic 
transition
transparency 190; Chinese model of 
foreign aid 151, 152; and 
democracy 172; and parliamentary 
oversight 133
transport infrastructure 76, 151, 153, 
157–9
tribalism 191
United Democratic Front (UDF) 35, 43, 
45–6; participation in parliamentary 
elections 44; political ideology 50; 
results from parliamentary elections 45, 
see also Muluzi, Bakili
206 Index
United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) 3, 172
urban vs. rural Malawians, demand for 
democracy 16, 25, 26, 28, 29
Valle, F. 112, 118
Van Donge, J. 40
video If Women Counted 171
Vision 2020 76, 117
Wade, Abdoulay 151
watchdog institutions 9
water services: Chinese model of foreign 
aid 153; devolution 99
Weber, Max 78
welfare economics 97
western orthodoxy 1, 189; foreign aid 2, 4, 
9, 151, 194–6
Wilson, W. 78
win–win Chinese model of foreign aid 9, 
151
women: demand for democracy 16, 25, 26, 
28, 29; equality see gender equality
Women’s Environment and Development 
Organization (WEDO) 175
Women’s Lawyers Association of Malawi 
177
World Bank 76, 102, 103, 116
Yambo-Odotte, D. 171, 172
Youth Development Credit Scheme 
(YDCS) 113, 121, 122–3, 126
Youth Enterprise Development Fund 
(YEDEF) 113, 121, 122, 122–3, 126
Youth Job Creation Initiative (YJCI) 113, 
123–5
Youth League 38, 54n1
youth unemployment 7–9, 112–15, 126, 
193; agricultural policy 115–18, 119; 
fertilizer subsidy programme 119–21; 
initiatives to address 113, 122–5; 
structural constraints 125
